Ahmed al-Sharaa Comes to Power
Just three months after the sudden seizure of power on December 8th last year, which led to the downfall of the Bashar al-Assad regime and stunned the international community, former jihadist Abu Mohammad al-Julani, now Ahmed al-Sharaa, has embarked on the difficult task of rebuilding the Syrian state. The new authorities face two formidable challenges: establishing internal peace and preserving the country’s territorial integrity.
Ahmed al-Sharaa is attempting to improve his image to gain the support of Western embassies, particularly that of the United States, and to lift economic sanctions. However, the composition of his new cabinet, announced on March 29th, has raised concerns. Apart from a Christian woman (Hind Kabawat) in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, an Alawite (Yarub Badr) in the Ministry of Transportation, a Druze (Amgad Badr) in the Ministry of Agriculture, and a Kurd (Mohammad Turko) in the Ministry of Education (who is not affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces), key ministries have been assigned to close associates of the new leader in Damascus and extremist Sunnis.
Concerns of Local Stakeholders
The announcement of this new government elicited a strong reaction from the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), also known as Rojava. This administration declared that the new government “does not reflect the country’s diversity,” and its members do not feel like “adhering to the decisions and directives issued by such a government.”
Is it possible that the DAANES will question the March 10th agreement with the new Syrian leader and commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi? This agreement, which envisions the integration of Kurds into the new Syrian government in exchange for guarantees of their rights, does not consider the Lebanese-style confessional structure of power-sharing based on religion.
Given that the Kurdish-controlled region in Syria (Rojava) encompasses nearly one-third of Syrian territory and possesses rich oil resources, the normalization of relations between Damascus and the DAANES is essential for preserving the country’s territorial integrity. In this regard, Ahmed al-Sharaa, at the National Dialogue on February 25th, emphasized his determination to dissolve militias and integrate them into a regular army.
Although, according to the March 10th agreement, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which played a significant role in the fight against ISIS, are to join the army, the precise details of this integration remain unclear and will likely depend on the country’s security developments and how minorities who had good relations with the Assad regime are treated, primarily since the Rojava region hosts refugee camps and prisons where many former jihadists are held.
The massacre of over a hundred Alawites in the coastal regions of western Syria by Sunni militias and supporters of the new government in early March and the continuation of arbitrary arrests have deeply worried Syrian minorities. Ultimately, internal peace depends on the will and ability of the new leader in Damascus to guarantee the security of minorities.
Syria also faces the intervention of regional powers seeking to exploit the country’s internal weakness. While the government is under the strain of international sanctions, it has become reliant on Erdogan’s Türkiye to maintain its army. Türkiye, having benefited from reducing Iranian influence, is expanding its own. Turkish military presence is mainly concentrated in the Jarabulus–Idlib axis in northwestern Syria and, to some extent, in the areas between Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, close to the territories controlled by the DAANES.
Interests of Regional Players
Türkiye, which has consistently supported Syrian rebels opposed to Bashar al-Assad, has now established close relations with the Ahmed al-Sharaa government and intends to gain greater military control over the country by establishing military bases, including near Aleppo and Homs. However, Israel, pleased with the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime (Iran’s conduit for supporting Hezbollah), strongly opposes such plans by Türkiye and demands the complete demilitarization of southern Syria.
Tel Aviv is also concerned that Syrian infrastructure and military equipment will fall into the hands of groups even more extremist than the Ahmed al-Sharaa government, as Syrian national unity remains fragile and uncertain, especially given the presence of foreign jihadists in the country. Israel is trying to eliminate the remaining Syrian military capabilities and continues its airstrikes around Damascus and incursions into border areas in the Golan Heights, leading to bloody clashes with residents.
Although Syrian and Turkish officials have condemned Israel’s actions, their reactions and responses remain cautious. The Syrian army cannot confront Israel and fears the escalation of conflicts, which would hinder the lifting of sanctions. Türkiye’s primary focus remains on the Kurdish issue and the Syrian Democratic Forces, which it considers an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK (a party Türkiye has been in conflict with for over 40 years).
The new Syrian president finds himself in a difficult predicament. On the one hand, he needs Türkiye’s military assistance to maintain territory, and on the other, he must contend with Israel’s reaction to Ankara’s ambitions. Concurrently with Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington on April 7th, President Trump announced that he would use his good relations with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to de-escalate tensions. Furthermore, Washington has presented Damascus with a list of conditions necessary for lifting sanctions, the fulfillment of which will play a decisive role in the potential success of the new government.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.
Bahram P. Kalviri is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India. His research interests focus on the Middle East, particularly the interplay of international relations and public diplomacy within the region.