The 51st anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention cannot be a regular diplomatic affair. It is a time that demands reflection instead of ritualistic commendation. Over 50 years have lapsed since the Convention became effective, yet most of the shortcomings evident in the early years remain today. It has transformed the world, science has grown fast, and there is a strategic rivalry between the great powers. The actual question is not whether the BWC is still relevant, but whether it is powerful enough to be relevant in the future. The Convention was seen as a historic success when it was negotiated in the early 1970s. States have made a moral and humanitarian decision to prohibit a complete type of weapons, the first in history. That judgment set a valuable international precedent: the notion that sickness should never be a weapon.
The principle is popular even now. But the issue is not the norm per se; the issue is its weak enforcement. Contrary to other arms control treaties, the BWC has yet to implement a legally binding verification process. States are supposed to adhere to the rules, in large part, due to trust and voluntary transparency, which is not enough in modern politics, and recent global events have only made these flaws more apparent. The pace of scientific advancement in biotechnology and gene editing, as well as artificial intelligence, is outpacing the capacity of the international system to regulate it. Such technologies can revolutionize the health of people, agriculture, and medical research, but can also pose significant security problems when abused. There is an increasing disparity between the advancement in technology and the international control over it, and the BWC has failed to keep up with the advancement. The Convention seems to languish in the political thinking of the past in place of adjusting to new realities.
The other problem is the growing politicization of biological threats. Major powers are increasingly employing biological issues as a strategic competition instead of enhancing cooperation. Slanders are used, retaliation is retorted, and the transparency is selective and not real. This tendency undermines the authority of the Convention and creates doubts among the smaller states and developing states. Once the failure of the powerful countries in showing responsible leadership, the whole mechanism of trust in the world starts to go away. The role of the responsible states plays an even greater role in this case. Pakistan has been constantly upholding the goals of the Biological Weapons Convention and has repeatedly stressed that biological weapons do not feature in Pakistan’s national security policy.
Pakistan has been categorical and firm on its stance that international security cannot be founded on confrontation, but rather cooperation, and that disarmament agreements should be applied in a non-discriminatory way. The strategy is indicative of the broader goal of responsible behaviour in the international system rather than a short-term political interest. The position of Pakistan is also significant as it will reflect the view of the developing world. To a lot of the nations in the Global South, the BWC is not only concerned with the issue of the prevention of biological weapons, but it is also concerned with the provision of access to peaceful science development. The peaceful use of biotechnology, disease surveys, and public health issues are still major concerns of developing nations. Pakistan has consistently emphasized the need to enhance collaboration in these aspects by saying that security and development cannot be discussed as two different phenomena. It is a wise strategy that proves that a responsible state does not simply discuss security threats, but also global cooperation and mutual development.
In the future, the Biological Weapons Convention will be determined by how states will be interested in going beyond symbolic diplomacy. The measures of confidence-building should also be more transparent and more consistent. There should be encouragement of scientific cooperation instead of limiting it. Above all, the Convention should be revised in order to correspond to the realities of contemporary science. By disregarding these pitfalls, we will be weakening the treaty as time goes by and lowering its credibility in the global world.
Pakistan can contribute positively to the enhancement of the Convention in the next few years. Pakistan can contribute to making the BWC more efficient by promoting cooperation between the developed and developing nations, advancing transparency, and facilitating reforms. Meanwhile, these initiatives also help strengthen the perception of Pakistan as a responsible state actor that subscribes to multilateralism and international stability. Responsible behaviour has never been more important in a world where mistrust is on the rise and political tensions are escalating. The Biological Weapons Convention, after 51 years, remains a vital undertaking by the international community to counter the abuse of science. But the anniversary must not just be about the past: it must be about the future as well. Enhancing the application, increasing transparency, and fair cooperation have to be prioritized now. The continued adherence of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the tenets of the BWC sends a strong signal that responsible states must be prepared to be the first to act in case global peace and trust are to prevail in the biological world.
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