Nuclear weapons have not been used since the Second World War. Still, the concept of nuclear strategy has been glorified from post-WWII airpower to the era of the Cold War in the security domain of global affairs. Different concepts, specifically deterrence, have altered the system of traditional stability into strategic stability by focusing on the evolution of doctrines and specifying categories of tactical and strategic weapons to ensure stability. The Russian nuclear doctrine has seen significant modifications over the years, under various rulers.
Stalin (1924-1953) was well aware of the capabilities of nuclear weapons. Still, he was hesitant to incorporate these weapons into the Soviet strategy and to rely on quantitative dominance and autarchic security values. Under the leadership of Stalin, the nuclear policy was “war-fighting” centric and majorly relied on pre-emptive strikes and the total annihilation of the adversaries. Assisting conventional troops by using non-strategic weapons and prevailing in a war of attrition against capitalism was an integral component of this strategy if deterrence were to fail.
Additionally, Stalin considered that nuclear weapons were intended to “restrict the Soviet Union from getting strategic gains in the Far East and more generally to provide the United States the upper edge.” The Soviet strategic policy was made to avert conflict while focusing on different elements such as geography, national heritage, and the utilization of nuclear weapons in conflict to project the Soviet Union as a superpower. Marshal Sokolovsky’s 1962 strategy reflects the change in the Russian nuclear doctrine and how its focus is on massive nuclear strikes to restrict the devastation of retaliation and to crush adversaries.
Under Nikita Khrushchev’s (1953-1964) instructions, major advancements occurred in the nuclear policy of the Soviet Union where particular emphasis was on the concept of deterrence, which also included the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons because of the USSR’s manpower reductions. This was all to discredit the advantages of the United States. Along with forming Strategic Rocket forces, Khrushchev delved into strategies like preventive warfare and minimum deterrence. The balance of power, Western objectives, and the demand for several levels of capability are the variables that underscore the shifting nature of nuclear strategy during the Cold War—these factors were under consideration by Khrushchev.
Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982), leader of the Soviet Union, stressed détente and strategic symmetry with the United States over visible nuclear threats toward Europe. Brezhnev pushed the concept of deterrence as an important segment of the Soviet doctrine. The acquisition of strategic parity was the cornerstone of the approach to detente.
He also highlighted the possibility of a regionally and globally expandable nuclear war and retaliation as a concept of controllable nuclear war. The immense edge in tanks, artillery, and personnel shows that the United States would be unclear about the first use policy of its nuclear weapons to stop a credible Soviet juggernaut. He was also engaged in discussions on arms control with the presidents of the United States like Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter.
Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) was confident about the West preparing a “surprise nuclear missile attack” against the Soviet Union. Andropov started project RYaN or Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie in retaliation to counter the surprise nuclear attack from the West. The estimated purpose of the aggression against Russia (former USSR) was to demolish the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union and to prove the Soviet authorities unfit for surviving a subsequent conflict. Under Andropov, the emphasis of the Soviet’s nuclear strategy was on enhancing Soviet military readiness to launch a pre-emptive strike to neutralize the threat of a surprise attack.
Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985) was the seventh leader of the Soviet Union and he was the détente supporting counsel of Brezhnev. Later on, he carried out diplomatic channels to reduce tensions between the superpowers. During his regime, talks to limit space-based, intermediate, and long-range weapons were commenced. Revival of arms control negotiations took place and the credit goes to Chernenko for his efforts to sit with the United States. Under his leadership, the idea of a “surprise nuclear strike” came into consideration in the early phases of nuclear conflict. This shows the emphasis that Chernenko was also concerned about the strategic balance and progression of a nuclear conflict. He focused on the potential vulnerabilities in strategic posture that should be addressed.
When Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) took his position in office as a new-generation leader of the Soviet Union, there was a significant technological gap between the US and the USSR. This gap projected an essential upcoming military liability for the USSR. Gorbachev also superseded the belief that nuclear strategic parity would act as a peacekeeping force. The main incentive that pushed Gorbachev towards disarmament was the threat of a nuclear war. In this step, Gorbachev terminated the Saber SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, one of the important segments of Soviet conventional strategy, by joining the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). In 1987, Gorbachev granted his consent to deactivate the OTR-23 Oka tactical nuclear missile and the industrial departments that were accountable for developing these missiles. This led to a smaller number of stockpiles of tactical missiles that wouldn’t hit the European targets due to their limited range. So, this tenure marks a departure from the traditional nuclear strategy because of this inclination towards disarmament and arms control steps.
After the demise of the USSR, Russia came out as the sole nuclear descendant due to the evolution of its nuclear policies and intentions. Political instability, economic reforms, and major nuclear disarmament initiatives with the severe decrease in defense budgets and strategic arms in conjunction with the US are the features of the early post-Soviet disintegration era. A great number of transformations were made in Russia, and the rise of oligarchy and privatization prevailed. The disintegration of the USSR brought significant changes in the nuclear strategy of Russia.
Arms control actions like START I and II were implemented under the administration of Yeltsin (1991-1999) to boost strategic stability, by minimizing the risks of accidental nuclear warfare and bolstering non-proliferation regimes. Strategic stability also recognized the minimal nuclear deterrence and it gained importance as a concept—that a state can cause unacceptable damage to an aggressor. Russia under Yeltsin suffered from the Chechen War and political and economic instability that showed their vulnerabilities.
In 1993, a document was passed as the Basic Guidelines of Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Russia saw a dramatic change in its nuclear doctrine during this era by giving up no first use policy (1982) to deter the US because of the perceived flaws in conventional forces. In 1997, by relying on comprehensive security, the national security concept of the Russian Federation was promoted to use nuclear weapons in response to existential threats. This shows the rapid development of the nuclear deterrence doctrine.
Under the administration of President Vladimir Putin, the nuclear posture of Russia evolved as he stressed the strategic value of intercontinental ballistic missiles over the minimal capability approach. The doctrine focuses on developing efficient non-strategic systems, including nuclear and conventional tasks. It also advocates increasing the number of weapons in the nuclear arsenal and improving their delivery systems.
Conflict types depend on the strategies to be applied such as deterrence, de-escalation, and convincing tactics to control escalation in armed conflicts. In the paper “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” policy prefers deterrence over nuclear coercion and prioritizes pre-emption to avert a disastrous first strike. Russia came forward in 2001 when Putin signed a new national security concept by challenging Western global dominance. According to the document that was released in 2001, the use of the nuclear option “to repel armed aggression” is unavoidable in situations where all other options for crisis resolution have been explored or proven worthless.
In 2010, the Russian nuclear doctrine came out intending to use nuclear capability in response to nuclear or other mass destruction weapons being turned against Russia or its allies. In the event that the nation faced an existential threat, nuclear weapons were to be used in reaction to conventional weapons. In addition to deterrence, Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons to escalate or de-escalate policy to force adversaries to the bargaining table.
Changes to the doctrine of Russia in 2014 were approved with no significant modifications. During the Kosovo War, Russia realized the conventional asymmetry with the US. Then in 2018, Putin refuted the widely held notion of “escalate to de-escalate,” saying instead that “our concept is launch under attack” and that “our strategy of nuclear weapons use does not include a pre-emptive strike.” In 2020, Putin made public the fundamentals of Russian nuclear deterrence with its English version by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Russia has largely been successful in bringing back nuclear deterrence as a foreign policy and in a relationship with the West. Its nuclear deterrence policy is defensive—it will use nuclear weapons in the event of a last resort—it does not cover the first use in a nuclear scenario and also does not leave undecided to go for first use in response to conventional attack.
Conditions of Using Nuclear Weapons:
- Reliable information about the ballistic missile launch hitting Russia and its allies
- WMD attack
- Attack on government sites and military sites in Russia
- Conventional attack that could put Russia in jeopardy.
From the evolution of the USSR to Russia, significant changes occurred in the nuclear doctrine under different political brains. All of which happened to address or neutralize the door-knocking threats by rival states and to cover the deficiencies of military capabilities.
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He is a student of National Defence University Islamabad. He is pursuing his bachelors in Strategic Studies from NDU.