SMRs: How are Small Modular Reactors a Challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Introduction

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are being advanced as a next-generation solution to clean, reliable, and flexible energy needs in the world. SMRs, intended to produce power between 300 and 500 MWe (and even 1,000 MWth on some passive safety designs), are contrasted with conventional nuclear power facilities, mostly in the form of modular construction, factory-fabricated units, and the potential to deploy in fast and flexible modes. These features help SMRs to be appealing to states aiming to decarbonise energy, improve and increase energy security, and provide electricity to remote or underserved areas. The proliferation of SMRs across the world presents the nuclear non-proliferation regime with new and more complicated risks. Although SMRs represent civilian energy technologies, their implementation aspects, technical features, and fuel needs provoke serious concerns regarding the material proliferation, the efficiency of safeguards, and institutional preparedness, especially in those states where a regulatory capacity is limited.

Dual-use Dilemma: A Potential Non-proliferation Challenge

SMRs, like all nuclear technologies, are dual-use in nature. The very same processes that make it possible to generate electricity can also become contributors to the arms-grade nuclear material under certain conditions. The dual-use dilemma in the case of SMRs is aggravated by a number of design and operational features, which render them exceptional in contrast to the traditional large-scale reactors.

Key Proliferation Risks

SMRs are geographically mobile and can be deployed in geographically isolated or infrastructure-deficient locations. This enhances their commercial attractiveness but makes it difficult to monitor and manage. Smaller physical footprints, options of underground installation, and use in remote areas make them less detectable and enhance the possibility of covert abuse. SMRs could be constructed into civilian applications and concealed military programs in loosely controlled areas. Although SMRs are not as large as conventional reactors, SMRs can generate large quantities of plutonium over time. Some designs, especially fast-spectrum or breeder-type SMRs, can convert uranium-238 to plutonium-239, the material which can be directly used in nuclear weapons.

Financial and infrastructural obstacles of SMRs are somewhat less, which can also render them more available to states or actors with latent proliferation interests. Most SMR plans are based on increased uranium enrichment, frequently to the 20% U-235 level, which separates between low-enriched uranium and material of high proliferation sensitivity. Such reactors have increased diversion risks both in the fresh and used fuel. Although alternative fuel cycles, including thorium-based ones, are frequently given as an example of more proliferation-resistant ones, their success will only be as successful as their strict adherence, transparency, and compliance with safeguards. Operating models of SMRs introduce new risks. On-load refuelling designs raise the frequency of fuel handling, which opens chances of diversion. On the other hand, reactors that have sealed cores and can be refuelled with long intervals can minimise the immediate access but can cause the possibility of having undetected diversion eventually, in case the safeguards are not robust enough.

Implication for IAEA Safeguards

The IAEA safeguard system was mostly designed for large and stationary light-water reactors. Numerous designs of SMR do not fit this paradigm, making the available safeguards framework somewhat ineffective. Non-transparent coolants like molten sodium or lead-bismuth, integrated reactor vessels, and sealed cores make the conventional methods of inspection and verification ineffective. Although sealed-core design has been marketed as proliferation-resistant, it has the self-contradicting effect of making it more difficult to ensure safety by restricting access to the inspector and real-time verification. The decreased visibility of the reactor operations weakens the material accountancy and increases the dependence on indirect monitoring techniques, which have not yet been completely developed or standardised. The propositions of hundreds and possibly more than a thousand SMRs globally in the next 20 years would mean the IAEA will have a lot more to monitor. Protecting many facilities geographically located will cause financial, technical, and human resources strain to the Agency, requiring innovative technologies, practices, and models of inspection.

Institutional and Governance Vulnerabilities

A large number of Nuclear Energy Newcomers (NENs) are willing to adopt SMRs. Most of these states do not have established regulatory bodies and autonomous supervisory systems, as well as skilled and seasoned technical staff. Poor governance conditions increase the chances of material diversion, unreported operations, and political meddling in the nuclear-related decision-making. Another factor that complicates the issue of proliferation is the supplier-state behaviour. Some exporters are strict with their non-proliferation requirements, whereas others depend on the less rigorous bilateral agreements that might not be the best practice. This inconsistency poses a challenge to opening loopholes within the non-proliferation regime. The spread-out characteristic of SMR implementation compromises the conventional centralised model of spent fuel storage and supervision. The use of spent fuel in multiple locations exposes it to security risks over the long term and makes it hard to regulate internationally.

Recommendations

Incorporation of safeguards, security, and safety concerns into the initial design of SMR is necessary. Safeguards-by-design can mitigate the risks of proliferation by incorporating monitoring compatibility, material accountability, and tamper resistance deep into reactor designs. IAEA needs to be equipped with more financial advantages, technical apparatus, and early-stage involvement systems with SMR designers. Individualised safety measures, superior containment and monitoring systems, and alternative non-destructive methods of measurement will be essential. Suppliers and international organisations ought to focus on the capacity building of regulations in new countries. These involve the creation of self-governing nuclear regulators, the provision of competent human resources, and the promotion of an ethos of transparency and compliance. Multilateral fuel supply guarantees, international fuel banks, and spent fuel take-back can play a significant role in eliminating the incentive that drives national enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, which in turn decreases the proliferation risks.

Conclusion

Small Modular Reactors have the real potential to solve energy security and climate change issues. However, they can proliferate uncontrollably, which undermines the major nuclear non-proliferation regime pillar. The proliferation issues that come along with SMRs are not only technical in nature, but also institutional and political in nature. In the absence of active international coordination, protection innovation, and reform governance, SMRs may be used unintentionally as vectors for acquiring nuclear weapons. To mitigate the risk of proliferation, robust, coordinated, and effective policy actions need to be taken.

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