Introduction 

India and Pakistan share the most dangerous border in the world because of many unresolved issues such as the Kashmir dispute, water issues, terrorism, proxy wars, and nuclear factors. Since 1947, both countries have fought three major wars and small skirmishes under a nuclear umbrella in 1999. The doctrinal transformation has been taking place in India continuously since the nuclearization of South Asia. The nuclear factor, Pakistan’s military capabilities, and changing strategic dynamics forced India to rapidly assimilate modern strategies to maintain strategic dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. It has been observed that because of geographic compulsions and many unresolved issues, the strategic thinking of both sides is focused on each other. For instance, if we look at most of the Indian military deployment, it is against Pakistan, whereas Pakistan also did the same.

Major Shifts Post-1971 

India’s aggressive posture took a new shape after 1971, Pakistan was dismembered, and India played a vital role in the fall of Dhaka. Since then, India has introduced a handful of different military doctrines.

The Sunderji Doctrine

Developed by the Indian military in the 1980s under General Kirshanswamy Sunderji, it was an aggressive military strategy that focused on leveraging India’s conventional military superiority to decisively defeat Pakistan in a conventional war. It had two main objectives, which included “dissecting Pakistan into two” and “destroying Pakistan’s nuclear program.” The strategy aimed to engage Pakistani forces along multiple fronts to sever the country geographically and to launch a preemptive strike to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

Cold Start Doctrine

After the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi (Standoff 2001-02), India revisited its military strategy. The Indian military began to work on the “Cold Start Doctrine,” which focused on rapid, limited military strikes that could punish Pakistan for provocations without escalating a full-scale war. Under this doctrine, India would attack Pakistan within 48–96 hours after an alleged terrorist attack on Indian soil having links with Pakistan. These operations would operate under integrated battle groups along with triad forces. India would try to attain an element of surprise in quick multiple strikes, hold some area, or may destroy some Pakistani outposts to avenge an alleged terrorist attack.

To counter the threat of the introduction of integrated battle groups (IBGs) by the Indian military, Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapons in 2011, especially with the testing of the Al-Nasr missile. The Nasr missile system was designed as a mobile, short-range system with a range of 60 km and could carry a low-yield nuclear warhead.

Indian Hybrid Warfare Strategy (2008)

This strategy refers to India’s use of a combination of conventional military tactics, irregular warfare, cyber operations, and psychological warfare to address security threats and exert influence, particularly related to Pakistan. This approach emerged after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which were attributed to Pakistan-based militants by India. Under this strategy, Indian security advisor Ajit Doval introduced his “Defensive-Offensive Doctrine.” This strategy focused on creating hybrid warfare against Pakistan, which includes supporting terrorist organizations in Pakistan to undermine internal security, creating social vulnerabilities in regions i.e., FATA and Balochistan, supporting nationalist movements, and creating an environment of international isolation of Pakistan.

Land Warfare Doctrine (2018)

Unveiled in 2018, the LWD mainly focuses on the Indian army’s threat perception and possible response in limited war scenarios. This doctrine emphasizes India’s need to be prepared for a two-front war, particularly against Pakistan and China. The LWD-2018 addresses the growing challenge of hybrid warfare, which involves a blend of conventional, irregular, and cyber warfare alongside information operations. A significant feature of the LWD-2018 is the establishment of the IBGs, which are self-sufficient, agile, and flexible fighting units designed for rapid mobilization and quick responses to emerging threats. The doctrine also focuses on the significance of the joint operations by Indian triad forces. Under this doctrine, the Indian army seeks to integrate cutting-edge technology such as artificial intelligence, drones, and precision-guided munitions into its arsenals. 

Way Forward 

Pakistan must carry out successful operations in its tribal areas against terrorists and cartels. Pakistan must deny physical space to terrorists. Furthermore, Pakistan should improve its intelligence agencies and their coordination and carry out reconstruction and development in areas that are facing economic and social deprivation, i.e., FATA, Balochistan. Additionally, Pakistan should acquire a second-strike capability and communicate its credibility and capability effectively to counter Indian aggression.

“It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”

Sun Tzu, in the Art of War

Conclusion 

Indian strategic thinking is based on aggressive and intentionally ambiguous doctrines and strategies. Furthermore, it is based on competence. This type of Indian attitude and provocation would plunge the region into greater instability and turmoil. Pakistan must look forward to playing a more positive role by continuing its defensive postures and collaborations with its international partners and peacekeeping and crisis management agencies. 

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