Introduction
The revival of SAARC remains a daunting challenge in contemporary times. Since 2014, the last summit was held in Kathmandu, SAARC has not been able to make its way to the next summit, which was supposed to be held in Islamabad. Since then, the organization has been hostage to India-Pakistan conflictual relationships. The issue of terrorism, the revocation of Article 370, and polarization in the region altogether have failed SAARC in implementing its core objectives.
Despite being dysfunctional for the last ten years, no member states have expressed any inclination towards disbanding the organization. The identity of SAARC, being the only organization representing all the South Asian states, remains intact.
Nevertheless, the lingering question pertains to navigating internal discord and addressing various structural flaws within the SAARC framework. So in view of dealing with the current deadlock, this study puts forward some practical suggestions, especially in the context of Pakistan.
The Legacy of SAARC
Established in December 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) began its journey with an ironclad commitment by its founding members, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan, to uplift the quality of life of the people living in a region which was the least integrated and one of the most poverty-ridden regions in the world.
In its formative years, from 1985 to 1989, the SAARC Summits were held regularly, and several important conventions were concluded in response to pressing issues of the time. For instance, the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and an agreement to establish a “South Asian Food Reserve.”
However, starting from 1989, the frequency of annual sessions began to decline. Over 22 years, from 1989 to 2011, only 12 summits were convened. Subsequently, from 2011 to now, spanning 13 years, only one summit occurred in 2014. The debilitating frequency of annual meetings speaks volumes about the inherent discord between the member states, especially between India and Pakistan. The extra-regional power politics and the mushroom growth of sub-regional and trans-regional organizations have negatively impacted the progress of the SAARC. SAARC has been practically dysfunctional since 2014.
Nevertheless, in nearly a decade of dormancy, none of the member states have expressed any desire to disband the organization. All the states, especially the smaller states, still have faith in the SAARC and are quite hopeful for its revival. The importance of SAARC has remained impervious to the prevailing challenges.
The establishment of SAARC Regional Centers, South Asian University, the South Asian Development Fund, the Food Bank, and the Arbitration Council are some of the outstanding achievements that SAARC has made so far. But it is worth mentioning that almost all the achievements that SAARC has made in the past 38 years were made possible when Pakistan-India relations were normal. This implies that the normalization of Pakistan-India relations is the key to the smooth functioning of SAARC, and there is no scope for either minus-India or minus-Pakistan-led growth within SAARC. This possibility has been discussed causally in both Pakistani and Indian literature.
Current Challenges
The revival of SAARC remains a daunting challenge in the contemporary geo-political and geo-strategic environment that the so-called “China threat” has potentially shaped.
The Galwan Valley face-off between the Chinese and Indian forces in June 2020 and the subsequent push in India-US relations (evident from operationalizing the QUAD through a naval power show in November 2020) brought a paradigm shift in the strategic culture of South Asia. Later, the Ukraine War that broke out in February 2022 led to an increased polarization in the South Asian region.
Now, the divide is quite visible as the US and like-minded Western powers are trying to consolidate their position in the region through a strategic partnership with India and promoting its role as the “net security provider” in the region. Mindful of the existing tide, China and Russia are treading cautiously in their bilateral engagements with the South Asian states. The existing “polarization” has accentuated the division within the SAARC, which was already paralyzed because of two major incidents, i.e., the Uri attack on the Indian Army Brigade Headquarters in 2016 and the revocation of Article 370 by India in 2019.
Today, minus Pakistan, India is willing to work with other neighbors and has already been doing so for quite a long time. Circumventing Pakistan, New Delhi is quite active in streamlining connectivity agreements under Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal Network (BBIN), which was conceived after Pakistan objected to India’s proposed regional Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) as half-baked in the last summit that took place in Kathmandu, Nepal in 2014.
The same agreement was passed in 2015 under the BBIN platform, and now it is in the final stage and ready for implementation soon. Apart from MVA, India is widening the scope of the BBIN by mulling cooperation on energy and trade. On the other hand, minus India, Pakistan prefers to work with other SAARC countries. Still, Islamabad’s efforts have been unsuccessful in fully exploiting its bilateral relations in this regard because of New Delhi’s greater influence over the foreign policy decisions of the smaller states.
Moreover, due to existing acrimonious relationships between India and Pakistan, no cross-border regional connectivity mechanism, especially energy and transportation, could be operational under the SAARC framework. Practically, only bilateral/intergovernmental mechanisms exist in the region. In almost all the existing bilateral mechanisms (especially in the energy sector), New Delhi is well connected with the region’s smaller states compared to Pakistan. (India-Bangladesh 1160 MW, Bhutan-India 2260 MW, India-Nepal 520 MW, Pakistan-Afghanistan (CASA 1000 MW)). Thus, the vision of economic integration under SAARC remains a challenge as India and Pakistan have opted for alternate, more simply, opposing modes of integration within the South Asian region.
For India, SAARC is no longer a significant component of its “Neighbourhood Policy.” The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC, a transregional organization) has gained more significance. However, India is skillfully using the SAARC forum to advance its part of integration while circumventing Pakistan. The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal Network (BBIN) is a prime example.
Unfortunately, New Delhi has spoiled the SAARC’s spirit of “region-ness.” New Delhi is now using the SAARC forum only to advance its two-pronged policy of isolating Pakistan and neutralizing the impact of Chinese influence. Be it SAARC, the BBIN, or BIMSTEC, New Delhi is determined to play a central role. For Pakistan, though SAARC remains an important organization in achieving the goal of regional cooperation in South Asia, Islamabad’s increasing reliance on Chinese-led development projects has largely shaped its image as a “typical member” of the SAARC.
The Prospects
Despite several loopholes and the mushroom growth of other sub-regional organizations (i.e., BISMTECH and BBIN), SAARC’s identity as the only organization representing all the South Asian countries remains intact.
The smaller states, despite the existing polarization in the region, are still interested in the revival of SAARC, which they believe can be potentially helpful in streamlining cooperation on less controversial issues such as poverty reduction, people-to-people contact, cultural exchanges, tourism, and science and technology cooperation.
The alternative/opposing economic integration infrastructures could be integrated into the SAARC vision of economic integration if Pakistan-India relations are normalized. Moreover, in the absence of annual summits, which have been in limbo since 2016, the regular meetings have gained more importance as the organization is relatively alive and surviving on committee-level interactions between the member states.
SAARC has been quite active since Ambassador Golam Sarwar from the People’s Republic of Bangladesh assumed charge as the 15th Secretary General of the organization on 25 October 2023. After 4 years, the 39th SAARC Charter Day was celebrated on 11 December 2023. Many board of governors’ meetings of regional centers have been held so far. More recently, in 2024, the 31st meeting of the governing board of the SAARC TB and HIV/AIDS Centre was held in January.
Conclusion
To tap the potential of existing synergy at the SAARC Secretariat, Islamabad needs to engage with its current Secretary General, Ambassador Golam Sarwar. Pakistan can consider inviting him (virtually or in person) to conferences, seminars, etc.
Former Secretary General Mr. Esala Ruwan Weerakoon visited Pakistan in December 2021. Islamabad also needs to increase its engagements with the SAARC regional centers and be active on SAARC’s social media platforms. In its engagements with member countries, Pakistan should stress the fulfillment of the social charter of the SAARC and also make efforts to mobilize the observer states to contribute to the SAARC Development Fund.
Such initiatives would help rebuild the member states’ confidence in SAARC. Pakistan also needs to make serious efforts to convene the pending SAARC Summit. For that matter, Islamabad needs an active engagement with the current chair of the SAARC (Nepal) and other smaller states to mobilize their support in setting the ground for the summit in Islamabad.
Previously, in 2018, the former PM of Pakistan, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, attempted in that regard. During his visit to Nepal, he met with the Prime Minister and the President of Nepal, K.P Sharma Oli and Bidya Devi Bhandari, and other political figures. He urged them to play their role in convening the SAARC Summit.
To address the emerging climate-related issues, Pakistan needs to stress the active role of the SAARC Disaster Management Centre. Based in India, the Centre can be exploited to encourage climate cooperation within SAARC. Pakistan also needs to push for reforms in the SAARC Charter. Learning from other organizations like CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program), the SAARC’s institutional framework/decision-making process can be simplified. Multiple layers (SAARC Summits (Apex Body), Council of Ministers, standing committees, programming committees, technical committees, working groups, and action committees) are potentially delaying the decision-making in the SAARC.
Additionally, since Pakistan-India relations are the key to the revival of SAARC, both Pakistan and India need to expedite efforts to normalize their relations in the greater interest of the welfare of South Asian people. In conclusion, Pakistan should not be kept hostage to the existing stalemate between India and Pakistan. Islamabad’s continued inattentive attitude will provide New Delhi room for contemplating policies detrimental to Pakistan’s relations with other smaller states. The forum of SAARC at this point in time needs to be fully utilized to neutralize India’s policy of isolating Pakistan within the SAARC, and this can only be possible through active engagement with the member countries and participation in the meetings and events.
This piece was originally published by the Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad
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