Abstract
Since Ethiopia inked a deal with the breakaway state of Somaliland, the maritime access dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia threatens the security architecture of the Horn of Africa. This research aims to explore the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in prior maritime access disputes and draw lessons for the Somalia-Ethiopia case. It also examines the potential impact of the unresolved dispute on regional security.
The study also highlights how UNCLOS can enable the settlement of maritime disputes and the difficulties that landlocked countries face in obtaining sovereign access to the sea. Thus, this research argues that the cases of Bolivia, Nepal, and Afghanistan highlight the importance of transit alternatives and the ability of international law to secure passage for trade and resources.
The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have played their role in mediating this dispute, but the positions taken by Somalia and Ethiopia on the dispute have prevented progress. If left unaddressed, the unresolved dispute would have serious implications for regional security. Peace and security in the Horn of Africa require that the dispute be resolved by constructive dialogue and collaboration in the framework of UNCLOS and regional institutions.
Keywords
Maritime access, landlocked countries, Somalia, Ethiopia, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), regional security, Horn of Africa.
Introduction
The maritime access dispute over Somalia and Ethiopia is a recent, yet significant, conflict over territory, with roots deeply etched in the historic claims regarding access to vital maritime zones. Contrasted against any other border disputes, which have plagued the Horn of Africa for a long time, the current disagreement pertains only to accessing maritime areas neither of these nations controlled but find themselves competing for in the wake of ever-growing global competition over maritime routes and resources (Okumu, 2010).
Having been a landlocked state since Eritrea became an independent nation back in 1993, Ethiopia has remained faithful to gaining access to international waters as part of the country’s grand strategy towards trading and further securing economic interests (Magnet, 2019). Somalia, on its part, remains adamant over its territorial sovereignty, especially with regard to its EEZ, which contains some of the very most essential natural resources, including fisheries and oil reserves (Glaser et al., 2015). Such cases always draw worldwide interest, as both countries have reached out to third-party enforcers, most prominently regional and international legal institutions such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Both Somalia and Ethiopia need maritime access. This is especially important for Somalia, which depends on the sea for its current and future economy, for fishing, for trade, and the potential exploration of energy resources in its EEZ. With more than 30 years of civil unrest behind it, the Somali economy considers the maritime domain to be a springboard for sustainable development.
Whilst Ethiopia is landlocked, this presents a challenge to foreign trade capabilities. The importance of maritime access for Ethiopia is therefore twofold. The overall aim of these objectives is, first, to increase the economic potential of the country via secure trade routes, and second, to protect the national security of the country by keeping a constant presence in strategically significant maritime areas. More than an economic issue, these waters mean a lot for the pride of both nations and political stability. (Takele & Tolcha, 2021)
The Somalia-Ethiopia maritime dispute, which is unresolved and part of the recent broader security concerns of the Horn of Africa, which is already affected by instability, interstate rivalry, and economic challenges. Being strategically located along major international shipping routes, control of its waterways is of international significance (Ylönen, 2022). The stakes are also more geopolitical, as evidenced by the presence of foreign powers–the U.S., China, and Russia–and regional players Djibouti, Kenya, and Eritrea.
However, if the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute remains unresolved, it could aggravate already rampant regional tensions and further degrade the manifestly insecure security architecture in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, it could start an arms race or even increase the militarization of the waters of the region, entailing consequences of devising not only the two countries but also the entire regional security framework (“Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean Security,” n.d.).
With these complex dynamics, the international community, through bodies such as the United Nations and the African Union, has tried to mediate the dispute and set a framework for peace and reconciliation. Maritime activities such as delimitation of territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves are governed, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, by a complete legal system (Kadagi et al., 2020a). In addition, regional organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have also fostered dialogue and promoted cooperative approaches to the management of common maritime resources.
Nonetheless, their effectiveness has been somewhat limited because the dispute has yet to be laid to rest, with both Somalia and Ethiopia continuing to assert their competing claims, sometimes taking the occasional verbal or, in rare cases, even physical steps along what both consider the disputed maritime border between them. The United Nations and the African Union have both intervened to no avail in the two countries’ failure to reach a consensus on how to set maritime boundaries or manage access to the resources of the contested waters (Okafor-Yarwood & Onuoha, 2023).
The dispute has been deadlocked due to the inability to come up with a mutually acceptable solution, with the possibility of conflict escalation, threatening to spill over into other aspects of regional security. The ongoing tension of this stalemate presents risks because an unresolved maritime dispute could lead to renewed tensions, more military buildups, and even armed conflict between Somali and Ethiopian forces.
The ramifications of such an escalation would extend into the wider Horn of Africa region, which is already full of economic, political, and social problems. It is most important that this dispute is resolved in a peaceful way and through the establishment of a basis for cooperative management of its shared maritime resources as part of efforts to maintain regional security and to foster sustainable development in the region (Tekalign, 2019).
To emerge out of this deadlock, a more comprehensive and innovative way is needed that ignores traditional boundary delimitation and considers new models for resource sharing and joint management. This exploratory research aims to delve into three critical questions. How has UNCLOS been applied in prior maritime access disputes, and what lessons from these stand to help resolve the Somalia-Ethiopia case? How could the unresolved maritime access dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia affect the Horn of Africa’s regional security architecture? Answering these questions will enable an understanding of the dispute in a larger geopolitical setting and show some possible avenues to resolution.
The Application of UNCLOS in Maritime Access Disputes
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is the basic legal framework for dealing with maritime access disputes and provides for the delimitation of territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves (Sohail, 2025). This treaty covers extensive areas, providing for the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans, and provides landlocked countries with the “right of access to and from the seas” and “freedom of transit.”
Both Somalia and Ethiopia are parties to UNCLOS, which makes UNCLOS a starting point for negotiations and dispute resolution. The convention sets out clear procedures for delimiting maritime boundaries, establishing that they are based on equitable principles. It also takes into account, inter alia, geographical features and economic factors.
As a landlocked country, Ethiopia suffers from a lack of maritime access. Thus, Somalia was looked at as a potential solution, one that is against international law, as the government of Somalia asserts (Hassan, 2024). The dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia could be finally resolved through UNCLOS, which sets a legal framework in which Somalia can protect its maritime interests and Ethiopia can get access to the sea.
However, the question remains how these legal frameworks would work in favor of both countries to end the long-standing dispute. We will explore the examples of countries trying to gain maritime access through other countries.
Bolivia vs. Chile
Several countries gained access to the maritime in the past, for example, Bolivia. With the attempt to get maritime access from Chile, Bolivia has been trying to get sovereign access to the sea. The War of the Pacific (1879-1884) cost Bolivia its coastline to Chile, leaving its access to the ocean at the mercy of Chile. Bolivia has sought for over a century to regain sovereign access, under historical treaties and the protection of international law, most recently seeking recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In 2018, the ICJ ruled against Bolivia, saying that Chile had no obligation to negotiate sovereign access for Bolivia, albeit Bolivia still benefits from access to Chilean ports for commercial purposes, under preexisting treaties (Berg & Laing, 2018).
This case illustrates the difficulties of landlocked countries whose sovereign access to the sea is in question. Although history and economics imperatives seemed to provide clear grounds for Bolivia to have satisfied its claims through international adjudication, it did not. The ICJ said that while treaties signed after the war still gave Bolivia some commercial transit rights, they did not back Bolivia’s demand for sovereign access. This shows the problem with changing historical treaties retroactively, even with international law frameworks, such as UNCLOS. (Dunkelberg, 2019).
Nepal
Nepal’s case is a similar one, being landlocked and dependent on its neighbor India for maritime access. Political tensions have also blocked Nepal’s ability to trade, principally with India. To counter this, Nepal has looked to China for alternative maritime access, paying for the right to use Chinese ports under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Under this agreement, Nepal gets one more option to gain access to international waters and become less dependent on India for the transit routes (Adhikari & Ma, 2022).
Nepal’s example underscores the need for transit alternatives. Nepal remains highly dependent on India for much of its trade, but linking up with China reduces its vulnerability to political tensions with India. In this case, landlocked countries can improve their access to global trade through a set of agreements with multiple transit countries, rather than through a single transit country (Faye et al., 2004). This is similar to the case of Ethiopia, which is diversifying its transit options and no longer relies on Djibouti, and since the Eritrea deal has not borne any fruit.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan is another case, as a landlocked country, it has historically depended on access to maritime trade through Karachi port in Pakistan. But trade routes from Afghanistan have often been disrupted by political tensions with the two nations. To balance this out, Afghanistan has negotiated an alternative route through Iran via the Chabahar Port, which is permitted under UNCLOS, where landlocked countries have rights to use neighboring states’ sea ports. The alternative access is less dependent on Pakistan, as well as more stable in accessing global markets (Kumar S, 2021).
Kenya vs. Somalia
An example of the use of UNCLOS involves a recent case that resolved a maritime boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia. Disputes between the two over the Indian Ocean maritime boundary concerned their respective claims for a boundary based on either the equidistance principle or a parallel to the latitude line. In this case, the high-stakes resources were offshore oil and gas reserves.
In 2014, Somalia filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the framework of which it invoked UNCLOS as the main legal framework. Somalia prevailed over the 2021 ICJ ruling, while largely supporting the 2020 equidistance approach to maritime boundary delineation as per UNCLOS, over Kenya’s reservations. UNCLOS does a tremendous job of providing a neutral, structured forum for settling disputes over these very valuable resources using the power of the law instead of force (Ioannides, 2022).
In other words, as illustrated in the case of Bolivia, Nepal, Kenya, and Afghanistan, we see that landlocked countries are commonly bound to be confronted with challenges to enjoy sovereign use of the territorial sea. Legal backing can be had from international frameworks such as UNCLOS, but sovereign access is seldom permitted, especially where they are prohibited by historical treaties. These cases provide a hint that Ethiopia may have to concentrate on negotiating transit agreements with Somalia as opposed to asserting full sovereignty over maritime routes by utilizing international law to secure unproblematic passage of trade and resources.
The Role of the African Union and IGAD in Mediating the Somalia-Ethiopia Maritime Access Dispute
In this regard, regional organizations such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were instrumental in mediating the dispute and finding a peaceful resolution. Regional institutions brought parties in conflict together and called them into a negotiation, while making recommendations of possible solutions on the complex maritime boundary dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. Their involvement in not only this but many other disputes has been vital in keeping channels open and looking at possible avenues to a mutually agreeable resolution, though the procedure and subject matter of dispute are determinable. (Kadagi et al., 2020b)
The African Union has also been very proactive in the resolution of issues relating to maritime security in the Horn of Africa, being aware of the value that waterways would bring to this region in terms of trading and economic development. To a large extent, the AU has played a pivotal role in convening regional measures to curb piracy through the Djibouti Code of Conduct and subsequently improving maritime domain awareness as well as information sharing by the parties involved (Vreÿ, 2010). Until today, the AU has supported good governance and the rule of law in the area where maritime disputes are normally resolved.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development has been playing a very important role in mediation initiatives regarding Somalia and Ethiopia. IGAD has provided space for dialogue between the two nations through the avenues of communication provided. IGAD’s regional knowledge and understanding of dynamics within the local setup have contributed to dealing with the complexities of this conflict (IGAD, 2023).
Despite these, the maritime border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia does not seem to find an end since the two countries seem to maintain their claims over the disputed maritime area. Somalia objects strongly, having threatened to use armed force to stop it from taking place. On January 4th, 2024, the leaders of IGAD met, hoping that this would help come up with an amicable solution to calm the situation. Somalia rejected all such mediation initiatives.
On the same date, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Somalia came with an announcement that “There is no room for mediation unless Ethiopia withdraws its illegal MoU and restates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia.” This statement underscores Somalia’s position that the port agreement is a breach of its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Paravicini & Endeshaw, 2024).
The staunch position taken by Somalia poses huge problems for regional mediators. The present situation is loaded with tension, and should no settlement be reached, it might become even more explosive. The continued failure to find a settlement on this issue of maritime disputes also brings dire implications for the region. This is an open dispute, needing continuous diplomatic efforts and flexibility to compromise on the most basic principles of international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Lessons for the Somalia-Ethiopia Maritime Dispute
The case of Somalia and Ethiopia presents its own challenges. While Ethiopia is a landlocked country trying to obtain access to the sea through Somalia’s land. The precedents set through UNCLOS application to other maritime access disputes offer important lessons.
First, UNCLOS acknowledges the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of shared resources, which can be applied to the case of Somalia and Ethiopia. As a landlocked nation with historical grievances, Bolivia has been denied sovereign access to the sea in numerous international courts. In a similar manner, Ethiopia, which is a landlocked country, should make the most of negotiations aimed at the elaboration of sound and long-term transit agreements with Somalia with a view to having guaranteed and efficient access to Somali ports.
The Somali territorial integrity would be secured in an ethically defensible way within this sort of cooperative endeavor, which would also serve Ethiopia’s necessary trade and economic development needs. Through mutual benefits and transit agreements that specify clear rules and procedures, Ethiopia will be able to get a free and uninterrupted flow of goods and services, thereby promoting greater regional economic integration and cooperation between the two countries.
Second, UNCLOS offers a uniform and comprehensive plan for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states with respect to maritime issues. They include mechanisms such as negotiation, mediation, and referral of the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Somalia and Ethiopia could explore these dispute resolution mechanisms to reach a solution that is mutually acceptable with the principles and provisions of UNCLOS. The use of these UNCLOS-sanctioned procedures would help the two countries to work out their differences in a lawful, cooperative way.
Third, experiences of other countries in the implementation of UNCLOS may provide lessons in terms of a clear and transparent governance framework. For example, Afghanistan’s negotiation with Iran over access to the Chabahar Port shows how landlocked countries can use regional cooperation to offset geopolitical obstacles. Without access to maritime routes under UNCLOS, the solution should be regional partnerships with Somalia, mediated by international and regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in order to allow access to maritime routes.
Nonetheless, the Somalia-Ethiopia case under consideration poses specific difficulties, but the international experience in applying UNCLOS in solving other maritime access disputes may help to define and achieve a reasonable and lasting solution.
The Unresolved Maritime Access Dispute: A Threat to the Regional Security Architecture
The leasing deal with Somaliland by Ethiopia is the latest development in the maritime access dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, emphasizing significant risks to the fragile security framework of the region. This decades-old conflict can, step by step, go back decades in graduated moves in regional cooperation and spark a wider conflict that could destabilize the whole of the Horn of Africa. If left unchecked, the question of shipping-lane access and control of strategic ports could threaten renewed conflict or undermine joint efforts toward greater economic integration and political stability on this fragile continent (Henneberg & Stapel, 2020).
This crisis converged with other underlying internal and regional instabilities, creating a particularly dangerous situation. Domestic tensions have pushed Ethiopia to the very edge of civil war, while Somalia is trying simultaneously to grapple with its own internal chaos. Such circumstances arise in varied forms in the Horn of Africa, making the escalation of any single conflict potentially very consequential. This dispute runs deep into far-reaching consequences for regional security. It has the potential to unravel years of cooperation and revive old animosities threatening to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.
Heightened Risk of Military Conflict
The controversy surrounding the port agreement makes the risk of conflict in the region much more heightened. In Somalia’s claim of military interference to stop the implementation of the port treaty, the prospect of violent clashes by parties involved has been immensely heightened. Any kind of limited military confrontation may turn into unpredictable proportions with the entry of regional players. Hence, the probability of an unintended escalation in the presence of other regional actors raises the likelihood of a wider conflict at the expense of an already fragile security architecture in the region (Olika, 2011).
Erosion of Regional Cooperation
This further eats into the legitimacy and workability of regional bodies, such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Somalia has rejected mediation attempts, with an argument that it will not trust the process and that the AU has unofficially aligned itself with Ethiopia’s policy actions. Such developments keep at bay the confidence that would otherwise catalyze these bodies to collaborate on security matters, such as fighting terror groups and combating transnational crime.
The inability of the regional organizations to come up with a resolution on the maritime access contention raises questions about their effectiveness in dealing with other complex regional disputes (Woldemariam, 2018).
Exacerbation of Existing Conflicts
The dispute may also further exacerbate the already entrenched tensions and conflicts in Somalia. The central government might possibly sidetrack its efforts and energies to counter the perceived danger from Ethiopia, creating some kind of security vacuum that al-Shabaab may exploit. Furthermore, the issue could embolden some factor elements in Somalia who revel in instability, and aim to weaken the power of the federal government (Farah, 2021).
The internal conflict within Ethiopia, not to mention with the Tigray region, adds only further mess to this in a way that takes much-needed resource allocation and attention away from regional security concerns. Such tensions, domestically, could only exacerbate the instability within Ethiopia, thereby providing an opening for armed groups and further destabilizing the Horn of Africa (Ishiyama, 2023).
Increased Foreign Interference
This dispute offers an opportunity for external actors to exploit the situation for their strategic interests. In the Horn of Africa, competition between states over influence and access to key resources could yield greater militarization, proxy conflict, and greater destabilization. Beyond some of the existing hostilities, the involvement of foreign powers driven by their own geopolitical agendas could worsen existing tensions and hamper efforts toward regional stability.
The dispute may be the right opportunity for major global powers like the United States, China, and Russia to take advantage of opening up their sphere of influence in the region by providing military support, economic incentives, or backing the participating parties. Such foreign interference could make it easier for local actors to stall attempts aimed at achieving lasting peace and security in the Horn of Africa (Plaut, 2013). Additionally, the involvement of these external actors could escalate the conflict, making it more difficult to resolve through regional cooperation and dialogue.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the maritime access dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, especially in allowing the latter to enter a lease with a breakaway state, Somaliland, is a gigantic threat to the fragile security architecture of the Horn of Africa. Both the prospect of a larger-scale armed conflict, breakdown of regional cooperation, escalation of already ongoing wars, and higher opportunities for external interference point toward critical urgency to find a solution to this dispute through an exhaustive and integrative approach.
However, this complex issue requires constant dialogue and cooperative steps in the framework developed by regional bodies, such as the African Union and the IGAD, as well as within the terms of UNCLOS. It will therefore present an opportunity for preserving peace, security, and economic integration of the Horn of Africa.
Failure will unleash most of the gradual steps of improvement in regional cooperation and stability, possibly destabilizing the whole region and playing with the very lives of its people. A peaceful and negotiated settlement will therefore ensure that the throngs of hard-won gains will secure an even more prosperous future for the Horn of Africa.
These finding suggests different recommendations for the policymakers of these countries. Somalia should negotiate in good faith and protect its sovereign rights while still maintaining the possibility of a qualitative concession on limited access for Ethiopia into its maritime zone, with no sacrifice of its territorial integrity. Somalia should exploit the provisions offered by UNCLOS to protect its maritime interests while resuming its former regional mediation efforts under the leadership of the African Union and IGAD.
Therefore, for Ethiopia, negotiated agreements on maritime access are now the only way forward. Besides, alternative transit routes with neighboring countries are feasible. Above all, Ethiopia must engage Somalia constructively to find mutually convenient solutions. The two nations should ensure that there is diplomatic dialogue and joint resource management and revenue-sharing mechanisms to ensure regional cooperation with a higher probability of gaining maritime security.
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