alliances in south asia

The Shifting Alliances in South Asia: Bangladesh’s Pivot to Pakistan

Bangladesh’s post-Hasina foreign policy marks a historic pivot—moving away from India’s sphere of influence and embracing rapprochement with Pakistan. Once deeply tied to Delhi, Dhaka now courts Islamabad in a multidimensional shift impacting diplomacy, trade, and security. This shift in alliances in South Asia not only unsettles India’s regional standing but also signals a rebalancing of power across the region.

With Hasina’s departure, Bangladesh is reorienting its foreign policy by shifting away from India’s circle of influence and seeking alignment with Pakistan. The relationship India cultivated with Hasina’s government has dissipated with the interim government’s rise to power, which is now crafting a multidimensional foreign policy, and a rapprochement with Pakistan has surfaced as the dominant component of this diplomatic diversification. Islamabad is the main counterweight in Dhaka’s strategic calculus – a development indicating a shifted power equation in South Asia.

Hasina’s Collapse: A Verdict on Delhi’s Approach towards Dhaka

While India’s engagement with Bangladesh under Hasina was comprehensive—spanning political, economic, and strategic dimensions—the Bangladeshi public construed this involvement as excessively overarching. The buildup of anti-India sentiment over the years was one of the reasons for stimulating anti-Hasina protests in Dhaka that ultimately led to her downfall. India supported the trials and executions of Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) Bangladesh leaders under the Hasina government, and it served well its purpose to reinvigorate narratives of the 1971 war.

India has always considered the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and JeI comfy with Pakistan and even alleged they supported insurgency in India, as evidenced by the Chittagong Arms Haul. Sheikh Hasina acted against both parties by imprisoning BNP leader Khalida Zia, banning JeI, and forcibly disappearing its leaders. The suppression of these parties suited India, leading the Bangladeshi public to believe that Delhi had influenced her policies and contributed to the backlash against her leadership. Anti-India resentment brewed further in the Bangladeshi public when India decided to prop up Sheikh Hasina’s rule while the international community was criticizing her despotic actions.

Cracks in India-Bangladesh Cooperation: Border Tensions and Security Fallout

India will no longer be able to keep bilateral disputes under the carpet once hibernated under Hasina’s regime. New Bangladeshi authorities have urged India to resolve the Teesta River dispute. Border control issues are resurfacing where India has to halt fencing along the India-Bangladesh border upon reservations from the new Bangladeshi government. Previously, Hasina-led Bangladesh allowed border fencing, while the current government considers it a violation of the 1975 border agreement.

India’s refusal to return Hasina to Dhaka to stand trial for war crimes can rupture the bilateral extradition treaty under which Bangladesh previously handed insurgents over to India who were involved in insurgency in India. With the extradition treaty revoked, insurgents in India may feel emboldened to establish operational bases and sanctuaries in Bangladesh. Strained security cooperation can also exacerbate the security and connectivity in the Seven Sisters—India’s northeastern states connected to mainland India through the Siliguri Corridor.

Not long ago, a senior advisor in the Bangladeshi government urged the annexation of the Muslim-majority states of Assam, Bengal, and Tripura, citing their strong ethno-religious ties with Bangladesh. Diluted bilateral security cooperation will not only fuel the Mao-Naxal insurgency in India but can also incentivize Bangladesh-based religious organizations to radicalize the borders. Recently, the freed al-Qaeda-linked Islamist, Muhammad Jasimuddin Rahmani, calling for the secession of Kashmir, Punjab, and the Seven Sisters from India, reflects the heightened security risks for India.

These developments indicate that it will be complex for India to unilaterally calm the 4,096 km border without restoring security cooperation with Bangladesh.

Pakistan-Bangladesh Reset in Motion

While India-Bangladesh relations have hit an all-time low, post-Hasina Bangladesh seeks to restore ties with Islamabad after years of estrangement. PM Shahbaz Sharif’s meeting with Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the head of the interim Bangladeshi government, on the sidelines of the UN annual meeting was the first premier-level contact after many years. The momentum continued during the second premier-level meeting during the D-8 summit in Cairo. PM Shahbaz Sharif appreciated Bangladesh’s steps to lift Pakistan-centric trade and travel restrictions. In another development, Bangladesh has approved Fly Jinnah’s request to resume direct flights between the two countries.

As Pakistan and Bangladesh ease people-to-people interaction, Bangladesh has requested the EU to shift visa centers from India to Bangladesh or other countries because India is restricting visa access for Bangladeshi students. In this regard, Bulgaria has relocated visa centers from Delhi to Indonesia and Vietnam. At the same time, emerging Pakistan-Bangladesh economic collaboration serves as a counterpoint to India’s apparent decoupling from Bangladesh’s economy, possibly an attempt to show Bangladesh its place for pursuing an independent foreign policy.

India’s plans to tap the global textile industry could undermine Bangladesh’s competitive position in the worldwide textile market. Adding to these pressures, Bangladesh has alleged India deliberately flooded its eastern borders by opening the Dumbur Dam—such perceptions can further raise Delhi-Dhaka mutual suspicions.

Moreover, Yunus’s advocacy for reviving regional cooperation under the framework of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), endorsed by Sharif, reflects a shared vision for regional integration. The bloc has been inactive since 2016, when Sheikh Hasina followed India’s path to boycott SAARC’s annual meeting in Islamabad. The renewed Pakistan-Bangladesh engagement on SAARC could restore regional dialogue, challenging India’s approach to keep Islamabad diplomatically isolated.

Doors for Strategic Partnership and Military Cooperation Opens

With a Pakistan-Bangla multidimensional rapprochement on the way, the prospect of military cooperation has particularly unnerved New Delhi. The first high-level military contact occurred when a top Bangladeshi general reached Islamabad to discuss defense ties. A few days after this visit, an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) delegation landed in Dhaka to visit military installations and discuss establishing an intelligence-sharing network.

As India approaches the Taliban government, Pakistan’s outreach to Dhaka can be a trump card in balancing security optics in the region. The visit of Bangladesh’s naval chief to Pakistan and Bangladesh’s participation in the 2025 Aman Exercise indicate the bolstering of naval cooperation. The evolving contours of Pak-Bangladesh maritime engagement can squeeze the Indian naval ambitions at the crossroads of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

Talks about long-term strategic cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh have permeated the public space, too. At an event in Dhaka, Prof. Shahiduzzaman received tremendous applause when he proposed a nuclear treaty between Pakistan and Bangladesh. He pitched the nuclearization of Bangladesh as a strategic deterrent to Indian threats. Such sentiments show Pakistan’s perception-building in Bangladesh as a counterbalance in pushing Indian pressures.

Conclusion

South Asia is witnessing significant regional shifts sparked by Bangladesh’s repositioning in the region. Dhaka’s shifted foreign policy is restructuring regional alliances, economic interactions, and security dynamics. Bangladesh’s swinging posture has shifted the sands in which Pakistan has gained, and India has much to lose. However, geopolitical calculations aside, the path toward stability in South Asia passes through regional dialogue, for which revitalizing SAARC is the best option.


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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.

About the Author(s)

Abdul Haseeb is keen on nuclear politics, South Asian politics, the role of emerging technologies, and governance issues in Pakistan. His research explores the intersection of society, security, and technology, with a focus on how these factors shape global defense and governance. He aims to contribute to discussions on arms control, regional stability, and the role of technology in shaping the modern world.