Introduction

The concept of the “Century of Humiliation” (1840–1949) is central to understanding China’s national identity and strategic culture. This period, marked by foreign invasions, unequal treaties, and domestic upheavals, left a profound legacy of shame and victimhood. The victimization formed the collective “national trauma” which influenced the strategic culture. 

The victimization narrative in modern Chinese history was formally integrated into the national discourse following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Deng Xiaoping attributed the unrest to deficiencies in ideological and political education, leading to the development of a new ideological framework to replace the discredited class-struggle narrative of the Cultural Revolution.

By 1993, patriotic education was made a compulsory component of the nationwide curriculum, embedding themes of national victimhood and resilience in the collective consciousness. China’s hypersensitivity towards sovereignty issues, calling internal unrest a ground for foreign intervention, and secrecy in foreign affairs are all linked with China’s historical consciousness. However, it is not a simple process, the history is “chosen” by the elites (in this case CCP) which is disseminated among the masses.

Through patriotic education and public discourse, the CCP has cultivated a sense of unity and resilience, emphasizing the importance of sovereignty and national rejuvenation, the “Chinese Dream.” This article explores the impact of this historical consciousness on China’s strategic culture, national interests, and military doctrine, demonstrating how the Century of Humiliation continues to influence China’s present and future trajectories.

Historical Background

The Century of Humiliation began with the First Opium War (1839-1842) when China faced humiliating defeat at the hands of Great Britain and was forced into the Treaty of Nanjing and later, the 1860 Treaty of Beijing – called the unequal treaties. The unequal treaties ensured the unrestricted propagation of Christianity, allowing missionaries to freely travel, acquire property for churches and schools, and engage in proselytizing. This was seen as an attack on Chinese culture and values particularly.

The 19th century was also marked by domestic rebellion. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), one of the deadliest uprisings in history, caused widespread devastation across China, affecting most provinces and resulting in around twenty million deaths. Similarly, the Robin Hood-like Nian rebellion in North China (1853-1868) which employed guerilla warfare also aimed at dethroning Confucianism.

The government at the time restored compliance to the Confucian tradition under the Tongzhi restoration campaign (1862-1874) meaning “unified government.” The slogan of the movement was “Chinese culture for the foundation, Western learning for practical use [yong].”

The most painful among these 100 years was China’s wars with Japan. The Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) deeply shocked China as it faced a humiliating defeat by Japan, a nation it named as “dwarf bandits.” China lost Taiwan and shortly after, in 1897–1898, Western powers began demanding long-term leases on Chinese territories. Countries like Russia, Britain, and France established spheres of influence to exploit China’s resources and infrastructure for economic gain, symbolically “carving up the Chinese melon.”

At the outbreak of WW1, In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-one Demands to China, aiming to turn the country into a quasi-colony. Later, the Treaty of Versailles awarded Shandong to Japan instead of returning it to China, sparking widespread outrage. This led to six weeks of strikes, protests, and boycotts of Japanese goods, with some violence against Japanese nationals. The unrest culminated in the resignation of the Chinese cabinet on June 12.

Japan’s aggression toward China intensified from the 1915 Twenty-one Demands to the 1937 invasion, marked by atrocities like the Rape of Nanjing and a puppet regime under Wang Jingwei. Chiang Kai-shek prioritized fighting the CCP over resisting Japan, weakening his government amid widespread suffering and dissent. In contrast, the CCP gained strength by positioning itself as a nationalist force, ultimately rising to power after the war.

China’s national identity is strongly shaped by a deep sense of shame and victimhood, stemming from its history of foreign invasions and domination, often referred to as the “Century of Humiliation” (1840–1949). This period, spanning from the First Opium War to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, marked an era of subjugation by foreign powers.

The official adoption of the victimization narrative in Chinese modern history began after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Reflecting on the crisis, Deng Xiaoping attributed it to shortcomings in ideological and political education. This prompted the introduction of a new ideology to replace the discredited class-struggle framework of the Cultural Revolution. By 1993, patriotic education classes became mandatory nationwide.

A significant shift in educational content accompanied this change, moving from a “victor” narrative to a “victim” narrative that blamed China’s Century of Humilitation on foreign aggression, particularly Western imperialism. This reframing highlighted the West as the external force accountable for China’s suffering.

Analysis of the Century of Humiliation

Collective Memory and Sovereignty in Chinese Nationalist Discourse

Throughout China’s extensive history, conflicts with neighboring countries often led emperors and their advisors to view other peoples as “barbarians,” implying they were less culturally developed than the Chinese. However, being at a lower stage of cultural evolution did not necessarily prevent these less advanced groups from occasionally defeating China in military engagements. As a result of such defeats, China was compelled to permit foreign powers to establish autonomous enclaves, particularly in key trading hubs like Shanghai and Hong Kong.

The years between 1840 and 1860 are presented as European colonialism and imperialism on China and its exploitation. China is portrayed as a “victim” and these attacks were seen as attacks on its culture and values. Collective historical consciousness is transferred from one generation to the other by means of school education, parents, etc. In Chinese classrooms, the curriculum places significant emphasis on themes of national humiliation. Patriotic education is integrated into the educational system, spanning from kindergarten to college.

The CCP has advanced its narrative and legitmized its rule by being more assertive and loading the content heavily with patriotic education. China has emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of globalization. Its embrace of globalism has generated unparalleled wealth and power, laying the groundwork for the new Chinese Dream. It has provided CCP with enough power to use the “trauma” to achieve “glory.”

Political psychologists have identified various elements that constitute national identity. A widely recognized model, introduced by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), categorizes national identity into two key components: patriotic sentiment, and nationalistic sentiment. Historical narratives highlighting past achievements tend to strengthen patriotic sentiment, whereas focusing on victimization can cultivate resentment toward external groups and fuel a desire to reclaim national dignity. The victimization narrative started to surface post Tiannamen rebellion.

Note: This chart illustrates the percentage of articles in the People’s Daily that referenced the victimization narrative between “1946 and 2015”.

Impact of Century of Humiliation on the Strategic Culture of China

The concept of “strategic culture” is especially significant for countries like China, which take pride in their rich history and ancient culture. From these foundational beliefs, a nation’s foreign policy elites develop a set of prioritized actions, or “ranked preferences,” which should be consistently evident in the state’s behavior over time.

According to Alastair Iain Johnston’s strategic culture is “as an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.” To analyze the impacts of the century of humiliation, the strategic culture is divided into two domains i.e. national strategic culture and military strategic culture.

China’s National Strategic Culture

According to Andrew Scobell, the majority of Chinese elites hold the belief that China has a distinctively pacifistic strategic culture. However, it is not as simple as it seems. As Johnston and Scobell argue, China’s strategic culture consists of two distinct strands: Confucian and parabellum (or realpolitik). Under high threats, China’s realpolitik culture drives pre-emptive action, while low threats invoke Confucian restraint and defense. Moderate threats lead to cautious, limited offensives combining both approaches.

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting the wars.”

Sun Tzu in the “Art of War”

This explains China’s reliance on its soft power to establish hegemony.

One of the major features of China’s strategic culture is its hypersensitivity towards the issue of sovereignty. It is evident in its use of the Security Council veto on intrastate issues. The bullying and humiliation China faced at the hands of great powers during the opium wars, and sino-japanese still serves as a major element of “trauma” used by CCP while formulating the foreign policy.

Compared to the western culture where personal agency dominates, Chinese view individuals as part of a collective, where personal behavior is shaped by the expectations of the group. Thus the collective memory of past humiliations is a collectivist experience which dictates the national interests which in turn influence the strategic culture.

Another key characteristic of strategic culture is that the Beijing’s threat perceptions remain heavily influenced by the need to preserve internal stability and counter external pressures. As M. Taylor Fravel has observed, Chinese military doctrine regards internal conflict as both a potential source of conflict with neighboring countries and a justification for foreign intrusion. This is evident from how the Chinese government crushed down the late Ming uprisings, Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), and Xinhai Revolution (1911–1912).

The importance of maintaining internal unity is also reflected in the concept of the “Mandate of Heaven,” which is tied to the people’s acceptance of their ruler. Consequently, in Chinese strategic culture, the use of force is seen as a legitimate means for the government to demonstrate that it still holds the Mandate.

The Chinese refer to their humiliating experiences during “Western and Japanese incursions” as “national trauma.” After enduring a significant decline in national strength and prestige, this collective group is deeply determined to restore its former glory and power. This is manifested in the “rejuvenation narrative” presented as a policy direction in the “Chinese Dream.”

The Chinese also perceive themselves as a people with a deep sense of cultural and moral superiority. Liu describes the Chinese Dream as “the new leadership’s “mission statement” and “political manifesto” for the Party and the country’s future; and it is “a major strategic thought” for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Thus the “Middle Kingdom approach” still remains a major factor in influencing the strategic culture of China. It is their “chosen glory” which they want to achieve.

As pointed by Robert J. Samuelson, “China’s policies reflect the notion of China First…China accepts and supports the existing order when that serves its needs…Otherwise, it plays by its own rules and norms.” This is evident from China’s wolf warrior diplomacy when it comes to its claims on Tiawan, Senkaku islands, Mongolia etc.

The element of “ethnocentrism” is also predominant feature in Chinna’s strategic thought. In past the chineses created “us vs them” narratives. China was seen as a civilization bestowed with special gifts of art and statecraft while the others were referred to as “barbarians.” Therefore, when China was plundered, bullied, and humiliated by these Barbarians it became a painful  memory. The CCP an its hierarchy where the emperor is veneretaed is a testimony to this fact that CCP still relies on past cultural norms and values to justify its 1-party rule.

China’s Military Strategic Culture

The 100 years of humiliation not only had an impact on China’s national strategic culture but also on its military’s startegic thought. The literature taught to the personnel also relies on ancient teachings of Sun Tzu. Regarding the role of war, it asserts that “war is costly, destructive, and leads to internal dissension.” In all thirteen chapters of Sun Tzu, the term li (force) is mentioned only nine times, with several of these instances carrying negative or cautionary connotations.

A very crucial feature of China’s military startegic culture is its focus on securing a decisive victory over a stranger opponent through deception and cunning strategy. Chinese military writings also emphasize that victory should be attained with the least possible cost, with the ideal being to achieve conquest without resorting to bloodshed. Moreover, In Chinese culture, risk is typically viewed in a negative light. As Kurtis Hagen has pointed out, “In Western culture, risk is celebrated; taking risks is seen as a mark of bravery. But in Chinese tradition, to take risks is to be negligent.”

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Sun Tzu

It also holds that China fights war in self-defence and has no intention of invading other lands. It is evident in how China changed the narrative of the “rise of China” to “peaceful development of China” in order to reaffirm that it does not wants the overhaul of existing world order. Additionally, In Chinese doctrine, the mission of “frontier defense” (“bianfang”) focuses on maintaining internal political stability in China’s border areas and safeguarding the borders from foreign threats.

Xi Jinping has emphasized the principle of “being prepared for danger in times of peace” as part of China’s strategic approach. Military scholars draw comparisons between today’s international system and ancient China’s fragmented state, often citing The Art of War to stress the importance of achieving victory without direct confrontation. Despite a decrease in interstate wars and China’s relatively peaceful environment, global dangers for the military remain

Conclusion

The “Century of Humiliation” profoundly shapes China’s national identity and strategic culture. This historical trauma fosters a collective memory, driving nationalistic and patriotic sentiments embedded in education and political rhetoric. China’s strategic culture reflects a blend of Confucian ideals and realpolitik, emphasizing sovereignty, internal stability, and calculated responses to perceived threats. Moreover, the CCP leverages this the Century of Humiliation to legitimize its rule and assert its global ambitions, including the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. Therefore we can conclude that the past continues to define China’s policies, priorities, and global interactions.

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