Aamir Abbas is a PIEAS graduate with an MSc in Data Science from UET, Lahore. He is also a CSS/PMS mentor.
Since 1947 Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have been shifting between periods of collaboration and conflict. The two countries have been inseparable due to geography, yet they have been kept apart by politics and security issues. The Durand Line issue, migration, and changing alliances in the region led to early animosity. In 1979, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ensued, millions of Afghan refugees were accommodated in Pakistan and were assisted by the country in the resistance against the Soviets. The era established strong security connections; however, it also left behind guns, militant groups, and radicalization of ideologies that would destabilize the region later and cause cross-border terrorism.
Following the 9/11 events, Pakistan was a frontline state in fighting terrorism. Over the past twenty years, it has been combating violent organizations that attacked its cities, security forces, and civilians. One of the most dangerous was Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which launched its attacks throughout the country. Islamabad continuously claimed that militant leadership was being served using the Afghan land and safe havens to reorganize.
As the Taliban came back to power in Kabul in August 2021, Pakistan opted first to engage and not to confront. It promoted human aid, diplomatic routes of recognition, and regional connectivity. Islamabad always lamented in world forums that Afghanistan’s border would lead to an empty nest for extremist groups. Simply put, Pakistan was positive in its contribution, where dialogue and not sanctions were promoted. The security situation, however, took the opposite turn. The recent wave of cross-border terrorism in Pakistan has been apparent since the end of 2021. The United Nations Security Council surveillance systems reported that organizations such as TTP and Islamic State -Khorasan Province (ISKP) still exist and are operational. The anti-police, anti-military convoys and civil groups became targeted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The threat was not random, as it was proved by high-profile incidents in 2025 and the first months of 2026.
This development, as perceived by Pakistan, was a strategic blow. Despite the decades of diplomatic interaction and mediation between Pakistan and Kabul, militant operations against the country escalated. It has become a backstab, as characterized by many policymakers in Islamabad, not an emotional one, but a fact of hard security. This was hoping that Afghan soil would not be turned over to Pakistan. That is not the case, as indicated by the ground situation. The recent confrontation in February 2026 was a result of the targeted attacks by Pakistan on purported militant hideouts within the territory of Afghanistan. Islamabad termed the move as restricted and intelligence-led, in a move to counterattacks on camps across the border. Kabul denounced the attacks, and the situation became highly tense. Still, the main question is the same one: is the territory of Afghanistan going to be permitted to shelter groups of attack on its neighbor?
Analytically, there are three factors to explain the post-2021 surge. To begin with, the political vacuum that ensued following the U.S exit enabled various militant groups to restructure. Second, regional militant outfits have had ideological overlaps, which have led to networks and not isolated groups. Third, poor economic situations within Afghanistan have lowered the ability of the central government to exercise complete territorial control.
The solution to the situation would need more than general appeals to peace. To begin with, Pakistan and Afghanistan require a joint counterterrorism mechanism, which is verifiable with the use of third-party technical observation. The sharing of intelligence must be an institutional, but not a personal process. An integrated border coordination unit with real- time exchange of data would help in minimizing the miscommunication and deterioration. Second, the economic leverage should be associated with security standards. The trade concessions, transit access, and infrastructure cooperation need to be gradual and conditional on action being meted out against TTP and ISKP networks. Non-accountable engagement has not yielded any results; systematic engagement may. Third, the two parties should rekindle the highest level of political dialogue, and no longer should counterterrorism be intertwined with the wider ideological divides. Rhetoric in public should be defused so that nationalism is not brought up. The de-escalation is necessary because the prolonged confrontation will only empower the non-state actors.
Pakistan has been the most reliable in terms of interaction with Kabul because the stability in Afghanistan is the key to peace in the region. But it could not be the participation without a reply to the attacks. It is now the task of everyone to bring down militant networks collectively, not by condoning or even encouraging them. A durable peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan hinges on one thing, however: there should be no sanctuary, no proxies, and no selective counterterror. It is only at this point that decades of distrustful relations may be replaced by lasting stability.
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