Historical Roots and Mahanian Ambition
In an article that I co-authored with Prof. Rohan Gunaratna for Air University in the USA, we argued that China is tilting to leverage its sea power, emulating Mahan’s principles of complete command at sea. The recent launch of China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier, Fujian, has given Beijing a state of euphoria, affirming our argument on China’s zest for naval supremacy. The rise of the People’s Liberation Army Navy from a tiny coast guard force to a blue water navy was not set in an accidental manner, as it was deeply rooted in China’s own interest in restoring its maritime legacy that dates back to the famous voyages of Admiral Zheng He.
Drawing on Mahan’s doctrine that a powerful fleet underpins a prosperous nation, Xi Jinping once stated, “History and experience tell us that a country will rise if it commands the oceans well and will fall if it surrenders them…We must adhere to a development path that makes our country rich and strong by making full use of the sea.” In line with this strategic vision, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) gradually shifted from its traditional “Offshore Defense” strategy to an “Open Seas Protection” doctrine, which necessitated the rapid and large-scale development of its naval assets. Since the adoption of this doctrine in 2015, the PLAN has advanced its shipbuilding capacity to an unprecedented level, ultimately becoming the largest navy in the world.
The Fujian Aircraft Carrier
The USS Gerald R. Ford is powered by two A1B nuclear reactors and displaces approximately 100,000 tons at full load. In contrast, Fujian is equipped with an indigenously developed arresting gear system and relies on conventional gas-turbine or diesel-electric propulsion. Liu Le, a Beijing-based military commentator, praised Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult system as a technological advancement surpassing its US counterparts.
China’s third aircraft carrier has undoubtedly drawn significant attention within Washington’s defense circles; however, it remains uncertain whether Fujian or the broader Chinese aircraft carrier fleet constitutes a serious challenge to the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. More importantly, doubts persist as to whether Fujian’s capabilities can advance Beijing’s long-term objectives in the region’s most volatile flashpoint—the potential invasion of Taiwan.
From a technical perspective, Fujian and other Chinese aircraft carriers could provide operational cover for offensive maneuvers by deploying anti-air and anti-submarine screens to the island’s northeast and southeast. Furthermore, PLAN carriers might employ raiding strategies aimed at neutralizing US bases in the Indo-Pacific, such as Guam. In a worst-case scenario, China’s carrier strike capacity could surprise the United States by advancing into the mid-Pacific to disrupt US supply lines and divert attention from Taiwan. However, such operations would likely result in the loss of several of Beijing’s limited aircraft carriers.
Strategic Constraints and Allied Deterrence
Admiral Liu Huaqing, the architect of China’s modern naval strategy, foresaw that any future maritime escalation would likely occur in the area between the first and second island chains. The late Admiral Liu Huaqing advocated enhancing PLAN capabilities through aircraft carriers to enable power projection beyond the first island chain. Realistically, Fujian and other PLAN carriers face operational constraints, with limited experience as a blue-water navy beyond the first island chain constituting a key impediment to Beijing’s ambitions.
Conversely, the absence of sufficient land-based missiles and air support for Fujian confers a strategic advantage to the United States in any potential escalation. In particular, China’s reliance on carrier-centric operations becomes vulnerable given the strength of US alliances across the Indo-Pacific. In a previous article for Paradigm Shift, I argued that the deployment of US Typhoon missiles in the Philippines exemplifies Manila’s deterrence strategy against Beijing’s expansionism in the South China Sea. Indeed, the strengthening of partnerships among the United States, the Philippines, and other key regional actors has become a pivotal factor in undermining China’s aircraft-carrier-based strategy. In simple terms, Fujian’s technological sophistication alone cannot avert disaster in a potential naval confrontation, given the US Navy’s eleven large aircraft carriers and the support of its regional allies.
Apart from the salient factors mentioned above, China lacks major naval battle experience to pose a significant threat to the US. Moreover, aircraft carriers rely on enormous amounts of fuel and munitions for their longer operations in the high seas, which requires stronger basing infrastructure. China’s lack of such basing infrastructure can hinder Chinese strategy. The current Chinese overseas base in Djibouti remains out of the question in case of a naval escalation in the Indo-Pacific.
The Limits of Naval Dominance
Overall, Beijing’s Mahanian fascination—driven by its long-term ambition to secure maritime dominance—reveals inherent limitations. While the PLAN’s transformation from relative obscurity to a modern naval force is impressive, it would be pragmatic for Beijing to recognize that the Fujian aircraft carrier is unlikely to induce any paradigm shift in US naval supremacy in the foreseeable future. Beijing might also reflect on the “Tirpitz Trap,” which illustrates how Imperial Germany’s attempt to challenge British naval supremacy through excessive naval expansion backfired, as Britain responded by consolidating alliances in the lead-up to the First World War.
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Punsara Amarasinghe is a post-doctoral researcher affiliated with Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Pisa. He is a PhD holder in Public International Law from the Institute of Law, Politics and Development at Scuola Superiore Sant Anna (Sant Anna School for Advanced Studies) in Pisa, Italy. He holds LL.M. from the South Asian University, New Delhi, and completed his undergraduate studies in law at the Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
He completed another master's degree in international relations from the HSE, Moscow. He has held two visiting research fellowships at the Global Legal Studies Centre at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and Sciences PO, Paris. He was affiliated with the Minerva Center for Strategic Studies at Hebrew University, Jerusalem for a brief period in 2019.