The world today is no longer simply divided between friends and foes or East and West. It is instead divided into different ideas of order. On one side, the vision of global politics is transactional, deal-driven, personality-centric, and somewhat impatient with institutions. The other side has broad narratives promising stability through continuity, sovereignty, and long-term cooperation based on mutual trust. This contrast of ideas between President Donald Trump’s deal-making approach to international order and President Xi Jinping’s concept of a global community with a shared future isn’t a clash of ideologies but more like a contest over how international order itself should be.
This contrast tends to explain the contemporary puzzle in international relations of why many traditional allies of the United States, particularly the Europeans, are exploring opportunities of diplomatic engagement with China while being reluctant towards Trump-led initiatives such as the Board of Peace. This does not imply that these states are defecting from alliances or embracing a new hegemon. Instead, they are navigating a system of global disorder, where predictability is a valuable power.
The core problem with this shift is not the American capabilities but the erosion of trust in leadership. The United States may be militarily and economically dominant, yet leadership in global politics requires consistency, commitment, and restraint. Europeans’ engagement with China is more or less a reflection of such a crisis, that when global politics appear personalized, allies tend to hedge.
Moreover, China’s growing diplomatic appeal does not originate from universal acceptance of its values and political model. Instead, it offers something increasingly scarce in global politics nowadays: a coherent narrative. President Xi’s vision of a shared future emphasizes interdependence and non-interference. Europeans may not exactly endorse this framework, but their willingness to engage with Beijing suggests that in times of disorder, states tend to lean towards actors that appear stable.
It actually explains that the shift does not mean that the US allies are “turning Chinese” when they travel to Beijing while resisting proposals such as Trump’s Board of Peace. The hesitation is about rejecting a security governance that resembles a brokerage political model rather than an institutional process. Transactional diplomacy cannot work in security environments, as it can raise fears of unpredictability and imbalances. As peace for most states does not equal a deal, but more like a system that needs to be addressed and managed.
What we are witnessing today is that the strategic autonomy of states is replacing automatic alignment. It is more likely that the US allies are behaving like cautious shoppers, roaming around different geopolitical showrooms, inspecting the elements without being interested in long-term commitments, while keeping their options open. The behavior is a reflection that no single power can guarantee order indefinitely.
For countries like Pakistan, the environment demands strategic maturity. The main task is not to choose between great power visions but instead navigate among them with clarity of interest and consistency in policy. Pakistan does not need to market itself as a bridge between powers; it needs to become a stable platform that states can choose to engage with.
The search for order will not end with one vision defeating the other. The future is more likely to be shaped by competing ideas of stability, some built on deals and pressure, others framed around development, connectivity, and long-term partnerships. In this contest of visions, the language of cooperation may prove more sustainable.
China’s appeal, particularly to countries uneasy with the United States’ sudden policy reversals and transactional alliances, lies not in moral perfection but in consistency, long-term planning, infrastructure diplomacy, and a narrative of shared development.
For states navigating this transition, the task is not to pick up a savior but to invest in frameworks that reduce volatility rather than amplify it. The coming order will likely be shaped less by who dominates and more by who offers continuity.
The question, then, is not which power will rule the system, but which vision will make disorder less permanent.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.
Abdul Momin Rasul is an MPhil scholar of international relations at Bahauddin Zakariya University (BZU), Multan. His writing focuses on global order, peacebuilding, security studies, and contemporary geopolitical shifts.