The Blame Game Begins: Pakistan in the Crosshairs
At 2:30 pm, on 22 April, allegedly 26 people were shot and killed (could be more), in a terrorist attack in Baisaran, 6 km from Pahalgam in Indian-occupied Kashmir. True to form, Indian media went ballistic, and even more predictably, Pakistan was immediately blamed. The attack was owned by, what the Indian media said, were The Resistance Front (TRF), others called it the Kashmir Resistance Front (KRF), who were duly affiliated with Pakistani-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and accused of being their proxies. The so-called groups named by the media are hardly known, and information on them has been planted only now in 2025. No other records exist of their presence.
The apparently new creation explains the inconsistencies in the titles attributed to them by the media. Some reported khaki uniforms, others, camouflage, while it was claimed that there were 10 terrorists, and others claimed as few as 4. It was first reported that all were armed with AK-47s, then the US M4 was spotted, and later, helmet-mounted cameras were seen as well. This was a developing story, and one that was so horrific that inconsistencies in the reporting were not only understandable but expected. Nevertheless, the firm, singular, and committed reporting that Pakistan, and only Pakistan, was responsible for these killings is quite discerning.
Terrorism is usually a product of the intelligence agencies’ exploitation of a real or perceived grievance amongst the populace against their own government. Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility that one may be witnessing a reciprocal response to the Balochistan Jaffer Train incident; an ISI vs RAW conflict, in a tit-for-tat encounter. If that is the case, then the matter may not escalate any further and may be easily contained or settled down through an inter-agency negotiated settlement.
However, this does not look to be the case, and the event appears to have been triggered by other motivations. The first of these was allegations of it being a Pakistani-sponsored attack. However, unless there are other follow-up incidents, leading to co-related events contributing to separatist sentiments in Indian-occupied Kashmir, then the incident becomes meaningless and mindless. As a standalone event, the incident carries no weightage, other than loss of life and limb, and an attention-drawing crisis to establish the relevance of some forgotten dissident group. However, going beyond accusing Pakistan, a far more likely scenario is that this is another Indian false flag operation.
Beyond Accusation: The False Flag Possibility
The ingredients establishing that the Pahalgam incident may be more of a self-aggravated injury at the hands of India are as follows:
- Pahalgam is located well away from the LOC (400 km), making infiltration by militants difficult and thus not a likely venue for such an activity. The logistics to undertake such an operation would require transportation, caches, reconnaissance, etc., which would be difficult. Especially so when other, much easier targets are available. The militants traveling a long distance as a cohesive group would make them vulnerable to detection by Indian intelligence.
- For any resistance group within Kashmir to target tourism is highly unlikely since it affects the livelihood of the local people.
- Pahalgam’s geographical location is isolated putting it out of regular conventional communication and delaying responses to any emergencies. In spite of these known facts, on 22 April, at the beginning of the tourism season, there was no security apparatus visible or available. There was no monitoring of the environment that the situation in Kashmir warranted.
- The timing of the Pahalgam attack was conveniently straddled by a Modi-VP Vance meeting on Monday in India and then a Modi-Prince Salman meeting in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday. Though Vance was on a personal 4-day visit, his meeting with Modi was important and official. Modi cut short his trip to Saudi Arabia, but only after meeting Prince Salman and concluding important inter-state agreements. All he canceled was his meeting with the Indian community. The timing of the attack exacerbated the impact of the attack, but did not affect any state-level commitment – the theatrics by the Indian government displayed an artificial urgency, but in fact, no serious disruption took place to any state event.
- The readiness to blame Pakistan by a media in search of sensationalism and which had gone wild on steroids, fed by prepared political posturing and by the ready-made government statement/threats, indicated an element of premeditated activity. Too much, too soon to digest.
- The timing vis-à-vis Pakistan could not have been better with political unrest in every province, with the army involved in counter-insurgency in Balochistan and KP, the economy in dire straits, and with a visible Afghan hostility.
- Pakistan’s current relative isolation at a global level, while Indian diplomacy is carrying the day, is another indicator. Israel has been putting pressure on Pakistan to recognize Israel and establish formal relations – secret meetings of various government officials in the recent past have surfaced in this regard and have been reported in the media. Connivance between Israel and India cannot be ruled out in this matter, where more pressure can be applied against an unstable government to do the needful.
- India has a history of false flag operations, especially against Pakistan, beginning with the hijacking of the Ganga, Fokker aircraft, in 1971, the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, the Godhra Train Burning incident in 2002, the Samjhauta Express bombing in 2007, Mumbai attack in 2008. Pathankot airbase attack in 2016, the Uri attack in 2016, and the Pulwama suicide attack in 2019. This trend becomes far more prominent during the BJP regime and especially during Modi’s rule. In other words, this false flag operation in Pahalgam is in total keeping with the style, character, and history of India– a regular trend.
The Question of Intent: Why a False Flag Now?
Terrorism is an unfortunate phenomenon, and one does not want to descend into a blame game or justify terror as a natural component of conflict. Yet one must look beyond the immediate chaos and carnage to make sense of where this is all leading. In this case, for argument’s sake, if it is a false flag operation, then to what avail? The domestic political environment in India does not lend itself to adventurism at this particular time. The Indian economy, currently grappling with the Trump-created chaos, is not yet certain enough to venture into a thoughtless conflict. So why would India do such a thing?
Also, having learned from the February 2019 Balakot incident, the Indians have probably realized that such surgical strikes are likely to be counterproductive. They could fail and embarrass India, or Pakistan could respond and equally humiliate the Indians as was done earlier. This time, a false flag operation may go beyond a bombing run and manufactured notions and claims to glory, and instead be more focused on doing serious damage to Pakistan. The objectives, intent, and purpose of undertaking such an activity by the Indians will be explained a little later.
Non-kinetic Maneuvers
False flag operations are always premeditated and never spontaneous. Thus, if this were a false flag operation, the next phase of this madness would have been worked out and planned meticulously. There could be non-kinetic steps taken as well as kinetic. The non-kinetic steps would involve shutting down Pakistan’s waters and abrogating the Indus Water Treaty (though this would be illegal if undertaken unilaterally and would also amount to an act of war), but this would take time to implement and would not showcase an immediate effect.
Besides, one does not sacrifice 26 lives just to rationalize such a relatively small decision – a step which could be taken anyway, even if tourists are not murdered by one’s own intelligence agencies required to justify it. However, the Indus Water Treaty has other implications that cannot be ignored and one of them is implied in the treaty is the acceptance of Kashmir as it is today, divided between Pakistan and India. Implicit in the Treaty is that the waters are guaranteed to the lower riparian, i.e., Pakistan, which is seen as a tacit understanding of how Kashmir is divided.
By abrogating the Treaty, first India has, thrown out the argument that Kashmir is divided and is in fact a homogenous piece of land inter-dependent on its indigenous resources, and secondly, it has validated Pakistan’s argument that Kashmir is geographically contiguous to Pakistan and that India actually has no right to hold any of that territory – politically, ideologically, legally and morally. Then, another step that India may take is shutting down the border at Wagha-Attari, but there is already very limited trade that goes through it. Does this have enough drama and theatrics that can be suitably politicized?
Hostile activity at sea is a probability, intercepting and inspecting Pakistan-bound ships in international waters is a possibility, but then Pakistan too would respond in kind. Any sea-borne aggression can have very humiliating consequences for India, which would undermine its big-power status. Besides, such an activity would impact universally on all shipping in the Indian Ocean, through a conflict-surcharge and higher insurance, making trade more expensive for all. Concurrent with these steps, they could try and take the Pahalgam incident before the international community, hoping to prosecute Pakistan for misconduct and have it declared as a terrorist state, leading to international embargoes and sanctions. Of all the steps, this would be the most serious and effective.
The Specter of Kinetic Action: India’s Calculated Gamble
However, non-kinetic steps would not be enough to pacify the Indian populace, which has now been worked up into a war hysteria and is demanding blood. The people would only be satisfied when they visibly see Pakistan physically chastised in one way or the other. If the Pahalgam incident was premeditated by India, then the shaping of the Indian opinion was part of this premeditation and not a consequence of a spur-of-the-moment thought.
It appears that the Indian government is trying to manipulate approval from the people, seeking permission to engage in a kinetic operation. The public war-mongering would help in securing a resolution in the Parliament, making any such kinetic operation a kosher affair, with political propriety and from a high moral ground. In anticipation of a highly predictive public response, the Indians must have already planned a kinetic operation, its logistics, its targeting, and its narratives, and would now be in a position to quickly execute such a plan.
One would not go as far as qualifying it as a surgical strike, since any surgical strike can only take place in an operational environment of total surprise. The surprise has already been lost, and Pakistan already expects the Indians to do something or the other. Safeguards would obviously be in place, but would they be enough and the right ones? The Indians must have evaluated this possibility and planned an operation that would be unexpected and different, circumventing any preparations made by Pakistan. However, not undertaking a physical operation would now amount to political suicide, and the BJP can ill-afford that, after taking up such an aggressive position and public commitment.
So, what is the Indian government in search of – objectives, intent, and end-state? It is envisioned that India sees itself as acting in a copycat imitation of the US and Israeli combat initiatives. India now wants to join the big league – and display a power potential indicating a capacity for unilateral action when and where it’s needed. This would firm up its position in the QUAD Agreement and other anti-China agreements, securing weapon systems and arms from the West and projecting India as a reliable and capable strategic partner. India would vie for international prestige and regional dominance, projecting itself as a legitimate candidate to challenge Chinese supremacy. At the same time, cut Pakistan to size and forced it to acquiesce on many of the issues that await resolution, thus securing hegemonic control and relative peace for the time to come.
Beyond a Limited War
Yet to undertake a kinetic operation, India would still not want to be seen as the aggressor and thus would not be prepared to violate the International Border with Pakistan. Nor would it like to get involved in any long-drawn-out assembly of forces and concentration of strike components, inviting international mediation. Besides, the days of coercive strategy have long gone. The first and foremost influencing factor in any such limited plans for kinetic operations must include autonomous control of “war-termination” that is applied unilaterally but still allows space to announce a notion of victory, thus addressing public perception and expectations.
It is likely that Northern Command, suitably reinforced, would be tasked to carry out limited ground operations along the Line of Control, adjusting the border according to Indian preferences. It will be significant enough to hurt Pakistan, specifically Azad Kashmir, but not large enough to trigger a nuclear response. Functioning under the shadow of a nuclear threshold, Pakistan will be tested for responses, as India applies graduated, incremental thrusts designed to immediately halt in the face of any meaningful resistance and hold ground that has been won till then.
They are likely to conduct limited offensive operations in Siachin, the Skardu axis, Bagh axis, Bhimber axis, and Iftikharabad – concurrently or any selected sector, with the proviso to halt the operation in case things are not going their way or they are threatened by a nuclear response. The weather would suit such a limited offensive during this time, and by winter, gains could be consolidated to make the ground changes permanent. The most likely thrust would be towards GB, threatening the CPEC route. The progress of the operations in terms of depth and speed would depend on the resistance faced, and as such, every move would test Pakistan’s responses before moving to the next phase.
Pakistan’s Strategic Imperatives
The military leadership is well-informed and well-equipped to deal with Indian designs and, as such, must have already come up with plans based on prepared contingencies. Despite the current different divides and differences within the country, the military leadership should be very confident that in such a conflict, the people of Pakistan stand behind them and for them, always. However, a recommended response thrown in, by no means, suggests that there are any reservations in the plans already on the table, which by now would have been well considered and matured into executable reactions to Indian initiatives.
Yet, this paper offers its opinion, which contributes towards confirming and validating what has already been a well-considered plan. This paper hopes to instill confidence in the existing plans and their execution. Pakistan’s response in the face of such an eventuality must be beyond a conflict restricted to Kashmir, and Pakistan must not be drawn into such a limited war. If it does, it will become an accomplice to the Indian maneuver and reduce its own options. It should be clear to the Indians that they may initiate hostilities, but Pakistan would decide when they cease, and thus, escalation favors Pakistan.
Pakistan must carry out a heavy concentration of forces now in the Sialkot sector, threatening the Madhopur-Jammu axis from across the working boundary. By threatening to sever Kashmir from mainland India, Pakistan can contain Indian adventurism elsewhere. The deeper road communications through Basoli can easily be interdicted by occupying the Parmandal ranges overlooking Basoli-Akhnur. This warrants mounting large-scale collective training exercises immediately in the Sialkot sector in synch with mobilization exercises before the Indian Air Force is in a position to influence strategic movements in the area.
A wait-and-see approach would be self-defeating since once India has established its military posture, it will already be too late for Pakistan to respond. Any assessments that indicate that this is neither a false flag operation nor that the Indians are likely to mount an operation against Pakistan are self-defeating, but even if that is the case, a precautionary training exercise in the Sialkot Sector would be a reasonable and suitable safeguard against any hostile design. First, it controls escalation and does not allow the Indians a free hand in executing a unilateral war termination at a time of their choosing. Second, if launched, such an offensive would have devastating effects, leading to huge consequences that could go either way – a conclusion the Indians would not want to risk.
The Diplomatic Front: Seeking Long-Term Solutions
Along with this precautionary operational maneuver, Pakistan needs to set up a proper diplomatic way forward to its relationship with India in general and Kashmir in particular, for a final, long-term solution and a better future. Two nuclear-armed states that are neighbors cannot live as irresponsibly as we do. A day-to-day existence, with a relationship wholly based on incidents, is counter-productive. Events created with malicious intent or by third-party spoilers, only contributing to enhanced animosities, have no method to any bilateral relationship. Such events, structured as they are, become politicized with the government being forced to play to the galleries, thus escalating an already hostile situation. The rhetoric sways public opinion, clamoring for action, demanding war!!
India has always run away from third-party audits/inquiries or mediation in any Indo-Pak event, but is always the first to blame Pakistan for any incident that takes place in India. They do it without any evidence or substance, but they do it. It is time for Pakistan to bring to the forefront that India has been an accomplice to murder in Canada, the USA, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma, amongst many other nations, as already been stated by these respective governments.
Terror is not an unfamiliar tactic for India, but their denial is not only generally accepted by the world, but Pakistan is usually blamed instead. The United Nations must be approached to establish an impartial team to conduct a proper analysis into the violation of the Kashmir Resolution and the trampling of the human rights in the valley on account of it, the continual threat of abrogation of the Indus Water Treaty despite international guarantees and to inquire into all the accusations that India has been making related to terror-related incidents on Pakistan.
India should put before the world the evidence it has gathered and the information it has that squarely indicts Pakistan, and if it cannot, it should learn to hold the peace rather than sabre-rattle its way into silly attention-attracting dramas. Such international assistance through the auspices of the United Nations must be sought despite India’s reluctance. The legality of the Kashmir dispute needs to be addressed, even if it leads to no physical change.
The International Court for Justice must be moved by Pakistan to give a verdict on the unfinished business of the United Nations Resolution and the political discrimination of the Kashmiris by denying them the promised plebiscite. This day-to-day crisis management must eventually come to a stop. Even a hostile co-existence is more acceptable than what these two nations must endure. The terror must stop in an attempt to create a causal belief on a regular basis in pursuit of war by other means, where peace is elusive and war invisible, but war all the same.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.
