Indian Threat

Beyond the Ceasefire: The Unrelenting, Perpetual Indian Threat

The India-Pakistan military engagement in May 2025, while brief, marked a shift in warfare. India's objective was likely political, seeking public vindication, while Pakistan focused on defense. Despite a ceasefire, the conflict's aftermath includes the Indian threat to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty and India's continued instigation of cross-border terrorism. The author argues Pakistan must actively counter Indian aggression, internationalize Kashmir, and prepare for further hostilities.

“Opportunities multiply as they are seized.”

Sun Tzu

The 2025 India-Pakistan Conflict

In May of this year, 2025, India and Pakistan recently underwent a short, swift military engagement spanning 5 days. It was a meaningful engagement that holds a multitude of lessons, which have been elaborated upon by so many that a repetition here would be superfluous. It would suffice to state that warfare was prosecuted within an electromagnetic spectrum, never witnessed before, covering a multi-domain conceptual employment, with simultaneity and synergy. The nature and character of warfare would, and have, universally changed dramatically.

In this particular conflict, India reportedly lost 7 aircraft, including 4 prized Rafale fighters. However, looking at the episode in hindsight, I have failed to find tangible objectives that one could put one’s finger on, defining what this conflict was about in the first place. Going beyond the rhetoric of hitting terror camps in Pakistan, it is fair to presume that everyone understands that this was never going to stop terrorism, nor was it going to create the effect that was being projected. Yet, when we look at the whole affair critically, it appears that the objective was not as much a military one as it was a political one, which was played out to a hysterical Indian public in search of revenge and vindication over Pahalgam.

Pakistan’s objective stands out more clearly—the defense of Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan did not initiate the conflict but only responded to Indian aggression on the 6th of May, downing 5 Indian jets in this first encounter. Later, another two Indian fighters were lost in other encounters, supposedly forcing the Indians to ground their entire air force, switching strategy to drones and missiles. 

Hereon, the battle of narratives takes over—a series of exaggerated reports, with each side claiming victory.  After the conflict, we are told that India had asked for a ceasefire, wanting to end the conflict. It is fair to conclude that had this conflict been in India’s favor, India would never have wished to end it. Nevertheless, India has since denied that it ever initiated a request to the US to bring about a ceasefire, but the fact remains that there was a ceasefire.

If we are to go by India’s version, then did India, which was spoiling for a fight, willingly agree to a ceasefire, or was it then coerced by the US into agreeing to one? Furthermore, was India compelled to agree to such a ceasefire because of its combat losses?  These are questions that we, the public at large, are left to find answers to, but in my own opinion, India was relieved to have the ceasefire in place, whether it was imposed or a product of their request—either way. After all, it takes two to implement a ceasefire, and India was not only unmistakably eager for it but was also one of the parties implementing the ceasefire, despite what they may claim. 

On the other hand, having engaged one another over this short period, from the 6th of May to the 10th of May, we need to critically examine the after-effects of this engagement. It has left Pakistan facing a dilemma of dealing with probable water scarcity in an environment where water was already continually becoming more and more scarce, the consequences of climate change. The Indian threat to shut down the three rivers to Pakistan, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab Rivers, whose waters were guaranteed by the Indus Water Treaty, is a unilateral act of war if implemented. The threat is real, tangible, and now a grave possibility. However, it has also left India with the probability of internationalizing Kashmir and making Indo-Pak diplomatic interactions go beyond the bilateral levels to a multinational level.

The War Is Not Over Yet

In India, Operation Sindoor has not given rise to any jubilation or a national spirit indicating celebrations of having achieved anything, while in Pakistan, Operation Bunyan um Marsoos has been regarded as a crowning success with widespread euphoria; Pakistan seems to be more satisfied in the aftermath of this conflict than India. 

Here, without taking away the outstanding professionalism displayed by our Air Force in particular and the Armed Forces in general, I think it is only fair to moderate the elation we feel with a little bit of realism. What Pakistan did against the Indian offensive was a remarkable achievement and must never be demeaned in any form or manner, but still, in military terms, it cannot be termed a “success” as yet. The engagement has not concluded; it is ongoing, and there are greater objectives to achieve and even more to defend in the coming weeks and months. India has made no secret of its intent, and their prime minister, Modi, has categorically stated that there is unfinished business to attend to.

First, we need to take him at his word, i.e., any terror event in India would now be considered to be an act of war, Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail would no longer be tolerated and there would be no distinction made between terror groups and the administration/government that supports such activity—supposedly the terms of their “new normal.” The first implies having a convenient trigger to initiate war whenever it is desirable, the second attempts to call Pakistan’s bluff related to the nuclear deterrent strategy, and the last allows India freedom to accuse whoever it finds fit to accuse.

All this occurs without requiring any evidence, inquiry, or investigation—merely an accusation, akin to an offended village woman seeking vindication after a slight. Secondly, the Indian public perception that this conflict was not managed properly by the government has become a political matter that the ruling party will have to address sooner or later to satisfy a misled people. Their immediate political needs require a military success—visible, tangible, and painful—against Pakistan, and soon. Thus, the battle lines are already drawn—permanently. 

Pakistan, seeing the writing on the wall, should not be under any wishful misconception that nothing will happen—it’s now not the question of “if” but “when.” The military must prepare for an Indian military misadventure and be ready to face it on land, sea, and in the air. On a lighter note, Pakistan must test Modi and Ajeet Doval’s thunderous brag that, from now on, any terrorist activity in India will be treated as an “act of war.” Some activity must be generated in Kashmir to call the Indian bluff and see if they react as they have threatened to. If they do react, it will generate a conflict at the time of our choosing; as such, we can be suitably pre-warned and prepared to receive it. If they fail to respond, they will be committing political harakiri by not living up to the bluster and threats they have so brazenly hooted into the wind.

India’s Retaliation

Yet, on a more serious note, what India can do soon is an important hypothesis that needs to be analyzed. India is likely to carry out a full-scale assembly of forces across the international border, the working boundary, and the Line of Control very soon. This could turn into as little as a coercive strategy, trying to bleed Pakistan economically till Pakistan comes to terms with Indian demands. Alternatively, it could be focused on bigger plans involving kinetic military operations with defined objectives across the international border. The alternative is unlikely since Pakistan always outpaces India’s concentration and assembly of forces on account of its lesser geo-depth. Thus, it is always ready and prepared to receive an Indian offensive.

However, India’s greatest military asset is its large naval component, which it is very proud of but which usually remains irrelevant in an India-Pak military conflict. The Indian Navy has more or less been reduced to a ceremonial entity limited to displaying power potential only, and that too during peacetime. However, the navy is itching to be part of the larger conflict, and it has frequently indicated that it would prefer to be part of any future engagement within a deliberate design. By taking up a defensive posture with most of the land forces, the Indians achieved a superior defensive orientation.

This also denies Pakistan the possibility of mounting a meaningful land maneuver anywhere because of the foreclosure of all tactical or strategic objectives. If, contrary to operational logic, such a maneuver is still mounted by Pakistan anyway, and after India has already acquired a superior defensive orientation despite it, it would lead to substantial destruction of its forces. This would be due to the obvious favorable correlation of forces to India’s advantage. Yet, more importantly, during this process, no nuclear threshold would be crossed, leaving India in a visibly positive situation.

However, in case this is the posture adopted, both air forces would have to change their attitude from fighting an air-superiority battle to supporting ground forces. I am sure our air force is intellectually as well as technically capable of handling such a changed scenario, just as it has done in the recent past—the advantages of standoff may now be radically undermined. Thus, here, a probability of a naval threat could develop anywhere along Pakistan’s coastline to address the operational stalemate. It could focus on a temporary blockade of Karachi, leading to a declaration of a great achievement by the Indians, or execute a beachhead operation on an isolated stretch of the coastline.

Such an operation anywhere along the coast could be undertaken to secure a bridgehead for inserting ground forces into it. I actually would welcome the Indian Navy to try this out, and it would probably be the quickest way to lose their naval assets to our own submarine and air action, especially because such a naval force would give away its size, location, direction, and intent well in time. The caveat that would ensure Pakistani success would be to prepare for the eventuality; we must be ready for it—the critical issue in such an eventuality is not to be surprised, leading to embarrassment.  

Also, the Indian Army could try something in Kashmir in the mountains in search of some limited success. However, operations in the mountains require an extraordinary number of troops and would lead to very slow and deliberate operations, consuming a lot of time and resources. The Indians can ill afford slow operations on account of the general international opinion that is averse to an Indo-Pak conflict leading to pressure for a ceasefire, which is likely to be unrelenting. Another important factor is that, under the prevailing circumstances, Indian forces deployed to the east are likely to remain there on account of the Chinese threat. It is these forces that allow the Indians the depth in a correlation of forces to conduct offensive operations against Pakistan. Without those Eastern Command formations, India can probably only undertake a coercive assembly of forces with little else to spare for any other meaningful adventure.

Pakistan’s tactical nuclear capability denies the Indians the desert spaces where they can use their superior mechanized forces to full effect, and as such, this possibility too is very unlikely. Thus, these mechanized forces may contribute towards developing a superior defensive orientation by supporting the defensive maneuvers. So, it is fair to conclude that any future Indian aggression cannot go beyond coercive assemblies with a possible naval adventure at best, exploiting a relative existing vacuum, as it would appear.

Yet, when assemblies have been completed and troops are deployed eyeball to eyeball, the possibility of a conventional military conflict sharply reduces on account of the level of preparedness on either side. Thus, war will continue but by other means, i.e., low-intensity conflict or terrorism in the garb of separatist movements, insurgency, and creating chaos. Pakistan is likely to have enhanced terrorist attacks in the next few weeks as a continuation of the war, where India finds it difficult to prosecute the war through conventional methods.

Their objective could range from as much as truncating Pakistan, as was done in 1971, to as little as forcing Pakistan to acquiesce to their demands. The truncation of Pakistan would likely be the outcome of a long-standing US and Indian objective. It implies halting the CPEC project, denying China access to the Indian Ocean, thus severely limiting the BRI project. This manifests itself as a US desire to prevent China from challenging the US domination of the global economic order. India would be satisfied with containing China at the behest of the US. In this vein, Pakistan must be watchful and prepared to counter Indian terrorism in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Countering India

A statistic for May 2025 shows a continual increase in terrorist activities in Pakistan, with 5% more incidents than in April. These incidents led to 85 deaths, of which 46 were civilians and 67 were security personnel, while there were 11 terrorists killed in response. This figure exceeds any data related to casualties suffered in any conventional war between India and Pakistan. This is neither acceptable nor can this be allowed to go on. Thus, with great reluctance, it is proffered that terrorism can only be dealt with by equitable terrorism. Though saying this in such a manner is politically incorrect and highly controversial, this is the reality practiced by most nations.

For every terrorist incident in Pakistan, India must feel twice the pain. Unless some such equation is established, we as a nation will have to suffer terrorism perpetually. It is recommended that the Kashmir freedom struggle be encouraged and supported. The freedom struggle in Kashmir is not a terrorist activity as defined by the United Nations in its understanding of terrorism. The people have a right to take up arms against an illegal occupation as stipulated in the UN Charter. That is what we should insist it is: an independent, indigenous movement supported by Pakistan diplomatically, politically, and morally.

On the other hand, with so many fissiparous movements within India, Pakistan must acquire the capacity to operate freely amongst its dissident groups and pay the Indians back in the same coin. India must be taught that every successful terror activity conducted against Pakistan will lead to twice the pain for India. The consequences of their actions must be responded to with a defined practical manifestation and should go beyond rhetoric and slogans. 

In light of the belligerency that India is currently showing, Pakistan must be prepared for further Indian hostilities and should not get too distracted by the “success” it has claimed. Success is measured by the effect that is secured and one that is permanent and lasting. Achievements lead to success, and we did achieve a lot between the 6th of May and the 10th of May, but we need to think this through and beyond the conflict we experienced. This conflict is not over yet.

Pakistan must initiate a series of activities, of which the first is to indirectly discredit the United Nations for being a toothless, impotent, and useless organization in the face of the Palestine matter, as well as the long-standing Kashmir dispute. Pakistan must define a narrative that should be internationally projected, proving how Kashmir is univocally contiguous and geographically co-joined to Pakistan; the natural flow of the rivers and the geographical implication of the watersheds stand testimony to this fact.

The narrative must include that the IWT was a temporary arrangement that was made precisely because of this reality and executed only to maintain peace until the Kashmir dispute was resolved. Now the IWT has been unilaterally suspended, and as such, there is an immediate and urgent need to resolve the Kashmir dispute upon the agreed-upon basis of a plebiscite. Since this matter appears to be beyond the capacity and capability of the United Nations, instead, China and Pakistan should demand a tri-national settlement with India of India’s northern borders and the Kashmir Valley.

Kashmir is Pakistan’s lifeline, and diverting its share of water is reneging on an international agreement and is also in stark violation of the universally recognized and established conventions that govern the rights of the lower riparian. There is, of course, the latent hostile intent to cause serious damage to Pakistan through the mala fide position India has taken on the matter. It confirms that India cannot be trusted and that the resolution to the Kashmir dispute is the only permanent solution to the crisis created by this recent Indian atrocity.

In the meantime, Pakistan must abrogate the Shimla Agreement and define its own “new normal,” just as the Indians have done. We must reserve the right to physically and kinetically respond to the illegal occupation of Kashmir, at a time of our choosing, and annex it to Pakistan as a rightful part of our sovereign territory. Sitting back and waiting for things to unfold is not an option. Pakistan’s position should be that India cannot be trusted to hold bilateral talks, and as such, a third-party guarantor is needed to ensure that India keeps its word, or else there can be no talks. Kashmir must become a red line; its resolution through peaceful methods would be welcome, but if not forthcoming, then by war. It is India’s choice.     

The Chinese role in this affair is based on its regional presence and influence. China has invested over $60 billion in Pakistan in the CPEC project as part of the BRI. This was done to circumvent the Malacca Strait dilemma—China’s lifeline, threatened by a consortium of countries led by the US. CPEC through the Gwadar Port is the only alternative available to China. It’s in China’s strategic interest that Pakistan’s limited sovereignty remains intact and not be degraded any further, thus ensuring that the CPEC becomes a functional part of the BRI. The Israel-US-India-Europe loose alliance has made it amply clear where this alliance stands, while Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have also indicated their position.

The new attack on Russia by Ukraine was not possible without the help of the MOSSAD, CIA, and MI6, and thus, posturing has already begun to establish a new world order. Here, too, Europe and Ukraine are bragging about success in the face of Russian silence, oblivious of the guaranteed retribution that is certain to come their way. Iran is likely to be attacked by Israel soon in the hope that the US will be drawn into the conflict.

How Pakistan plays its cards is extremely important during such a conflict. Will we stand with Iran, getting drawn into this conflict, or will we stay neutral? Is being neutral even an option—a moot question? India is now part of the QUAD, an alliance primarily against China, and India is also stated to be the new US strategic partner, primarily intended to contain China. These alignments and alliances are predatory, threaten the region, and have to be confronted by someone or another, sooner or later. India must be cut to size. It is time to realign the northern Indian borders with China, as well as liberate Kashmir. The fresh alignment of territory must be defined by the sharing of a new border at Ladakh between Pakistan and China.

The Sikhs must also be assisted in acquiring their independence in East Punjab. This creates the buffers between Pakistan and India that guarantee peace in the future. Unless this protective zone/buffer is established, India will continue to perpetrate aggression and terrorism, disrupting stability in the region and denying the Sikhs their liberty and Kashmir its freedom. It will continue to mount operations to deny China access to the Indian Ocean and continue to disrupt Pakistan’s crucial stability, which it is in search of.

Conclusion

It appears India is spoiling for a war and is trying to project its power potential, which is based on an artificial and exaggerated premise. Their bluff must be called. War is never a pleasant activity and must be avoided, but there is a time when it’s the only way to peace. India must be offered a chance for a peaceful settlement with both China and Pakistan over the disputes it has, failing which, it must prepare for the consequences. For too long, Pakistan has taken it on the chin, remained quiet, suffered Indian transnational terrorism, and then stood guilty in the wake of baseless Indian accusations. It is high time that the world takes notice of these aberrations, or else Pakistan itself must take the necessary measures to put a stop to this mindless killing of its people. Only when India is suitably contained and peace is achieved can we then say with any element of certainty that we have “succeeded.”   

“Faith is taking the first step even when you don’t see the whole staircase.”

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

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About the Author(s)
Lt Gen (R) Tariq Khan

Lt Gen (Rtd) Tariq Khan is a retired army officer who has served as the head of Pakistan’s Central Command.