Fareha Quddus is an international relations graduate from Bahauddin Zakariya University with a keen interest in global politics. She is an avid reader and enjoys dipping into analytical and thoughtful essays on foreign policy and international power dynamics.
Strategic autonomy, often used interchangeably with terms such as strategic diversification, strategic hedging, multi-alignment, and non-alignment in some cases (as will be discussed later in the article), is characterized by a state’s ability to conduct its foreign relations independently. A country that follows such a strategy minimizes its reliance on other countries in political, trade, and military domains, thus expanding its foreign policy decision-making options and allowing itself the freedom to adopt its preferred choices in external affairs.
Although this phrase was popularized by the European Union in 2022, when EU countries collectively agreed to strengthen their own defense and decrease their reliance on the US, it is being widely resorted to as a viable policy option by various small and middle power countries as the international system gradually moves away from American unipolarity. Only recently have we observed Middle Eastern countries expand their defense partnerships to decrease their reliance on the US as the sole security guarantor. Likewise, Türkiye is also playing its part as a significant NATO member while maintaining close economic and security ties with Russia and China and actively pursuing relations with BRICS+ countries. Various other countries, such as Canada and South Korea, also appear to be following the same pathway in their external affairs.
While it may appear to be a relatively new concept, strategic autonomy as a policy option has been around for quite a while in the international system. New Delhi has steadily pursued a policy of strategic diversification, giving it significant autonomy in its foreign affairs. However, the experience of India also shows that strategic autonomy requires skillful diplomacy, economic capacity, and the ability to withstand the strategic risks involved.
The discussion that follows will briefly explore and evaluate the journey of India as a state that maintains strategic autonomy in its foreign relations. Later in the article, we will derive key lessons from India’s experience for countries that are treading a similar path in a multipolar international political environment.
Non-alignment in the Cold War
India’s foreign policy choice of non-alignment during the Cold War is well known. While most countries at the time allied with either the Western or the Eastern bloc, India remained neutral. Not only did India acquire this position on its own, but it also actively lobbied for the Non-Alignment Movement alongside various other states that adopted a similar disposition during the great power competition after the Second World War.
India’s history as a colony of the British had taught its leaders a lesson they took very seriously. To protect its sovereignty in the Cold War environment, India needed to prioritize its defense, economic stability, political autonomy, and energy security over any formal alliances. The foreign policy decision-makers had an understanding that India could not risk dependence on any one power for all these ends and considered it wise to partner with various states to ensure diversity in all these areas of cooperation.
The initial policy of non-alignment, which began as a strategy to navigate the Cold War environment, laid the groundwork for strategic autonomy that India continues to exercise in its foreign relations.
Maintaining Strategic Autonomy in Relations with Washington & Moscow
As discussed earlier, Indian foreign policy decision makers considered it reasonable to stay out of Cold War bloc politics. Prioritizing economic stability and defense above all else as a nascent country, India under Jawaharlal Nehru accepted economic and military aid from both the US and the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note here that India was able to get aid from both Moscow and Washington through a smart foreign policy tactic that will be elaborated on later in the article.
While a number of states from across South and West Asia joined US-led security pacts in the 1950s, India abstained, believing that entering a formal pact with the West would make it dependent on the US and compromise its sovereignty in external affairs. However, India did not entirely disengage itself from either the US or the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War period.
The 1962 war with China exposed the weakness of the Nehruvian foreign policy ideals India had been following. The limited military aid provided by the US and the UK revealed that in situations threatening national security, India, just like any other state, needed defense capabilities that could not come without external assistance. Furthermore, the Soviet Union’s passivity in the conflict made India realize that it could no longer rely on ideological affinities (Indian leaders of the time had socialist inclinations).
Similarly, when the US imposed an arms embargo as India and Pakistan went to war in 1965, New Delhi understood that it could not risk relying entirely on the West for buying defense equipment. Resultantly, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a pact of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971, which Indian leaders had long held off because of the non-alignment policy. This strategic shift came in the backdrop of the US’s diplomatic backing for Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis.
With China also extending support to Pakistan, India found benefit in its defense and diplomatic partnership with the USSR. However, this shift did not signify India’s preference for Moscow over Washington; it simply meant that India could leverage its strategic autonomy in crises to its benefit, without entirely risking its relations with the US. Nevertheless, when the Soviet Union disintegrated by the end of the Cold War, India found itself at a disadvantage, as it had been reliant on the USSR for a significant portion of its defense equipment. This reinforced the belief among policy circles in India that defense ties with one powerful country were unreliable and that New Delhi needed to expand its security partnership options abroad.
Years after the end of the Cold War, when the US-China rivalry became the exclusive feature of international power dynamics, Indian foreign policy saw a renewal. The non-alignment stance of the Cold War period was reinterpreted as strategic diversification. By entering various security agreements and initiatives such as the QUAD, New Delhi has strengthened defense cooperation with the US, especially in the wake of shared threat perception about China’s rise.
However, this has not prevented India from maintaining significant defense and energy ties with Russia. In fact, India has prioritized diplomatic ties with Russia for cheap fossil fuel supplies and defense trade. India has also avoided openly condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, much to the displeasure of Washington.
New Delhi’s engagement with Moscow and Washington over the decades shows a consistent pattern of strategic autonomy that evolved from its initial non-alignment policies. While such a strategy requires calculated diplomacy and is not without risks, it shows India’s persistent preference for flexibility over long-term formal alliances in its foreign relations.
Strategic Hedging in the Middle East
While India has maintained strategic autonomy in its relations with Moscow and Washington, in the Middle East, this broader concept has taken the form of strategic hedging, a foreign policy tactic directed at managing parallel relations with rival states. Over the years, New Delhi has treated its relations with Israel and the Arab countries of the Middle East as belonging to different diplomatic spheres, an approach known as “de-hyphenation” among policy experts.
Under British colonialism, India explicitly supported Palestinian statehood. The leaders of India, most prominently Mahatma Gandhi, openly opposed the objective outlined in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. For a significant period after independence, India continued to express solidarity with the Palestinians and voted against Israel’s membership in the UN in 1949.
India received limited defense aid from Israel in the wars of the 1960s with China and Pakistan; it avoided close ties with Israel and continued to actively advocate for Palestinian statehood. Although India formally recognized Israel in 1950, it was not until 1992 that diplomatic ties were established. This shift came by the end of the Cold War, as India aimed to expand its options abroad. After 2014, India and Israel have enjoyed closer ties, extending cooperation in defense, trade, and technology. However, this has not prevented India from extending diplomatic support to Palestine.
Similarly, New Delhi’s engagements with Israel have not hindered its ties with the Arab states. India remains a close trade and energy partner of the Arab states, securing oil and investment. Besides economic interdependence, the presence of a large Indian diaspora in the Gulf is a significant determinant of New Delhi’s cordial ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Thus, while India maintains close cooperation with Israel for security and defense technology, it ensures energy security and economic prosperity through friendly relations with Arab states. This compartmentalization in diplomatic relations with the Middle Eastern countries has allowed India to navigate regional tensions without alliance with any one side.
Diplomatic Dividends: Has India Benefitted from Strategic Autonomy?
Strategic autonomy has allowed India to avoid the risks that come with overreliance on one power in times of conflict. When Moscow abstained from involvement in the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and the 2020 border stand-offs, and the United States extended support to Pakistan in the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, India was able to avoid diplomatic isolation in crisis situations. India has enjoyed distinct benefits from various partner countries across diverse areas. It has ensured energy security through cordial ties with Moscow and the Muslim countries of the Middle East and has partnered with the US to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
New Delhi has also made the most of its defense cooperation abroad by ensuring diversification in the procurement of security equipment; it has taken weapons from Russia, bought defense systems from the US, and secured surveillance and missile technology from Israel. Such diversification has made India less vulnerable to any sanction pressures and given it a greater space for bargaining, especially in its relations with the West; for instance, when the US imposed sanctions on India in 1998 for its nuclear tests, India was able to gradually reduce tensions without abandoning its nuclear stance.
Moreover, by maintaining its image as an emerging power that champions multilateral diplomacy, India has enhanced its diplomatic standing in the Global South as an independent state. However, maintaining such a stance in external relations has not been without significant challenges and risks.
The Challenges and Risks of Strategic Autonomy
India has learned over the years that in order to achieve its foreign policy ends through strategic diversification, it must be ready for some trade-offs and compromises. Maintaining strategic autonomy has its downsides, as it risks displeasing a partner state at the cost of others. This has often been the case in India’s parallel ties with Washington and Moscow, and was observed only recently when India avoided openly condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine to ensure cheap fossil fuel supplies. This has earned Washington’s disapproval. The Trump administration expressed last year that it feels India has not reciprocated adequately in its partnership with the US and imposed a significant percentage of tariffs on Indian goods.
Multi-alignment also limits a country’s freedom to take strong positions on moral grounds in a global crisis. India’s close ties with Russia and Israel amidst the armed conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have been subject to criticism worldwide. Having multiple defense partners has created gaps in strategic coordination and interoperability for New Delhi. This was reflected in the India-Pakistan May 2025 confrontation; India’s procurement of defense infrastructure from various countries created gaps in coordination across command, logistics, and intelligence systems, whereas Pakistan benefited from close intelligence and air defense interoperability with China.
India also learned from its experience in the 1962 war with China; avoiding a formal alliance with a strong power significantly limits the credibility of deterrence for the rival country. The situation in the 1962 war with China may have been different had India entered a formal defense alliance with the powerful countries of the time. These challenges illustrate that strategic autonomy potentially exposes a country to external vulnerabilities, pressures, and uncertainties.
Learning From New Delhi’s Experience: Lessons for Other Countries
It was mentioned earlier in the article that, as a newly independent country, India was able to secure aid from both Cold War rivals. India was well aware of its strategic importance, and through skillful diplomacy, it was able to use US-Soviet rivalry to its advantage, as both powers were competing to bring strategically significant countries under their influence.
Maintaining multi-alignment in an unpredictable external environment necessitates economic stability and resilience. Over the decades, India has increased domestic manufacturing and has emerged as the fastest-growing economy in the world. This stability and growth have enabled India to withstand external economic pressures and sanctions, especially those that accompany an independent foreign policy stance.
Internal political stability is a precondition for strategic autonomy in foreign relations. India has its domestic political challenges, but it has seen smooth power transitions through the ballot since its inception. New Delhi has cooperated closely with various partners for defense, but now it is increasingly investing in domestic production of defense equipment, recognizing the hazards of over-dependence on external actors for strategic support. These foundations have enabled India to exercise an independent foreign policy without reluctance.
India’s experience carries vital lessons for all countries, especially small and middle powers, that look forward to strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. Countries aiming for a similar foreign policy would need skillful diplomacy, economic and political stability, self-reliance in the defense sector, and strategic relevance. These foundations will not only equip a state with the ability to withstand external pressures but also provide it with the stability needed to confidently pursue a foreign policy that prioritizes its national interest.
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