Durand Line Issue

The Myth of Duress and the Reality of the Durand Line Issue

The Durand Line is legally valid under international law (uti possidetis juris), where successor states inherit prior agreements. Lt Gen (Retd) Tariq Khan refutes claims that the line was time-bound or imposed. Historical records confirm the demarcation was an Afghan initiative, started by King Abdur Rehman in 1885 to prevent disputes, contradicting arguments of duress or a limited agreement.

The Durand Issue

Times are such, and narratives are so many, that everyone has a point of view and an opinion on anything under the sun. Today, the most pressing issue seems to be the Durand Line (as the Afghans like to call it), or the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (as Pakistan likes to address it). I, for one, do not think the name has any significant effect on the factual position of this dispute. The Afghan position is that since this was an agreement between British India and Afghanistan, the agreement is not recognized as a valid one between Pakistan and Afghanistan today.

This is, of course, not legally supported by international law, which defines the convention specifying that a successor state inherits the agreements made by the government in place before it. It’s clearly defined in the United Nations-recognized and stated laws related to the principle of state succession (uti possidetis juris). There is also a fake contention that the agreement was for only a hundred years—not true. Nowhere is it mentioned that it was for a hundred years.

Then the Afghans like to argue that it was an agreement made under duress after the Treaty of Gandamak. The Treaty of Gandamak was made between Yakub Khan and the British, signed on 26 May 1879 by King Mohammad Yaqub Khan of Afghanistan and Sir Louis Cavagnari of the British Government of India at a British army camp. While it involved forfeiting territory and areas to the British, it was never the instrument that led to the demarcation of the border as specified in the Durand Protocol demarcating the area.

The Afghans further argue that it has divided the Pushtun Tribes and that they have a right to be unified, and thus the claim for territory up to the River Indus is put before us. The Pushtuns make up 48% of the Afghan population and amount to 15 million. In Pakistan, the Pushtuns are 18% of the population, but amount to 38 million. How does one expect a larger portion of the Pushtun population to leave their country and join a smaller portion in another one by fidgeting with the border? In any case, why would anyone want to voluntarily go to Afghanistan from Pakistan when Afghan refugees have so often demonstrated that they would rather live here in Pakistan and had to be forced out!!

Stating Reality

This matter is part of history and goes back to the late 1800s, yet people narrate it in a manner that suits their line of argument, and we can never get to a final position on this matter. Nevertheless, since this issue comes up again and again, I thought I should place the reality before all so that they can make a judgment on their own.  

First of all, based on historical records, the matter was initiated by King Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan, who ascended the throne in 1880 and wrote to Lord Dufferin, the viceroy, in 1885/6. The letter is on record and available in the British archives, but the whole process is a volume of correspondence between the British and the Afghans and not any one singular letter. The original letter is denied by the Afghans, but it actually exists. The letter was inspired because of the Russian expansionism in the north of Afghanistan a little earlier, and Abdur Rehman wanted the southern/eastern borders to be demarcated in a similar fashion as they had been done between the Russians and the Afghans under British felicitation.

This letter is preserved in the British India Foreign Department Records (held at the India Office Records, British Library, London). It is referenced in Selections from records of the Government of India, Foreign Department: Afghanistan, No. CXXXII (Frontier Affairs), Calcutta, 1899, and also in Abdur Rehman Khan’s own memoir, The Life of Abdur Rehman, Amir of Afghanistan (1900), which paraphrases rather than reproduces the letter. The content of the letter is summarized below and paraphrased as follows:

The Amir wrote to the viceroy (Lord Dufferin), expressing his desire to have the limits of Afghanistan and British India clearly defined in order to prevent future disputes and misunderstandings between their frontier tribes. He emphasized that the absence of a demarcated boundary had led to constant disturbances, raids, and clashes along the frontier, and he requested that the British Government send representatives to negotiate and define a permanent boundary line.

Abdur Rehman added that a clear and mutually agreed frontier would strengthen the ‘friendship and peace’ between the British Government and prevent ‘ill-wishers’ (a veiled reference to Russia) from creating friction. This is further corroborated in British records, where the paraphrase of the same letter appears in Foreign Office Despatch (India Office Records, File No. 187F/1885), where Dufferin notes:

“His Highness has addressed to me a communication suggesting that the frontier line between Afghanistan and British Indian possessions of Her Majesty’s Government should be more distinctly defined, with a view to preventing possible misunderstandings between the subjects of the two states.”

This correspondence led to the British detailing of General Roberts to undertake the task of the demarcation, but the Afghans were wary of him and did not trust his judgment because he had led the expedition in the War of Retribution, where the British had avenged themselves for the reverses they had suffered in the First Afghan War. They totally laid Kabul to waste and were ruthless in their vindication. The Afghans, knowing that Roberts was soon to retire, delayed the process on one pretext or another till Roberts retired. The task was then given to Mortimer Durand, who undertook the task in 1893.

The relevant primary source extract from the Life of Abdur Rehman, Amir of Afghanistan, volume II (1900), written by Amir Abdur Rehman himself and edited by Sultan Mahomed Khan, is reproduced below as the Amir’s own account in his own words:

“In the early days of my reign, when I saw the restless state of the frontier tribes and the trouble caused by their disputes, I considered it wise to have the limits between territories of Afghanistan and those under the British Government properly defined. I therefore wrote to the Viceroy of India, Lord Dufferin, saying that as the friendship between the two governments was firm and sincere, it was desirable that there should be no uncertainty as to the boundaries of each side, because such uncertainty was the cause of many disturbances and misunderstandings.

I suggested that the boundary line between Afghanistan and the territories under British rule should be clearly marked so that each government might know the extent of its own possessions and that the tribes living on the border might no longer have occasions for quarrels.

His Excellency replied in friendly terms, expressing his desire also that peace and order should be maintained and that the friendship between the two governments should be strengthened. But he thought it was not necessary to fix a boundary line, as the friendship between us was too strong to admit such disputes.”

So after this brief summary of how the Durand Line came about, what is clear from the historical perspective is that it was an Afghan initiative and not a British one—in fact, the British at first did not even want a formal demarcation. There was no duress or pressure on the Afghans, and the process was the product of their own assertions.

The Treaty of Gandamak and the Second Afghan War were fought between Yakub Khan and the British in 1879; the correspondence between the British and the Afghans was initiated by Abdur Rehman in 1885, and as such, the Gandamak War was not the cause of any demarcation process.

Now, about the validation of the Line over the years:

  1. The first ratification occurred between Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, who was the Foreign Secretary of British India. 12 November, 1893.
  2. Second ratification by Amir Habibullah (successor of Abdur Rehman) and the British Indian Government in 1905.
  3. Third ratification, between Amir Amanullah and the British Indian Government on August 8th, 1919, in Rawalpindi.
  4. The fourth ratification was a confirmation of the 1919 agreement in 1921, which explicitly confirmed, “The validity of all previous border agreements, which include the Durand Line.”

Conclusion

Nowhere is the treaty time-bound, and at no time was it imposed on the Afghans. If the division of the Pushtuns is the pressing issue, then the Line should be moved further west so as to integrate the Afghan Pushtuns into Pakistan and not the other way around. It is hoped that this note is read and understood, and that it is noted that the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was inherited by Pakistan as per the international law as specified; the ethnicity favors Pakistan’s position, and so does history, just as geography stands to vindicate Pakistan’s stand. They should now put the matter to rest, and all Afghans who do not agree with the alignment of the border should be given a copy of this note.


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About the Author(s)
Lt Gen (R) Tariq Khan

Lt Gen (Rtd) Tariq Khan is a retired army officer who has served as the head of Pakistan’s Central Command.

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