The Islamic State’s Ingress in Africa: Implications for Regional and Global Security

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Abdullah Hafeez

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Mr Abdullah Hafeez is a student of International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

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This academic discourse scrutinizes the evolution of ISIS in Africa. ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ or ISIS is a formidable terrorist organization, tracing its trajectory from a dominant force in Syria and Iraq to its strategic shift toward Africa. The essay highlights the multifaceted nature of IS expansion, capitalizing on porous borders, high levels of illiteracy, and governance deficits. Notably, the organization has wielded influence through a nuanced approach, employing coercive measures and providing social services in areas under its control, thereby fostering a foothold for its envisioned Caliphate. Moreover, this paper underscores counter-terrorism measures taken in the region.

Defining Terrorism

The definition of terrorism in international law remains a contentious issue, with divergent perspectives among politicians, governments, activists, and legal scholars. Geoffrey Levitt aptly characterizes the quest for a legal definition of terrorism as akin to the search for the Holy Grail.

One major obstacle to consensus is the subjective nature of terrorism, encapsulated in the adage “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Ganor, 2002). Historical instances, such as during colonialism, exemplify this perspective, where freedom fighters were often labeled as terrorists. This ambiguity persists today, evident in discussions about groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthis.

Another challenge lies in the disparate motives and ideologies of terrorist organizations. Each group may have distinct goals, methods, targets, and means of violence, making a unified definition elusive (Wright, 2013). The ideological differences between religiously inspired and ethically motivated terrorists illustrate this complexity. Walter Laqueur observes that states tailor the definition of terrorism to suit their national interests, given the myriad forms and circumstances under which terrorism manifests (Laqueur, 1977). Consequently, creating a comprehensive definition becomes a daunting task.

Scholars like Yonah Alexander and Alex Schmid converge on defining terrorism as the “use of violence against random civilians” and “using force for political means.” However, they may overlook the transnational nature of terrorism and the intricacies of terror networking. Louise Richardson aptly notes that the term “terrorism” has become so widely used in various contexts that it risks losing meaning. The lack of a universally agreed-upon definition further contributes to this semantic ambiguity.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 attempts to provide clarity by defining terrorism concerning international criminal law and the criminal justice system. It characterizes terrorism as criminal acts, including those against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking hostages, to instigate terror in the public or specific individuals.  

While this definition is more feasible and internationally recognized, the debate persists on precisely delineating acts that violate national and international norms. Notably, the Islamic State unequivocally qualifies as a terrorist organization based on its involvement in criminal activities against non-combatants, as per United Nations resolutions.

Ideology of the Islamic State

The Islamic State (IS) espouses a radical ideology centered on purifying the Islamic community through the elimination of various groups, including Shia Muslims, other jihadist factions, Lebanese Hezbollah, Yazidis (a Kurdish ethnoreligious minority), and rival opposition groups globally. In contrast to Al-Qaeda, IS diverges from the “Far Enemy strategy” and does not prioritize the overthrow of corrupt Arab regimes. Initially, they did not perceive Western regimes as a direct threat until the commencement of U.S. military operations against them. Subsequently, IS escalated its activities, engaging not only in attacks against security forces but also deliberately targeting civilians, particularly those from Western countries.

The group’s ambitions extend globally, as evident in an ambitious world map released by its leader, Baghdadi. Their strategy involves establishing their rule in different countries, employing local commanders known as “Amirs,” who are accountable to the self-proclaimed and widely regarded as illegitimate “Caliph.”

Despite being Sunni Muslims, IS interprets Islam in a distorted manner to exploit individuals for recruitment and pursue its political ambitions. The group adheres to the Salafi traditions of Islam but manipulates these beliefs to serve its gain. This deviation from mainstream interpretations of Islam underscores the ideological extremism that drives IS, leading to violent actions against perceived adversaries and non-combatant populations.

Origin

Iraq War in 2003 created a power vacuum in the country, that gave rise to the insurgencies and terrorist organizations there. Taking benefit of the political turmoil, Abu Musab Al-Barnawi (ISWAP), served as a commander of a jihad training camp in Afghanistan and established Al-Qaeda in Iraq. He was a professional bomb maker and a master strategist who helped local militants, who later joined his group, to carry out guerilla warfare and suicide bombing against U.S. and U.N. forces. This group rose to a significant number because of their propaganda against Western involvement and common ambitions of establishing a Caliphate.

However, he was killed in an air strike by the United States and was replaced by Abu Ayyub Al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. They not only changed the name of the organization to Islamic State in Iraq but also helped it to emerge as a violent regional force. Ongoing civil war and socio-economic deprivation increased the recruitments and helped them seize a significant number of artillery, weapons, and other military gadgets. Joint operations of the Iraqi military and U.S. forces killed over 8000 fighters in 2008, including their new leaders.

Then Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi took charge, and crime rates increased significantly since then. He is convicted of starting sexual slavery, organized rapes, Yazid’s genocide, stone pelting, and mass beheading of thousands of people. The situation became worse when the U.S.A. suddenly withdrew its forces in 2011, which proved disastrous for the country. ISI (Islamic State of Iraq) moved towards Syria and started “breaking walls campaigns”. Under this operation, they freed their companions from jail and captured artillery of the local military and modern equipment left behind by U.S. forces.

In March 2013, Al-Nusra Front, a local militia group in Syria, merged with ISI and gave rise to the formation of ISIS. At that time, government activities were carried out by U.S. and U.N-supported local government bodies. Soon, the Al-Nusra Front separated from it, giving rise to intra-group fighting. ISIS proved victorious against the Al-Nusra Front, Liwa Al-Tawhid, and Ahrar Al-Sham and emerged as the sole power holders in Syria and Iraq.

In January 2014, ISIS captured Raqqa, a Northern Syrian city, where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself a Caliph and called for worldwide recruitment. Subsequently, ISIS occupied Mosul and Tikrit by July 2014. Soon, they gained control of the Mosul dam, a vital lifeline for 500,000 citizens, and six oil wells in Syria, engaging in oil smuggling to fund their activities.

This period marked a significant rise in global attention, with 1,200 reported murders outside Syria and Iraq in 2016. Engaging in diverse criminal activities, from attacking a Turkish airport to a shooting in Florida, beheading American journalists, and destroying Shia mosques, ISIS attracted recruits worldwide, reaching about 30,000 individuals.

The Islamic State, unable to withstand the impact of concerted counter-terrorism operations, underwent a fragmentation process, leading to the formation of underground factions. These factions, hitherto perceiving themselves as legitimate actors and exclusive representatives of the global Muslim community, subsequently retreated into covert operations. A contingent of fighters sought refuge by traversing international borders, subsequently re-establishing their presence or exacerbating local conflicts for strategic gains, notably within the African context.

ISIS Networks in Africa

Losing public support, increasingly aggressive operations, recapturing of land by the military and the death of their self-proclaimed Caliph weakened their hold in the Middle East. However, their branches, which had been pledged to the Baghdadi, kept operating in Africa and other regions. Africa, with poor governments and economy, attracted more terrorists than any other area around the world. Major terrorist organizations like Islamic State, Al-Shabab, and Al-Qaeda have strong footholds there.

Branches

Jund al-Khalifa, or the “Soldiers of the Caliphate,” in Algeria pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in September 2014, marking the birth of the first African Islamic State affiliate. Subsequently, the Shura Youth Council in Libya, comprising 300 fighters, also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Between 2014 and 2015, militants from various African regions, including Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and the Sahara, joined ISIS, leading to the emergence of multiple terrorist cells affiliated with ISIS in Africa.

Total Fighters in African Cells 

It is estimated that, overall, there are approximately 6,000 to 7000 Islamic State fighters dispersed across 9 cells within the continent. These cells exhibit significant variation in size, with the largest, the Islamic State West Africa Province (Al-Barnawi’s group), having around 3,500 fighters. On the other hand, cells such as the Islamic State in Algeria, and the Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, each have fewer than 100-150 fighters on average, according to the expert’s analysis.

Sahara Desert

The Sahara Desert is the hub of criminal activities in Africa, with the highest number of atrocities every year. Before discussing ISWAP, it is important to understand the Liptaku-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin areas which lie in the Sahel, an area bordered by 5 countries in the Sahara Desert. These two areas are the epicenter of terrorism and extremism as terror-related activities have increased significantly in the last 15 years in the Sahel region, particularly in the areas just mentioned above. ISWAP and ISGS (Islamic State of Greater Sahara), along with Boko Haram are the dominant organizations here. The first two, however, are pledged to the same organization but are operating differently. 

Sahel Region

The Sahel, meaning “border” in Arabic, is a geographic region in Africa that serves as a buffer between the Sahara Desert in the north and the tropics in the south. The 6 francophone countries in the western Sahel—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal—have a collective population exceeding 100 million. Despite its strategic location, the Sahel is one of the most impoverished regions globally. These nations rank low on the UN Human Development Index and face multiple conflicts, creating a breeding ground for violent extremism and organized crime. It is rife with criminal activities such as human, arms, and drug smuggling.

The region has become a hotspot for multi-dimensional conflicts, exacerbating its already fragile state. Deaths in the Sahel constituted 43% of the global total of terrorism deaths in 2022, a stark increase from just 1% in 2007. The Lake Chad basin and Liptaku-Gourma regions bear the brunt of these challenges, making them the worst-hit areas within this belt.

Instability in the Sahel is linked with the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011 which led to the illicit transfer of weapons in the region. Additionally, presence of the terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda affiliates and ISGS has further escalated the conflict. These terrorists, because they collaborate, pose a significant threat to the security forces, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin and the Tri-bordered area.

Both Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and ISGS have expanded their influence, with JNIM gaining control over territory in northern and central Mali, while ISGS has been confined to northern Burkina Faso and western Niger due to clashes with JNIM starting in 2020. Frequent transfers of power, with a combined twenty-five successful coups d’état between 1960 and 2022 in Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger combined, involve the military overthrow of democratically elected civilians. Additionally, porous borders in the region facilitate the free movement of insurgents to multiple countries, making the situation more tense for the security forces.

Islamic State of Greater Sahara (ISGS)

This cell constitutes 87 % of the Islamic State’s fighters across the Sahara. It emerged when Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a senior leader of Al-Qaeda’s branch (Al-Mourabitoun), pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in 2015. The group has been involved in several notable attacks, including the Koutoukale Prison break in Niamey in 2016. In 2017, the Tongo Tongo ambush led to the murder of 5 Nigerian officers, and 4 U.S. military casualties were reported, making it a dangerous organization.

Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) 

ISWAP is a Sunni self-proclaimed Jihadist movement with its own interpretation of Salafi thought. Its influence spans the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria’s northern borders, Niger, and Cameroon.

Formed when Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2014, ISWAP sought legitimacy and financial support from the center. This move led to increased terrorist activities, including the use of women and children for suicide bombings. Differences emerged as Boko Haram favored smaller-scale attacks, while ISWAP adopted direct assaults on military installations.

The leadership conflict occurred when Al-Baghdadi replaced Shekau with Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammad Yusuf. Shekau’s group distanced itself from ISWAP, operating under Boko Haram’s title, resulting in the emergence of two factions. Another key distinction lies in their interpretation of takfir, justifying the targeting and killing of apostate Muslims.

Under Barnawi’s leadership, ISWAP has been involved in various attacks, including killings of soldiers and the local population, recording a significant rise in terrorist-related deaths in West African countries in 2022, according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2023. 

Lake Chad Basin (LCB) 

LCB, situated in the southern belt of the Sahara Desert, is surrounded by Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Climate change has led to a temperature increase in the region 1.5 times higher than the global scale, causing a 90% loss of the lake since 1960.

In Nigeria, the poverty-driven migration of over 239,000 citizens to LCB has given rise to illicit activities. Moreover, food insecurity has affected 5.2 million people, with children constituting 99% of the total. The lack of jobs and unequal economic distribution in the northern areas has created unrest, exacerbated by low state presence, poor public services, and inadequate social justice.

In northern Cameroon, a predominantly Muslim area, factors such as poverty, lower living standards, state neglect, and porous borders with Nigeria have contributed to instability. These conditions facilitated ISWAP in gaining local support through its social services and ideology, resulting in a high number of recruitments. According to reports from the African Center for Strategic Studies, Boko Haram and ISIS-WA carried out at least 400 attacks in 2020, compared to just over 200 in 2019.

Liptako-Gourma Region 

At the center of the Sahel area, this Tri-Border area overlaps eastern Niger, some areas in central and northern Mali, and northern and eastern Burkina Faso. Covering 370,000 km² of land, it houses a population of 17 million, with 90% engaged in farming. This troubled land grapples with severe climate changes, demographic pressure, high levels of poverty, and limited opportunities for the lower class. 

The conflicts between extremists and security forces have displaced 1.6 million people since 2018. After Mali canceled the Defense deal with France, followed by the withdrawal of lateral forces, terror-related activities increased to a significant level in the region. The first six months of 2022 witnessed a dramatic increase in attacks, particularly in the Liptako-Gourma area, with the deaths of innocent civilians in the thousands.

Besides the Islamic State’s activities in the Sahel, it also operates in other countries like Libya, Egypt, and Mali, to name a few. The local insurgents operate under the command of an Amir, a kind of Governor according to the administrative structure of the center, who aims at establishing a Caliphate rule in that state and authorizes the decision-making. Ranging from recruitment to logistics, he holds significant power. Detailed below are more African Cells of the Islamic State that have been operating since the central power was at its peak in 2014.

Islamic State of Mali 

Regional and local dynamics are responsible for the terrorism in Mali. Representing 10 % of the Malian population, the Tuareg people, with separatist tendencies since Mali’s independence, organized under the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), rebelled against the state after the 2012 coup. MNLA captured the regional capitals of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, declaring the independent state of Azawad in northern Mali by April. They aligned with the Islamic State to impose Sharia law and establish a caliphate over the Northern territory.

In July 2012, the terrorists destroyed an ancient mosque in Timbuktu, and in 2013, thousands of ancient Islamic manuscripts at the Ahmed Baba Institutes were burnt. After these incidents, experts narrate that it is not Sharia that they want to impose, but it is a struggle for their political control over the territory. Moreover, Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups – JNIM and ISGS are also active in Mali. The Wagner Group which is supposed to take part in operations against the terrorists, is infamous for its atrocities against the locals. All these factors have given rise to the tense environment in Mali, causing an irreversible loss to the state and providing a fertile ground for the Islamic State.

Islamic State of Libya 

Emerged in 2014, no other African cell raised as much international concern as the Libyan Cell did, due to its robust network and being a haven for ISIS outside Syria and Iraq. In the start, around 300 Libyan fighters fought against foreign forces in Iraq under the banner of the Islamic Shura Youth Council. After returning to the homeland, they sent their pledge to Baghdadi which was accepted a month later, leading to their three branches in provinces of Libya: Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania. The U.S. Department of Defense reported a significant increase in their fighters in 2015, reportedly 4000 to 5000 in numbers. However, joint military operations with U.S. and Algerian forces, along with airstrikes, reduced their numbers and expelled them from major cities, including Sirte. Nowadays, it works as an underground unit.

Islamic State of Egypt

Emerged in 2015, this group – IS-Misr, distinct from the Islamic State in Sinai, gained attention after Amir’s interview was published by ISIS in 2017. Not pledging allegiance to ISIS, it conducted notable attacks, including the 2017 Palm Sunday bombings, which killed 45 civilians. Currently not active on the Egyptian mainland, they are suspected to have collaboration with IS-Sinai and Libya’s brigade. They have around 100 – 200 fighters in their ranks currently.

Islamic State of Sinai

Formed during the Arab Spring, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State which was swiftly accepted after three days. Previously targeting Israel, they shifted focus to Egypt, notable for the 2015 downing of a Russian flight, killing 228. They have estimated fighters between 1000 to 1500.

Islamic State of Algeria Province

They were considered the first African cell, founded by Abd Al-Malik, whose pledge was accepted in 2014. The group gained attention for beheading a French hiker after post-French airstrikes in Iraq, attracted recruits from 4 AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) splinter groups, and engaged in small to medium-scale attacks. Intense pressure from Algerian security forces and AQIM limited their growth.

Islamic State of Somalia

Islamic State in Somalia emerged in 2015 when Abdul Qasim, former Al-Shabab’s ideologue, pledged allegiance to ISIS and is commonly referred to as ISIL-Somalia or IS-Somalia Province. Despite not gaining recognition from ISIS, this group has been involved in 67 deadly attacks in Somalia, ranking second to Al-Shabab. The estimated number of fighters is suggested to be between 250 and 350, according to Somali journalist Tuuryare.

Islamic State of Somali, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda

A breakaway from Al-Shabab and Jabha East Africa emerged in 2016. The pledge was not officially recognized by Al-Baghdadi. Despite a multinational composition, the number of fighters proved to be comparatively small. Founder Mohamed Abdi Ali, a medical expert, was arrested in May 2016 for plotting to spread anthrax in Kenya as a tool of biological terrorism

Islamic State of Tunisia

Soldiers of the Caliphate Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia (JAK-T), pledged allegiance to the central Islamic State, and although this allegiance was not officially accepted, the Islamic State developed a presence in Tunisia. Despite having a small number of fighters, the Tunisian Cell has been recognized as one of the most important and notable sources for sending militants to Iraq and Syria

Besides these units, small factions of ISIS are also present in Mozambique, Sudan, and other states, putting the lives of millions at stake.

Analysis

Three plausible factors are noteworthy in this context.

• Firstly, factions whose pledges were accepted by the main group before it adopted a defensive stance attracted more recruits and posed a greater threat to the host country.
• Secondly, instances of local fighters fleeing to Iraq and Syria after their group gained recognition led to a reduced number of fighters remaining in their home country.
• Lastly, self-proclaimed terrorist groups, whose pledges were not accepted, tended to remain relatively small in numbers. Acceptance often drove them to engage in more violent activities, targeting whatever seemed feasible.

Counter Terrorism Measures

According to Hoeft (2015), the soft counter-terrorism approach involves deradicalization, a process of distancing individuals from extreme views, and disengagement, moving people away from activities associated with extremist groups. In response to the increasing threat of terrorist organizations in West Africa, various such initiatives have been implemented.

Over the past 15 years, the U.S. government has expanded its military presence across Africa, engaging in “special operations” alongside African troops to enhance security. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. has prioritized supporting counterterrorism operations and aiding efforts against violent extremism. Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), started in 2007, focused on training regional militaries to combat insurgents. The U.S. footprint has substantially grown, with drone bases in Niger and Burkina Faso and approximately 1,000 U.S. forces deployed. These military efforts are part of the broader Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which includes non-military assistance for governance improvement, social cohesion, and countering militancy and extremism.

Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger, serves as a crucial U.S. drone base, with an investment exceeding $250 million since its construction began in 2016. Designed to enhance surveillance and operational capabilities in the region, the U.S. plans to establish additional bases by 2025 as reported by The Washington Post.

Humanitarian Assistance

USAID disbursed over $6 billion in assistance in 2022. A significant portion of U.S. aid is directed through contracts with international NGOs, and specific programs, such as providing $30 million annually for deradicalization, demonstrating a multifaceted approach. Additionally, the U.S. commits $200 million annually to the Lake Chad Basin and has deployed over 8,000 troops across Africa. In 2022, Washington hosted a U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit, followed by its participation in the 2023 U.S.-African Business Leaders’ Summit in Botswana, aimed at addressing socio-economic deprivations.

In addition to that, the U.S has some special command centers in Africa as well:

AFRICOM

Established in 2007, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) serves as a regional headquarters located in Germany. Tasked with overseeing U.S. military forces and providing regional military assistance, AFRICOM focuses primarily on building local capacity to counter armed Islamist extremist groups. As one of 11 U.S. Department of Defense combatant commands, AFRICOM employs a comprehensive approach encompassing diplomacy, development, and defense to facilitate inter-agency efforts, addressing the root causes of terrorism.

SETAF

In 2023, the Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) engaged actively in various security cooperation activities across Africa. The force led multilateral exercises such as the African Lion and Justified Accord, conducted multiple medical readiness exercises, and remained prepared to support crisis response operations in both Europe and Africa.

Military Exercises

Flintlock is a military exercise – the largest annual special ops exercise in Africa by the US, comprising of 1,300 service members from 30 participating nations; it aims to enhance the capabilities of key partner nations in countering violent extremist organizations. The mission emphasizes collaboration across borders, ensuring security for local populations, upholding human rights, and fostering trust with civilian communities.

Challenges for the U.S.

The U.S. faces challenges in its African engagement, primarily stemming from military coups and the growing influence of China and Russia. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken had praised Niger as “a model of resilience, a model of democracy, a model of cooperation.” However, this positive sentiment presented a harsh contrast when viewed next to the military overtake in Niger, the seventh coup in Africa since 2020.

The U.S. remains wary of its role in Africa, with concerns heightened by the Wagner group and China’s expanding economic partnerships with African states.

Biden’s policy 

Under Biden’s administration, Africa received cursory attention in the U.S. National Security Strategy that was published last year, along with a separate strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. Both documents were infused with domestic, and political objectives like prioritizing climate change policy, and a substantive lack of focus on African issues.

In March 2023, Washington released a revised strategy named ‘Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability’, which incorporated a 10-year strategic plan for West Africa. However, the practical implementation of U.S. foreign policy mirrors other strategies, emphasizing the “green agenda” and social policies, such as abortion and gender, which may have limited positive impact in Africa.

European Union

Various bilateral training missions are underway in the region, involving multiple entities. The European Union is actively engaged in military training through two missions in Mali—the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and the EU Capacity-Building Mission (EUCAP). Additionally, these efforts extend to Niger.

The EU-African summit aims at providing €150 Billion in different projects to enhance security and stability in the region.

African countries and the EU engage in cooperative endeavors through various frameworks, including the Samoa Agreement and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Complimenting these agreements, the Council has formally endorsed three regional strategies addressing specific geopolitical challenges in distinct African regions.

These encompass:

• Horn of Africa
• The Gulf of Guinea
• The Sahel

Such strategic initiatives underscore the multifaceted nature of the collaboration, emphasizing tailored approaches to regional complexities. The comprehensive framework established through these agreements serves as a testament to the commitment both parties share in fostering diplomatic, economic, and developmental ties across the African landscape.

IOM-UN migration

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the G5 Sahel have agreed to enhance regional and intra-state cooperation to address human mobility. This collaboration aims to accelerate resilience, development, and integrated border governance in the G5 Sahel countries. The agreement outlines three strategic priorities for joint programming between the two organizations, focusing on mitigating the negative impacts of forced displacement and irregular migration, using migration as a development accelerator with an emphasis on job creation for youth, and promoting integrated border governance for peace, security, and development.

G5 Sahel

The Joint Force aims to complement the roles of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and Operation Barkhane.

It takes a comprehensive approach to address security, surpassing Barkhane’s mandate by tackling terrorism, transnational organized crime, and conducting joint cross-border operations. Additionally, it engages in anti-terror operations while facilitating humanitarian efforts, development activities, and restoring state authority. The expectation is that enhancing the overall security situation will empower MINUSMA to fulfill its peacekeeping mandate more effectively. Consisting of up to 5,000 military and police personnel from national battalions, the force incorporates the existing Liptako-Gourma task force established earlier by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, specifically designed to secure their shared border region.

France 

Established in August 2014 as a successor to Operation Serval, French Operation Barkhane, headquartered in Chad, had been one of the most effective military operations against The Islamic State. The primary objective was to ensure regional security and combat terrorism in collaboration with Mali, Niger, and Chad. 

Furthermore, French troops have been engaged in various joint operations and hold the authority for direct, kinetic action against terrorist fighters. As per 2021 data, France deployed the highest number of troops in the African region. However, challenges arise from military coups and evolving relations between France and African countries. In the present time, as reported by  Le Monde Newspaper – “France’s influence has collapsed in the Sahel”.

Role of Other States

Numerous U.S. allies in the Middle East, such as Israel, Turkey, and the UAE, exert considerable presence and influence in Africa. The European Union and various other nations emphasize African regional policies, though France encountered setbacks in its influence, notably in Mali and Niger. The current Italian government has proposed the “Mattei Plan” aiming to restore Africa’s dignity through collaborative international efforts for the development of its energy and resources.

Indo-Pacific partners, especially India and Japan, also wield a significant footprint and influence by providing loans and aid in development projects. India has sought to enhance its role, proposing the admission of the African Union to the G20, while both India and Japan focus on countering Chinese influence on the continent. 

The International Peace Institute organized a conference on Countering Violent Extremism, leading to advocacy for a soft counter-terrorism program. This approach aims to reverse the radicalization process by reintegrating individuals into moderate society. It involves providing them with a stable support network, examining their original reasons for radicalization, and severing ties with their extreme beliefs and social contacts. The U.S. and its allies are assisting local authorities and healthcare departments with millions of dollars to rehabilitate, reeducate, and deradicalize the already brainwashed citizens.

Multi-National Joint Task Force

Established in 2015 by the African Union, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is dedicated to countering terrorism through offensive military actions and addressing issues such as trans-border organized crime and arms trafficking in the eight affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin. Its operational success is measured by territorial recovery, neutralizing terrorists, and seizing vehicles, cash, and weapons from them.

This task force engages in civil-military activities designed to garner support from the local population while targeting terrorist networks. Non-kinetic activities include facilitating the surrender of militants and ensuring the safe return of refugees. Between September and February 2021, it successfully facilitated the return of more than 271,500 refugees in the Lake Chad Basin. However, challenges, particularly related to insufficient and inconsistent funding, especially since COVID, have hindered offensive actions against ISWAP, as noted by Mamman Nuhu, the executive secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

U.N Global Counter-terrorism Strategy

To counter the threat of extremism, the UN plays a crucial role; it deploys peacekeeping missions in terror-affected areas of Africa, comprising military personnel from various countries. These missions not only combat terrorists but also engage in activities initiated by the UN, such as training local military and police, distributing life-saving medicines, assisting medical staff, and providing social services in hazardous areas.

UNESCO

UNESCO plays a vital role in promoting intra-faith and inter-faith dialogues, aiming to enhance understanding among different nationalities and cultures. By addressing unresolved regional conflicts and engaging with global issues, including development concerns, UNESCO contributes significantly to strengthening the international fight against terrorism. Its 210 programs across the continent are aimed at providing education, scientific knowledge, social and technical skills, and breaking the communication barrier.

Additionally, its 54 offices are dedicated to promoting tolerance, global values of humanity, and awareness in the locals about threats of discrimination and racism.

UNDP

The United Nations has undertaken the stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin by rebuilding communities in seven affected areas, encompassing education, health, security, justice, environment, communal support, and livelihood. This initiative has yielded positive outcomes, with over 30,000 individuals benefiting from improved health facilities, a significant influx of students returning to school after reconstruction, the adoption of sustainable and environmentally friendly practices, and the construction of thousands of housing units to alleviate socio-economic deprivations in Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.

Furthermore, its strategies aim at providing sustainable growth and development, investment in captivity building, and addressing 6 key issues:

• Governance
• Social deprivations
• Underdevelopment
• Health problems
• Unemployment
• Climate change

Counting Terror Financing 

Groupe d’Action contre le Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC), a regional body following the FATF model, is dedicated to combating money laundering activities in the Sahel region. Additionally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union actively engage in intelligence sharing with other nations to disrupt the financing of these organizations.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Established to tackle social, economic, and other grievances in underdeveloped regions of terrorist-affected countries, the initiative aims to diminish recruitment into extremist groups.

UNSC Report

In a paper titled ’20 Years of UNSC Counter-terrorism Policy’, key findings suggest that major approaches to counter terrorism and extremism are unfortunately focused on a military aspect, ignoring governance and poverty issues in the region.

Related programs, which are ongoing, are facing severe financial shortcomings. A significant issue arises from the UNSC’s insistence on African States adhering to resolutions that may lack relevance to the continent. Rather than this approach, the UNSC should intensify its support for African States in transitioning from a state-centric to a human-centric security paradigm. This transition is essential for effectively addressing the distinctive challenges confronting African nations in the field of counter-terrorism.

Failed Military Tactics 

According to Berlin Gozzi and Stoddard (2020), the counter-terrorism strategy is struggling to adjust to ISWAP’s new population-centric tactics, exacerbating governance and economic gaps. The security forces adopted the super camp strategy, consolidating forces into large, fortified groups. However, ISWAP exploited this strategy three times in 2021, revealing its vulnerabilities against modern tactics. Moreover, a harsh climate is another hurdle in the military operations against them.

Not a White Man’s Problem 

Representing Secretary-General António Guterres, and Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed emphasized, “In today’s hyper-connected world, the spread of terrorism in Africa is not a concern for African Member States alone; the challenge belongs to us all.” This highlights the global significance of addressing terrorism in Africa, stressing the need for comprehensive planning and attention to eradicate the threat permanently.  

Conclusion

To eradicate the permanent threat of the Islamic State in Africa, a comprehensive approach is essential. Firstly, training police officers with support from Western countries, including intelligence sharing and access to satellite technology to monitor illicit immigration across porous borders, is crucial for timely responses. Secondly, assistance to local authorities, judges, teachers, and administrative institutions can address socio-political grievances.

Establishing deradicalization centers and providing training to healthcare professionals will aid in rehabilitating individuals. Monitoring and controlling social media propaganda, which influences recruitment, is imperative. Supporting pastoralists and internally displaced persons with micro-entrepreneurship initiatives can boost economic development.

Vocational training for students, along with capacity-building sessions for community and religious leaders, is helpful as it promotes social cohesion and tolerance. Continuous financial support is essential for sustained counter-offensive actions. Emulating successful multinational operations, like those against ISIS, involving multiple nations for full-scale operations in affected regions is necessary. Increasing the use of technology, such as drones and fighter jets, is vital for operational efficiency, coupled with strict measures to disrupt the group’s financial supplies and illicit income.

Following the insights of Louise I. Shelley, transnational crimes have undeniably become the defining issues of the 21st century. Collaborative efforts on matters of collective interest are imperative, with terrorism standing out as a primary concern. While major powers and local authorities are actively countering the threat posed by the Islamic State in Africa, it is crucial to address the socio-political and economic deprivations that fuel the rebellion against the state. Many research analysts advocate that tackling these root causes is the most effective strategy for eradicating extremism in the region.

Moreover, nations must unite and launch offensive actions, akin to those conducted in Iraq and Syria, to comprehensively eliminate militant forces. Providing sufficient financial aid, technical assistance, job opportunities, and improved living conditions for the local populations in terror-affected areas is essential to prevent the further proliferation of terrorism. By concurrently addressing both the immediate security threats and the underlying socio-political grievances, a holistic approach can counteract the multifaceted challenges posed by ISIS in Africa.

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