In a strong affirmation of gender equality and constitutional integrity, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has given a milestone judgment in Zahida Parveen v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, categorically holding that marital status cannot be a hindrance to a woman’s eligibility under the employment quota of the deceased civil servant. The ruling, given by Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, hands down a strong rebuke of patriarchal legal exegesis, administrative overreach, and institutional exclusion of women from public life based on marital status bias.
The case occurred when Zahida Parveen, daughter of a deceased government school teacher of District Karak, was inducted as a Primary School Teacher (BPS-12) under Rule 10(4) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1989, that provides for appointment to a child of a dead or permanently incapacitated civil servant. Despite fulfilling all legal requirements, her appointment was arbitrarily withdrawn by the District Education Officer based on executive instructions, which purported to exclude married daughters from the scope of the rule—unless they were separated and financially dependent on their natal families. The Court set aside these executive instructions as ultra vires, holding them to be legally and constitutionally invalid.
Justice Shah noted that Rule 10(4) has no express or implied restriction based on the child’s marital status. The rule’s language is gender-neutral and inclusive, giving eligibility to “one of the children” without differentiation between sons and daughters or married and unmarried children. The exclusion by administrative interpretation of married daughters, the Court found, constituted an impermissible and unconstitutional restriction upon a statutory benefit. The right to amend or limit such regulations under Section 26 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, resides in the Governor alone and cannot be claimed by administrative officials through executive communication.
Justice Shah also founded the judgment on the Pakistan Constitution, holding the exclusion of married daughters to constitute inadmissible discrimination on Articles 25, 27, and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The classification was not only lacking in rational basis but was also inextricably founded in a patriarchal assumption that marriage takes away a woman’s personal personality and independence. Although married sons continued to be eligible for the same quota, married daughters were considered to have lost their rights—an unreasonable double standard patently in contravention of the right to equality and non-discrimination.
Furthermore, exclusion from employment based on marital status was considered an offence against human dignity, a right which the Court stressed encompasses financial autonomy and self-determination. The ruling overturned deep-seated socio-legal presuppositions by stating that the law neither does nor can assume that a woman becomes economically reliant on her husband solely by marriage. In this regard, Justice Shah invoked the discredited English common law doctrine of coverture, which considered a woman’s legal existence as merged with that of her husband upon marriage—a doctrine long abandoned by contemporary legal systems and Islamic jurisprudence.
Referencing Surah An-Nisa (4:7), the Court pointed out that Islam confirms a woman’s right to independent ownership of property and income, thus refuting the cultural belief that the economic existence of a married woman is established through her husband.
In the unusual and admirable case of feminist jurisprudence, the ruling used the writings of legal theorists like Martha Fineman, Simone de Beauvoir, and Bell Hooks to explain the way that traditional structures of dependency and cultural construction of women as “the Other” have been utilized to exclude them from full citizenship and access to public benefits. By drawing on these intellectual traditions, the Court confirmed that constitutional interpretation needs to be rooted in the lived experiences of those it purports to serve—and must reject the reinforcement of gender hierarchies in the name of neutrality. The Court’s directive reinstated Zahida Parveen on full benefits and held the executive letters attempting to exclude married daughters as null and void.
More significantly, the judgment sends a loud message to all public institutions: no administrative agency can take power to cut back constitutional liberties or statutory advantages through social custom or patriarchal diktats. Women’s legal status, independence, and personhood remain unchanged by marriage; they cannot be subjected to social tradition or moralistic presumptions about suitability for work or claims.
This judgment is not just a legal victory for one woman but a doctrinal shift toward a jurisprudence of substantive equality. It exhorts the judiciary and executive to use a gender-sensitive perspective in decision-making and terminology and to root out all discriminatory practices that denigrate women’s status as equal citizens. In confirming women’s economic and legal independence, the Supreme Court has made a firm step towards realizing the Constitution’s guarantee of equality, dignity, and justice for all—regardless of gender or marital status bias.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.
Aiza Musaddiq is a 4th-year law student at Kinnaird College for Women. Her interests lie in constitutional law, human rights, social justice, and legal research.