The Pakistan India War of Competing Narratives

The fourth round between the two South Asian rivals can be described as the most intense and devastating air-land battle, which ended as fast as it started. The 72-hour, fast-paced, high-tech, and net-centric South Asian version of Star Wars, preceded by a two-week media-hypnotic psychological conditioning phase, brought to the fore some new lessons in modern-day warfare. This article focuses on the war between Pakistan and India, as well as their contrasting narratives.

While this piece is not intended to analyze the character and nature of an early-summer war, which is primarily a subject of military history and technology, it will, however, endeavour to dissect the ideological and perceptual divisions that precipitate animosity and conflict, defining the security construct of South Asia. The conflict, yet again, highlighted that the competing narratives are rooted in deep-seated, contending notions, where the fundamental truths of one side are viewed as illusory delusions by the other and vice versa. Objectivity in South Asian contests has always been the first casualty, and one has to, therefore, tread with caution to discern the right picture and reality.

Media and Intellectual Framing

While the media is awash with a blend of fact and fiction, often pushed by jingoistic anchors and pseudo-analysts, many of whom lack proper training or are driven by nationalist diktats and blind ideological zeal, this creates a compulsion to fuel hysteria in the name of competition. Truth, reality, and morality become casualties. But then, who cares? As the adage goes, everything is fair in love and war. So be it—damn the objectivity.

I have therefore tried to glean the contending narratives not from the respective country-stated positions or the bigoted media analysts but from the competing discourse of leading intellectuals from either side. Among the leading names of respect, I shortlisted eminent thinkers and writers such as Shashi Tharoor, Pravin Sawhney, Karan Thapar, Najam Sethi, Rauf Hasan, and Maleeha Lodhi, among others, to try and discern reason from rancour and rigidity.

India’s Narrative

The Indian narrative cannot be better outlined than by one of its most admired, eloquent, and soft-spoken literati, Mr. Shashi Tharoor—the Congress leader and Chairperson of the Standing Committee on External Affairs. His filibustering before and after Operation Sindoor (Indian military action post Pahalgam Attack) truly exemplifies the minds of Indian sane intelligentsia, which, too, have either swayed with the hyper-jingoistic hysterical tide or have largely played to the galleries.

The summary of Shashi’s dialogue with Karan Thapar on The Wire and Tom Burges Watson on Global News Today (GNT) pretty much sums up the Indian thought process. Deluded with nationalist spirit, Thapar, like many of his literati pals, at the very outset, loses rationality, sanity, and objectivity when he castigates Pakistan scornfully to frame and get Pakistan accredited as a state sponsor of terrorism.

He is not alone in this – media icons like Christiane Fair, Piers Morgan, Dr Sajjan Gohel, et al. echo more or less the same mantra. The strands of the Indian narrative are summarized hereunder: “Pakistan is a revisionist and a bigoted power which uses terror as a tool to internationalize the Kashmir dispute. A terrorist providing state vs. India a terrorist victim state. India, a status quo power wants nothing, that Pakistan has reacted in self defence to terrorist outrage in a calibrated manner targeting only known terrorist bases/HQs, avoiding civilians and military targets – have shown restraint and not escalated. Pakistan chose to overreact on LOC, India responded in kind. India was not escalating, merely reacting. Pakistan is a master of denial, adept at nuclear blackmail and resorts to asymmetric means to achieve its objectives. General Asim played Tango (War) due to institutional necessity to shore up its internal legitimacy and reshape internal and external narratives in Pakistan’s favour. Effort of re-hyphenation of India-Pakistan is a nonstarter as the two have no parallels.”

Dr Christine Fair (Professor of Security Studies, George Town University), in her talk with Karan Thapar, was not behind in chastising Pakistan when she referred to the prescription in her book to PM Modi’s rhetoric that Pakistan’s behaviour will not change, until it bears considerable consequences to its behaviour and that Pakistan’s Army is closer to insurgent organizations. Like India perceives that behind every terrorist attack, there is Pakistan, this is mirrored in Pakistani perception that India is behind most of the terrorist actions in Pakistan; the Jaffar Express incident may have precipitated the Pahalgam attack. Pakistan is an artist who plays the American fiddle and knows how to depict itself as the victim of Indian aggression and how to solicit American assistance. The conflict has given a temporary boost to General Asim Munir, who has been rehabilitated. Trump reintroduced the hyphen in Pak-India relations and offered to mediate negotiations; India has said nothing to rebuff Trump’s statement.

Dr Sajjan Gohel (Chair of NATO Counter Terrorism Advisory Group and International Security Director at Asia Pacific Foundation and visiting teacher at the London School of Economics) on Al-Arabiya alleged Pakistan of harbouring terrorist groups, which hasn’t done enough to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. There is a denial statecraft of Pakistan. Military/ISI have ties with terrorist groups – civilians don’t have much sway or ability. The COAS is the focus. There is a need to have an off-ramp. The rule of engagement, changed by Indians, was underlined by the policy of preemption.

David Sedney (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Pakistan in the Obama Administration) also underlined that terrorist groups do exist in Pakistan – LeT, which has been hosted/supported by Pakistan over the years. ISI played a supportive role in their efforts – given COAS’ recent hostile speech against India, where he attributes Kashmir as the jugular vein and key to Pakistan’s national survival, it is very hard not to see Pakistan’s hand behind Pahalgam. There is a longstanding Hindu-Muslim confrontation behind the problem.

Yet, not all Indian voices aligned with the dominant view. Pravin Sawhney (Editor of Force Magazine) offered a critique of the Indian military strategy, arguing, “The Indian narrative of terrorism didn’t find the expected credence in the world capitals; given global geo-political dynamics, the era of terrorism has ended and the era of conventional war remains. Indian planners made a strategic blunder as Operation Sindoor was not able to affect deterrence to any such terrorist incident – nor could Pakistan be punished sufficiently, expectedly; therefore, violence and terror incidents will increase in J&K and rest of India. Kashmir is again in the spotlight with resurging calls for mediation (sic Trump). Notwithstanding India’s expected rebuttal, citing compulsions of bilateral engagement under Simla Agreement, but now exclusive to terrorism and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The attendant sequel are China’s clamoring claims for Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Indian effort to isolate Pakistan didn’t succeed either. India’s prior information to Pakistan about Operation Sindoor was a classic example of foreign policy with strategic arrogance, as it gave Pakistan much need planning time for an operational response, also aligning the international community of impending Indian aggression and getting acquiescence to Pakistan’s right of self defence/retaliation.”

Pakistan’s Narrative

Pakistan’s narrative couldn’t have been better put across than by one of its maverick political commentators, Mr. Najam Sethi, known for his liberal and nuanced views, which he eloquently articulates with his characteristic wit and winks, making these agreeable to his gullible TV audience.

An editor, writer, former Chief Minister and Chairman of PCB, he, without harbouring bias, chiselled the discourse with Karan Thapar with his objectivity and hindsight knowledge. Unlike Shashi, who avoided any mention of RAW activities in Pakistan, Sethi admitted Pakistan Non-State Actors (NSAs) complicity in terror incidents in the past. His eloquence artfully caricatured the India-Pakistan narrative of David and Goliath before and after Operation Bunyan ul Marsoos.

He, along with Rauf Hasan and Maleeha Lodhi, was almost unanimous in their viewpoint, reiterating, “LeT & JeM are banned orgs, which haven’t ceased to exist, but have ceased to function and are not able to carry out their activities. Pakistan no longer exports freedom fighters. Pahalgam was a false flag, given too many unanswered questions about security, intelligence failures, and other eyewitness accounts. It was likely aided and abetted by the Indian deep state, which orchestrated the terrorist killings to justify aggression against Pakistan, to divert attention from internal political challenges, and bolster nationalist sentiments. There is a need for an international neutral commission to look at the evidence to prove or disprove whether the Pakistan establishment was behind it. No country in the world condemned Pakistan. After the Jaffar Express incident perpetrated by BLA and believed to have an Indian hand, Pakistan refrained from raising the stakes or pointing a direct finger at India.

Since 90s India has constantly accused Pakistan of fomenting trouble in Kashmir. Likewise, since 2004, Indian deep state hands in supporting the secessionist movement in Pakistan have increased. The joint communique of the 2010 Sharam el Sheikh meeting between the two PMs mentioned the bilateral problem of Indian sponsored terrorism in Balochistan & Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir. Abeyance of IWT is legally and morally reprehensible; nowhere in history has threatening to cut the water supply happened. If India sets this precedent, then China might also follow suit, being an upper riparian. Likewise, if the Simla Agreement or LOC is held in abeyance, that means invoking old UN resolutions and hence no bilateralism, implying third-party intervention. Pak nuclear doctrine envisions the likelihood of first use, given the sensitivity of major cities and industrial centres…..”

On the onset of “Operation Bunyan Ul Marsoos,” Sethi added, “There is a doctrinal issue of compulsion of retaliation to offset the new normal; response to Indian new normal is the Pakistan’s anti-normal response. Escalation comes after retaliation, if India responds, its escalation and hence onus of escalation on her. As long as the Kashmir issue simmers, such incidents cannot be ruled out and therefore possibility of this escalation ending up in a bigger escalation next time is very real and hence important to get to the root cause. The only road to peace is negotiations, talks, settlements and compromises. India has aspirations to be a great power, but can never be one, if she doesn’t stitch up the neighbourhood in a way equality is established – you can’t be a hegemon in this region by bullying countries around and by leaving unresolved conflicts.”

Rauf Hasan’s (ex-Information Secretary of PTI) dialogue with Tom Burges Watson on Al-Arabiya more or less echoed the impression of “False flag, given the speed and alacrity with which Pakistan was accused within minutes and refusal for an independent transparent investigation, smacking of pre-meditated design of fixing Pakistan – a bulwark against Indian hegemonic design; not palatable for them, hence resort to series of adventurism overtime. The existence of militant groups is a story of the past; they have been dismantled and don’t have the capability to mount an operation as grave as that of Pahalgam. Anything happening in India is blamed on Pakistan. India is the aggressor and we are only responding under Article 51 of the UN charter. Escalation would lead to full-scale war, which is not a solution, rather resolution of disputes through dialogue, but India refuses to sit on the table. Against Indian unprovoked aggression there has been an insipid and incoherent political response, where the political leadership was conspicuously absent and muted on the happenings.”

Maleeha Lodhi (ex-Ambassador to the US) succinctly paraphrased the contending position, stating that a new normal has been established from both sides. She discounted Indian clamor of nuclear blackmail by Pakistan, rather there has been reestablishment cum enhancement of Pakistan’s conventional deterrence. The “terror and talks can’t go together” assertion of Narendra Modi is meaningless, as Pakistan has lived without a formal dialogue, given its suspension for the last 12 years and a nonexistent back channel. She says that Pakistan’s messaging was poorly put across by some of our ministers – that aside, Pakistan’s international stock has gone up; conversely, India’s reputation has suffered. India could not establish its strategic dominance.

Adam Weinstein (Deputy Director at Quincy Institute) pointed out, “India narrative is more likely to be accepted than Pakistan’s narrative due to history and hesitancy by some of Pakistani leaders to renounce some of anti-India groups, due to complexities within Pakistan that makes this difficult to do – he added that given Indian Bollywood media credence, it’s not an equal playing field.”

Analysis

The South Asian competing narrative is a unique exposition of diametrically opposed notions of aggressor and victim, viewed through divergent lenses and playing on the theme of terrorism as a sub-conventional conflict option in the absence of a full-blown war due to the nuclear overhang. While terrorism thrives mainly in the sub-continent as a politico-military instrument to avenge unresolved historical grievances, the world is somehow averse and weary of its perpetual hostility. It looks the other way with indifference, intervening only when the escalation risks global repercussions. This is a dynamic that both India and Pakistan understand well and seek to leverage to their advantage.

The South Asian conflict continuum hence simmers under suboptimal war conditions, where the real contest often lies outside the battle space—in the perceptual domain, shaping opinions both domestically, regionally, and globally. Therefore, the blend of psychological operations, diplomatic signalling, media framing, and intellectual posturing is weaponised to influence the moral and legal legitimacy of respective nations, thereby giving rise to the centrality of narrative warfare.

Ironically, both states play the victim card, accusing each other of sponsoring terrorism. While the messaging is similar, the jargon and lexicon are different. 

From the Indian standpoint, the emphasis is on “pre-emptive calibrated retaliation,” portraying Pakistan as a state that legitimises terror proxies as strategic tools. Its discourse claims a moral high ground through assertions of strategic restraint and civilian safety while attributing Pakistan’s actions to internal legitimacy needs and regional destabilisation efforts. However, dissenting voices, such as Pravin Sawhney, highlight internal contradictions, questioning India’s tactical overreach, strategic misjudgment, and misreading of international receptivity.

Conversely, Pakistan’s perspective seeks to reframe its image from an accused perpetrator to a targeted victim of “false flag” operations. Intellectuals like Najam Sethi and Maleeha Lodhi acknowledge the past complicity of non-state actors but argue convincingly that the current trajectory represents restraint and rational state behaviour in response to an aggressive regional hegemon. Their insistence on international investigation, resort to legal recourse, and highlighting India’s refusal to negotiate with Pakistan as a rules-based actor seeking dialogue over domination. Yet, inconsistency in the narrative communication, partly due to the residual baggage of past proxy affiliations and fractured internal messaging, dilutes its global credibility.

As aforementioned, Pakistan’s narrative of being a terror victim, though universally known, doesn’t get the due acceptance and credit.

Its sacrifices and contributions in WOT, with no parallels, are virtually morphed in the post-conflict phase due to the probable incidence of the 4Cs of spacecraft:

• Complicity
• Complacency
• Incompetence
• Incapacity

The reflection of intellectual bankruptcy is evident in the striking contrast between Indian political-bureaucratic-intellectual elitism versus its nemesis, dwarfism. Had it not been for the operational efficacy of Pakistan’s armed forces in checking Indian aggression, our political-bureaucratic structure would well have succumbed, reaffirming the need yet again for having a truly representative political system, a nonpartisan and empowered bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, and an apolitical establishment.

Additional contrasting optics prevailing are:-

• Perceptions: Pakistan has always been suspicious of Indians: of their sincerity, of their cunning mentality, of a schemer, seeped in intrigue and adept at Machiavellian tactics – a two-faced, vile character exemplified through well-known Hindi parlance, “Baghal mein churri munh mein Ram Ram” – whereas the Indians view Pakistan as a master of denial, duplicity and hypocrisy.
• A Caveat: Pakistan’s narrative strategy of denial, once effective, is now outmanoeuvred by India’s astute diplomacy. Instead, Pakistan has to get its act together through superior leadership and matching Indian brinksmanship to make the world believe that it doesn’t support terrorism – it is not on the giving end, but rather on the receiving end. Pakistan has suffered a lot and has been a victim of state terror, not a perpetrator.
• Behavioural Patterns: Pakistan’s smaller state is cautious in its approach, restrained in its conduct, and circumspect in its actions. The Indian approach, given its size, state, and stature, is one of disdain, scorn, ire, vengeance, and strategic arrogance. However, when this swagger is manifested in rage, it loses control of reason and rationale and, in the process, leads to miscalculations and blunders.
• A Stark Dichotomy: India casts Pakistan as the last bastion of state-sponsored terror in a post-9/11 world; Pakistan, in turn, frames India as a revisionist hegemon, denying self-determination and undermining regional stability. Within this matrix, objectivity remains the first casualty.

The deeper risk lies in the normalization of escalatory doctrines disguised under the guise of so-called calibrated restraint. With both countries now operating under declared “new normals” – preemption by India and reflexive retaliation by Pakistan, the conflict threshold is narrowing dangerously. In the absence of neutral conflict resolution mechanisms, even minor incidents can spiral into full-scale confrontations with unpredictable consequences.

Additionally, historically, two belligerents have settled their differences through arbitration by a third party (a state or organization) – either directly or indirectly.

Expecting India and Pakistan to break this trend would be a forlorn and utopian wish, and therefore, to mitigate risks, there ought to be a 6R Off-Ramp approach from conflict management to conflict resolution:-

• Renewed international mediation not as interference but as facilitation of intractable bilateral issues.
• Rescinding of proxy wars by both belligerents to allow the elusive peace process to take root.
• Revival of Lahore (1999) and Agra (2001) spirit, rekindling the hope of sustained engagement.
• Re-initiation of Track-II dialogues and academic exchanges to rebuild mutual understanding.
• Running neutral fact-verification mechanisms post-crises to prevent propaganda-driven escalations.
• Recalibration of strategic communication infrastructures in both countries to counter hyper-nationalist narratives and promote factual, responsible messaging.

Final Word

From a strategic lens, real victory in such confrontations lies not in territorial gains or tactical supremacy but in securing narrative dominance: who gets believed, who garners international sympathy, and who is perceived as acting within the bounds of legitimacy. It is this war of words and worldviews that will shape the future trajectory of South Asian peace and conflict, more than any kinetic engagement. And therefore, until the narratives themselves are brought to the table-examined, challenged, and harmonised-the guns may fall silent, but the war will rage on.

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