In the spring of 2025, Ankara again stepped into the spotlight as a potential broker in the Russia–Ukraine war. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Vladimir Putin on 11 May that Türkiye was ready to host peace talks in Istanbul, echoing Russia’s proposal for direct negotiations on 15 May. Shortly before, Putin had publicly offered a summit in Türkiye between himself and Ukraine’s Zelenskyy, hoping to negotiate an end to the “bloodbath.” Ukraine’s president cautiously agreed to meet on Turkish soil, writing on social media, “I will be waiting for Putin in Türkiye on Thursday. Personally.”
These developments followed Türkiye’s initiatives to mediate in the conflict (including hosting the first wartime talks in Istanbul in March 2022) and its role in negotiating the Black Sea grain corridor that kept Ukrainian exports flowing. Türkiye now deliberately projects itself as a “bridge” between the East and West – a NATO member that backs Ukraine’s territorial integrity, yet has refused to join Western sanctions on Russia.
Turkish Diplomacy: Mediation Efforts and Strategic Trust
Türkiye has cultivated an image as an honest broker in recent conflicts. It has retained “cordial ties with both Kyiv and Moscow since Russia invaded Ukraine” in 2022, supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty while keeping channels open to Russia. Ankara co-brokered the July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative with the UN, opening Ukrainian ports to shipments after a self-imposed blockade, and in late 2022, President Erdogan held separate calls with both Putin and Zelenskyy to try to expand the deal.
A senior Turkish official noted that Türkiye “has good ties” with both sides and “has taken a mediating role in the conflict, hosting peace talks and working to bring together the Ukrainian and Russian presidents,” Such balancing has won Erdogan some praise; Western officials concede that Ankara’s “balanced policy on Ukraine was welcomed, even admired,” and that the war has made allies realize Türkiye’s geopolitical importance.
That trust, however, can be fragile. European diplomats privately caution that domestic policies (such as the 2022 life sentence for philanthropist Osman Kavala) have at times shaken confidence in Ankara’s reliability. But in general, Türkiye’s readiness to host high-stakes talks—from Ukraine to Gaza ceasefires—has burnished its reputation as a mediator. Türkiye has even offered to shuttle between Israel and Hamas or between India and Pakistan during crises, suggesting that Ankara sees mediation as a role where it can add value.
In every case, Ankara couches its efforts in an appeal to stability and pragmatism. For instance, Erdogan publicly pressed both Putin and the West to find a path off the battlefield, arguing that without dialogue, “massive” sanctions or further escalation would be all that remains. In doing so, Türkiye portrays itself as a “power broker able to wield influence economically and diplomatically,”— a characterization echoed by neutral observers of Türkiye’s rising stature.
Military Diplomacy and Defence Exports
Türkiye’s foreign policy now depends not only on diplomacy but on a booming defence industry. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drone has become emblematic. It gained global fame (and infamy) in Ukraine’s counter-offensives, credited with destroying Russian tanks and artillery. By mid-2024, Baykar CEO Haluk Bayraktar noted that the TB2 had become a “symbol” of Ukrainian resistance. Turkish officials say the drones were built and sold by a private firm, not the state, after Putin angrily “complained to Türkiye” about their use by Ukraine.
Indeed, by some counts, Baykar has signed export deals for its TB2 with 30 countries, including Ukraine, Ethiopia, Libya, and Azerbaijan. Reuters noted that exports of Turkish drones to Ethiopia and Morocco expanded “after their successful use in international conflicts,” and that drone shipments were being negotiated with new clients. Last year, Baykar even announced it would manufacture drones inside Ukraine with a 500-strong plant, underscoring the scale of its role.
The military sales run deep into Ankara’s diplomacy. Exports of drones (and other arms) to Azerbaijan surged before and during the Karabakh clashes, reflecting “strong defence cooperation” that analysts say “is getting stronger by the day”. In 2020 alone, Türkiye’s drone and weapons sales to Azerbaijan spiked sixfold compared to the year before. Last autumn, Azerbaijan and Türkiye held joint war games on Azerbaijan’s soil – a clear sign of closeness after the “Karabakh victory” in Baku.
Türkiye has also matured into a major global supplier. According to SIPRI, Türkiye’s arms exports have more than doubled since 2018 (making it the 11th-largest exporter worldwide), with the Gulf, Pakistan, and Asia as top customers. These deals serve Türkiye’s political ties. Ankara reportedly signed its largest-ever export contract in 2024, selling Bayraktar Akinci drones to Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, Turkish drones have turned up in unexpected places. The Wall Street Journal (citing US officials) reported that Bayraktar TB2s were delivered to Sudan’s military via Egypt amid that country’s civil war. Türkiye also rapidly ramped up sales to Ethiopia during its Tigray war, prompting US concerns about civilian harm. More broadly, Washington has noticed Turkish drones in conflicts from Libya to Iraq. Erdogan dismisses these concerns, emphasizing that Türkiye sells weapons to sovereign governments and that it uses those sales to cement partnerships.
In effect, Ankara leverages its defence exports as a strand of “military diplomacy,” helping allies and clients build capability in return for influence and economic ties. As one Turkish official quipped in 2022, when asked about another batch of Russian missiles, “nobody can interfere in terms of what kind of defence systems we acquire…we are the only ones to make such decisions.” Türkiye’s defence industry is now a major lever of its foreign policy.
Role in Syria
No chapter of Turkish diplomacy is as complex as Syria. Since 2011, Ankara has juggled multiple roles there: it hosts nearly 3.7 million Syrian refugees (by far the world’s largest refugee population) reuters.com; it has sent tens of thousands of troops and allied militias into northern Syria; and it has sat at the negotiating table (often with Russia and Iran) to manage the civil war’s aftermath. These roles sometimes pull Türkiye in conflicting directions.
On one hand, Türkiye has long opposed the Assad regime. Early in the conflict, Ankara supported and armed moderate rebel groups and lobbied for Western military intervention. It launched cross-border incursions (2016’s Euphrates Shield, 2018’s Afrin, and 2019’s operations in Idlib and eastern Syria) to push back ISIS and Kurdish militants. Even today, Turkish strikes and patrols continue in parts of Syria that Ankara controls or contests.
In March 2025, the Turkish Defence Ministry reported that its “operations against Kurdish militants in northern Syria [were] continuing,” despite a new Damascus-Kurdish agreement and US diplomacy. Ankara views the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as terrorists linked to the PKK, and it has vowed repeatedly to crush their presence along the border. Türkiye’s actions in Syria stem from its view that “the YPG spearheads the SDF” and are an offshoot of the outlawed PKK – a reality that has long strained US-Turkish relations.
On the other hand, Türkiye has quietly shifted toward reconciliation with Syria’s neighbours. After years of hostility, Ankara in late 2022 quietly embraced a Moscow-led process with Russia, Iran, and Damascus. In April 2023, the defence and intelligence chiefs of Türkiye, Russia, Iran, and Syria held “constructive talks” on Syria’s future. Syria’s government declared that these talks reaffirmed the “territorial integrity” of Syria and discussed issues like the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the opening of highways.
In public, Turkish ministers have said Türkiye wants to normalize relations with Damascus only after its security concerns are met (specifically, the pullback of Kurdish forces from the border). In private, Ankara’s leadership has even signaled a willingness to meet Bashar al-Assad under the right conditions. In January 2023, Erdogan said he might personally sit down with Assad in a trilateral format with Russia “to establish peace and stability in the region.” These shifts reflect Türkiye’s calculation that the Syrian war is winding down and that it must have a stake in the settlement, including reshaping refugee returns and border security on Turkish terms.
Meanwhile, hosting so many refugees has become both a humanitarian feat and a political burden. City markets and rural towns across Türkiye bear the visible imprint of nearly 3.7 million Syrians in recent years. Growing segments of Turkish public opinion now push for their return; Erdogan’s government has even erected model villages in northwestern Syria to house up to a million people (though this is contested by Damascus and the UN). Türkiye has recently begun quietly facilitating refugee “go-and-see” visits, and tens of thousands of Syrians have voluntarily gone back under new schemes (losing some privileges to re-enter). Whatever one’s view, the refugee issue shows how Türkiye’s Syria policy has domestic as well as international dimensions.
Throughout, Türkiye has tried to balance pressures from Russia, Iran, the US, and its NATO allies. It now coordinates patrols with Russia in Idlib, consults with Iran on border security, and chastises the US for its Syrian Kurdish alliances. Its ambition is clear: to be seen as a guarantor of stability in post-war Syria, not just another outside player. As one report puts it, Ankara now sees returns of refugees and expanded economic ties (with Damascus) as evidence that it can “wield influence economically and diplomatically” in Syria’s future.
Strategic Alliances with Pakistan and Azerbaijan
In Asia, Türkiye has deepened ties with fellow Muslim nations. Pakistan has long been Ankara’s closest partner in South Asia. Whenever Islamabad faces a crisis with New Delhi, Türkiye steps up its support. In early May 2025, after Indian strikes in Pakistani territory brought the neighbours to the brink, Erdogan phoned Pakistan’s prime minister to “convey his solidarity.” The Turkish presidency praised Pakistan’s “calm and restrained policies” and endorsed its call for an impartial investigation into the militant attack that triggered the conflict.
Erdogan said Türkiye was ready to use its “diplomatic contacts” to help prevent any escalation into all-out war. He publicly condemned the Indian military action as risking regional stability, even as he noted that “Ankara also maintains cordial ties with India.” In short, Türkiye’s strategy is to align firmly with Pakistan’s interests (and shared Islamic identity) while trying to stay on speaking terms with India. Türkiye and Pakistan conduct regular military exercises and defence cooperation, and Ankara has made Kashmir an issue at international forums in sympathy with Pakistan’s position.
Türkiye’s most fervent ally, however, is Azerbaijan. The two are sometimes called “one nation, two states,” and Türkiye gave overt political and military backing to Baku in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Defence exports jumped accordingly: by one accounting, Türkiye sold some $123 million in military equipment to Azerbaijan in Jan–Sept 2020 alone. Last autumn, Azerbaijan hosted its first post-war drills with Turkish forces (3,000 troops across two countries). Azerbaijani officials proudly note that Turkish drones spearheaded their campaign, and analysts observe that “Ankara is very determined in providing Baku with its needs.”
President Erdogan has repeatedly sided with Azerbaijan’s stance, for example, stating publicly that Armenians must pull out of Karabakh. Türkiye’s support has also taken symbolic forms: Turkish lawmakers backed Pakistan on Kashmir, and likewise, Türkiye consistently backs Azerbaijan in international forums. In return, Baku has done its part by facilitating pipelines (TANAP) and gas sales that help diversify Türkiye’s energy supply. The partnership with Azerbaijan is thus both emotional (ethnic and cultural ties) and practical (trade, energy, and military cooperation).
Soft Power and Cultural Outreach
Türkiye complements its hard strategy with active soft power around the world. Its international development agency, TİKA, coordinates the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, and wells in Asia, Africa, and the Balkans. In Somalia and Pakistan – two of the world’s most disaster-prone states – Turkish engineers and aid workers moved in at moments of crisis. Somalis famously nicknamed Türkiye the “Holy Grail” of aid. In 2012, refugees in Mogadishu said Turkish teams did “more in eight months…to shatter the perception that Mogadishu is a no-go zone than the international community has achieved in twenty years.”
Türkiye also uses cultural diplomacy; it funds dozens of Yunus Emre Institutes and Maarif Foundation schools abroad to teach Turkish language and culture, and the Diyanet (religious authority) trains and sends imams to build goodwill in the Muslim world. Ankara’s scholarship programs bring thousands of African and Asian students to Turkish universities each year, creating alumni networks across developing countries.
Meanwhile, Turkish popular culture has burst onto global media. Period dramas like Diriliş: Ertuğrul (Resurrection Ertugrul) recounting Ottoman-era exploits have been exported to hundreds of countries and racked up hundreds of millions of viewers worldwide. They have helped transform Türkiye’s image abroad – scholars call it “Neo-Ottoman Cool.” Turkish soaps and music now fill screens and airwaves in the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Asia. In recent rankings, Türkiye is among the top exporters of TV series globally, on par with Western producers. All these efforts bolster Ankara’s narrative: a proud, modern Muslim democracy. Even in Europe, the Turkish diaspora and its media have given Ankara unofficial influence. For example, Turkish-run schools in the Balkans teach a pro-Ankara history, and Turkish NGOs sponsor cultural festivals in Africa.
In sum, Türkiye throws its weight behind friends not only with tanks and treaties but with cash, classrooms, and culture. As one analyst notes, Ankara can “play the religious card,” symbolizing Islamic solidarity; its deep pockets and institutions mean that wherever there is upheaval in the developing world, a Turkish charity or construction crew often follows. This soft power makes Türkiye a familiar name in many societies from the Balkans to Central Asia, which in turn feeds back into diplomatic trust.
Strategic Autonomy in a Multipolar World
Behind all these initiatives lies Türkiye’s grand strategy of strategic autonomy and multipolar balancing. On energy, for instance, Türkiye is scrambling to reduce its import dependence (over 90% of its energy is imported). Its first major domestic gas field, Sakarya in the Black Sea, began producing in 2023 and now supplies roughly 6–7% of the country’s gas needs. The government is simultaneously reaching out to new fields abroad. The Turkish state oil firm, TPAO, struck recent agreements to explore offshore blocks in Bulgaria and Somalia, signed joint bids with Pakistan for its waters, and partnered with Azeri companies to develop Caspian Sea resources. Türkiye also finalized deals with Turkmenistan to pipe gas in 2024.
In short, Türkiye is leveraging its geographic bridging of Europe and Asia to pursue oil and gas everywhere from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. It even lobbied (with Russian support) for the construction of a gas export hub on Turkish soil to feed Europe via Turkish pipelines. These moves are driven by a desire to become a regional energy hub, not just a consumer.
Politically, Türkiye defies simple labels. It is a founding NATO member with the Incirlik airbase and thousands of troops in Europe, but Ankara has often annoyed its allies. It quietly helped block Sweden’s NATO bid until the US agreed to deliver F‑16 jets in 2023, and it slapped sanctions on German lawmakers who recognized Armenian suffering in World War I. Türkiye’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles in 2019 (and hints at a second batch) has been particularly controversial.
Erdogan’s message was blunt: “In the future, nobody will be able to interfere in terms of what kind of defence systems we acquire…we are the only ones to make such decisions.” Even so, Türkiye insists it will honor its NATO obligations. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler recently told Reuters that Türkiye’s “priority is to fulfil our responsibilities to NATO as an important ally and to strengthen solidarity with our allies. Our focus should be that NATO is prepared, determined and strong.” He noted approvingly that Turkish accession to the US‑led alliance “does not prevent [us] from developing relations” with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or BRICS countries. In practice, Türkiye walks a middle path: it buys arms from both Washington and Moscow, and it welcomes bribes (or investments) from both Beijing and Berlin.
Türkiye’s renewed interest in Eastern bodies is telling. Since 2020, Ankara has signaled its desire to join the Russia-China-led SCO, and even held the rotating chairmanship of the pro-Russian Black Sea Economic Cooperation forum. It enjoys a free trade deal with Pakistan and visa-free travel with Qatar and some Central Asian states, aligning with like-minded “Global South” partners. Yet it remains committed to Western security guarantees. For example, after Türkiye approved Sweden’s NATO membership in 2023, Washington immediately approved Ankara’s order of 40 new F-16 fighters – a deal that had been held up for years over Russian S-400 grievances. Türkiye has thus managed a sort of hybrid posture: remaining a linchpin of NATO defence while cultivating strategic options outside it.
This multipolar strategy is especially clear on energy, as noted. Türkiye accepted a US waiver in 2024 to continue paying for Russian gas via the TurkStream pipeline, even after US sanctions were imposed on Gazprombank. In return, Ankara pledged to keep Türkiye’s gas flows and even extend supplies to Hungary and Slovakia through its routes. In effect, Brussels’ push to decouple from Russia has collided with Ankara’s dealmaking. President Erdogan can thus say with some truth that Türkiye keeps Western pipelines running, even as it warms toward Eastern markets. In his telling, Türkiye’s goal is not to be America’s enforcer or Russia’s pawn, but a power that can engage with all great powers on its own terms.
A System-shaping Middle Power
Taken together, these trends have made Türkiye more than a regional actor. It is striving to be a system-shaping middle power – a country that cannot dictate world affairs, but that aims to tilt outcomes in multiple theaters. By brokering diplomacy (from Ukraine to Gaza), exporting military hardware and deployments (from Bayraktar drones to base access), nurturing alliances (with Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkic states), and wielding soft power (aid, mosques, media), Ankara weaves itself into many international equations.
Its choices often seem made on calculated pragmatism rather than ideology. It will partner with whoever serves its interests on a given issue, be it Putin, Xi Jinping, or President Trump. Western media often describe this as a “delicate balancing act,” and indeed, Türkiye’s leadership argues that its unique position allows it to prepare for the end of the war in Ukraine.
This self-conscious diplomacy is driven by domestic needs as well. Facing economic headwinds and domestic dissent, Turkish leaders have sought prestige abroad to bolster national pride. Erdogan often notes that after years of being sidelined by crises, global powers now come to him to broker deals – from grain exports to ceasefires. “The war has made allies realise Türkiye’s geopolitical importance,” one senior official told Reuters, adding that many Western diplomats now admit Ankara was “alone in having hosted wartime talks between Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers and peace negotiators.” To be sure, there are limits. Türkiye’s authoritarian turn at home and occasional hubris have alienated some. But for now, Ankara plays its cards with skill.
In sum, Türkiye today straddles continents and fault lines. It claims to uphold both Western security and Eastern multipolarism. It backs Ukraine and Qatar, simultaneously courts Russia and Pakistan. No great power fully trusts it, but none can ignore it either. As one recent dispatch from Istanbul notes, the country has emerged as a broker and balancer “able to wield influence” well beyond its size. Whether one labels this realpolitik or opportunism, the fact is that by mid-2025, Türkiye has become a pivotal node in many of the world’s crises. That status, hard-earned through diplomacy, trade, aid, and sometimes force, confirms the calculations of those who long ago predicted that if Europe were the West’s “sunset,” then Türkiye might just be its “east star.”
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.
Mohammad Zain is an International Relations student at NUML, Islamabad. With an associate degree in English Literature and Linguistics and a BS in International Relations, he brings a unique blend of analytical and literary skills to his writing.