Origins and Evolution of the ISI
More than a decade after its publication, Hein G. Kiessling’s book, Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, has remained in the shadows in Pakistan, away from Pakistan’s academia and digital media. It may be largely due to fear of institutional action or curbs on the media to avoid discussion of such a sensitive institution’s history. Reading through Kiessling’s book is an interesting experience for a reader who is connected with the ongoing currents in Pakistani politics.
The book delves deep into the organization’s history during different decades, where it not only played a key role in national security but also in domestic politics. While many authors and politicians allege that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has increased its footprint in current politics due to the continuous whacking of the military by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, the party of former Prime Minister Imran Khan (who is serving a jail sentence), much of this goes back to its history. The ISI did not emerge from proper planning but was a product of the environment after the partition of India.
Founded by Australian Major General Walter Joseph Cawthorne, the initial structure of the ISI was not very complex, having very little role in politics or national security early on. The war in Kashmir and threats from India gave impetus for the creation of a prime intelligence agency that could help provide accurate information about threats coming from neighbors. Despite widespread claims that the ISI borrowed its organizational model from foreign intelligence agencies such as Iran’s SAVAK or the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), historical evidence suggests otherwise. In reality, most modern intelligence agencies, including the ISI, SAVAK, and the CIA, emerged in the mid-twentieth century in response to the changing nature of warfare and geopolitics. They developed largely in parallel, adapting to their respective national contexts.
During the initial years, the ISI remained unimportant to the nascent government. Not much consideration was given to important appointments, as brigadiers remained at the apex of the intelligence cadres until 1966. One notable exception in the early leadership pattern of Pakistan’s ISI also occurred between May 1951 and April 1953, when the organization was headed by a colonel. At the time of its establishment, the agency’s primary mandate was external intelligence collection, particularly focused on reconnaissance activities beyond Pakistan’s borders, with special emphasis on India and the disputed territory of Kashmir.
Rise as a Strategic Intelligence Power
In addition to intelligence gathering, the ISI was entrusted with the planning, coordination, and operational management of Pakistan’s first military attachés appointed to foreign missions. Internally, however, the ISI’s role remained limited. Except for the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir, the agency had no formal domestic intelligence mandate, as internal security and political surveillance were largely handled by other institutions. During the first decade of constitutional and political crisis, Kiessling argues, the ISI started increasing its footprint in domestic politics due to the sheer incompetence of the political class. However, it was still relegated to a petty institution, not worth much for the country’s national security decisions.
The importance of the ISI became increasingly evident when a strategically sound and well-conceived military plan failed due to poor execution by field officers following poor intelligence in April 1965. This failure stemmed from institutional lethargy, inadequate intelligence inputs from field operatives, and weak coordination between operational and intelligence arms. The episode revealed structural deficiencies in Pakistan’s early security architecture and underscored the necessity of a professional intelligence service capable of timely information gathering, analysis, and dissemination. As threats evolved and became more complex, the absence of a robust intelligence mechanism posed serious risks to national security, thereby reinforcing the strategic relevance of the ISI to Pakistan’s ruling establishment.
Notably, during the 1970s—particularly under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later General Zia-ul-Haq—the ISI demonstrated operational effectiveness that attracted international attention. It was during this period that the CIA increasingly learned from and collaborated with the ISI, especially during the Soviet–Afghan War (1979-1988), when Pakistan became a frontline state, and the ISI played a pivotal role in intelligence coordination and covert operations against the Red Army. The ISI is said to have become a state within a state during the Afghan war, while also getting itself involved in political manipulation to halt Benazir’s rise to power. The author claims that the fear of reprisal from the second Bhutto dynasty led to the ISI’s involvement in domestic politics. The ISI failed for the first time in election manipulation, and the attempts to curb, politicize, or marginalize the ISI for reasons of political vendetta altered the agency’s operational trajectory.
It can be argued that the agency might have remained largely apolitical had it not been subjected to political pressure and institutional manipulation, particularly during the second Bhutto dynasty. Furthermore, the appointment of retired military officers to senior leadership positions within the ISI blurred institutional boundaries and contributed to its deeper engagement in Pakistan’s domestic political landscape. This involvement complicated civil–military relations and affected public perceptions of the intelligence community.
Core Institutional Ideology
At its core, however, the primary responsibility of the ISI has always been the protection of Pakistan’s national interests and strategic assets along with the early detection of internal and external threats, neutralization of hostile designs by India, and safeguarding the state against covert aggression from Western powers. Achieving these objectives requires not only enhanced professionalism and institutional autonomy but also the continuous recruitment and training of intellectually capable and technologically adept young professionals. Equally important is the maintenance of a balanced civil–military relationship, wherein intelligence agencies operate within clearly defined constitutional and legal frameworks.
But this balance has been broken for the last three decades because the military leadership has developed a deep mistrust of civilian leadership. The core of the mistrust lies in propaganda against the military taking a good share of the budget pie, leaving little for public sector development. Moreover, politicians often claim to handle political affairs behind closed doors, which has led to political uncertainty and instability. While these claims are partially true, the vetting of politicians is vital for national security. Along with that, India spends almost ten times the budget; that is why Pakistan has to give a big chunk of its budget to defense.
Contemporary Challenges and Global Comparisons
Contrary to the belief that intelligence agencies remain detached from political processes around the globe, global precedents illustrate the profound influence such organizations wield over national and international affairs. The CIA has historically played a decisive role in shaping U.S. foreign and security policies; India’s RAW has been repeatedly involved in destabilizing activities within Pakistan; and Israel’s Mossad has conducted extensive domestic and international operations to mobilize Jewish public opinion and advance Israeli strategic objectives. In this broader comparative context, the ISI’s role must be understood not as an anomaly but as part of a global pattern in which intelligence agencies serve as critical instruments of state power. In terms of national security, the ISI must increase its global footprint while also focusing on the domestic problem that is continuously simmering and may explode if not addressed. The ISI is Pakistan’s iron pillar, which must not be rusted by old, shabby, contaminated water.
The impression among the youth is highly tilted against the old gerontocrats and the Pakistani establishment. The ISI must recognize that the current political class of the 1980s and 1990s is not suitable to fulfill the aspirations of Gen Z. The real secret to Pakistan’s future success lies in bringing in new young minds, retiring the gerontocrats from politics, and ending the alienation caused by dynastic political parties. Pakistan, in the current violent global political atmosphere where India is bent on destabilizing it, needs a stronger defense, which primarily comes from the Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI and the establishment must carefully reconsider their support for established dynasties. Moreover, the black sheep need careful removal, as they are tarnishing the name of the institution for their personal gains and diverting institutional resources for their personal interest. The institution has recently started taking note of such officials, as is evident from the conviction of a former spy chief.
The Future of the ISI and Pakistan
As Nizam ul Mulk Tusi wrote in his famous Siyasat Nama, the ruler (state) must not let the enemy destabilize the state and must have an active network of spies to keep him informed about the intentions of the enemy. In the modern age of misinformation, Pakistan needs to create awareness among the youth about the damage caused by misinformation regarding the government and its institutions. We should not forget that if Pakistan is destabilized by enemy intelligence agencies, a whole lot of our people will become destabilized. The ISI needs a more active role in world affairs and domestic vetting, though there must be legal procedures. As the author argues that the ISI plays a central role in Pakistan’s security, there must be an open discussion on the future role of the ISI, and books like that of Hein Keissling are a careful reminder to analyze the deepening role of the intelligence agency in the state’s affairs. As the world is again moving toward anarchic global affairs and Indian intelligence agencies are expanding global outreach, Pakistan’s intelligence also needs a more proactive role to counter Indian propaganda and actions abroad to keep national security and integrity. The ISI is a vital organ of the state and will remain its vital pillar for the future, with a more nuanced role in changing global contours.
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