The Institutional Barriers to Climate Policy Implementation in Pakistan

Introduction

The catastrophic monsoon floods in Pakistan in 2025 highlighted the nation’s severe vulnerability to climate change. Heavy rains from the Himalayan basins “killed a thousand people and forced the evacuation of 2.5 million” in Pakistan’s north, destroying bridges, highways, and flood defenses. Experts confirm Pakistan’s vulnerability, saying it is “unquestionably on the front line of climate change” and has “acute vulnerability to frequent extreme rainfall.” Future monsoon rains are predicted by climate scientists to be considerably more intense.

To mitigate and reduce the risk of flooding, Pakistan has created a variety of climate and disaster policies, including its National Climate Change Policy, National Adaptation Plan (NAP), and disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies. However, the execution of these initiatives has been hindered by institutional flaws in the administration. Drawing on the aftermath of the floods in Pakistan in 2025, this article analyses the main institutional and governmental obstacles to the implementation of climate policies, particularly with regard to flood prevention and disaster risk reduction.

Pakistan’s Climate Policy and Disaster Framework

Although governance mechanisms are complicated, Pakistan has a legal framework for disaster and climate policies. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC) are two federal organisations that ostensibly direct flood response and climate action. The 2023 National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Plan (NAP) and the 2012 National Climate Change Policy (updated 2021) are two examples of climate frameworks that place an emphasis on adaptation, mitigation, and “nature-based solutions” (such as watershed management and reforestation).

The National Disaster Management Act of 2010 established Pakistan’s multi-tiered legislative structure for disaster management, with the NDMA at the top and district and provincial DM Authorities (PDMAs) at the bottom. In 2025, the NDMA published a revised National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy 2025–2030, outlining institutional strengthening initiatives and priority goals such as multi-hazard risk assessment and resilient infrastructure. The execution of these policies is still lacking. “Pakistan’s systems and institutions were not adequately equipped for the unprecedented scale” of the 2022 climate calamity, according to the stark conclusion of the 2022 World Bank-UN Post-calamity Needs Assessment (PDNA) for the country’s floods.

Governance and Coordination Gaps

Top-down Administration and Fragmented Authority

Although catastrophe and climate duties are distributed among levels of Pakistan’s federal structure, coordination is inadequate. A “prevalent top-down frame of management, centered on federalism” that fosters mistrust across levels and “vacuum[s] for misinterpretation” of policy is noted by experts. For instance, Pakistan’s 2023 NAP noted that development is hampered by inconsistent policies and overlapping responsibilities among agencies.

There is a “disconnect between the Federal Ministry of Climate Change (policy development) and the departments of the provincial governments (implementation).” In fact, there are no provincial climate change committees to coordinate provincial initiatives with federal strategies. Because of this disconnect, provincial and municipal governments frequently lack the resources or clear direction necessary to implement national climate or disaster risk reduction goals.

Inconsistent Disaster Governance

Gaps in cooperation also make it more difficult to prepare for floods. The 2025 floods, according to the Institute for Economics & Peace, revealed “gaps in disaster governance,” with “inconsistent responses, poor communication, and delays” across regions undermining confidence in the organization’s goal.

The World Bank PDNA also identified ongoing “complex governance” issues, as highlighted in the 2022 Floods, including the division of responsibilities for water management and flood planning among agencies, which leads to a lack of attention to hazard mitigation and infrastructure maintenance. In conclusion, Pakistan’s flood response is disjointed due to overlapping institutions and ambiguous tasks, which has increased the impact of the tragedy.

Capacity and Resource Constraints

Limited Institutional Capacity

Significant capacity shortages are noted in both government publications and independent evaluations. “Limited institutional capacity: inadequate resources, technical expertise, and coordination mechanisms among NDMA, PDMAs, and DDMAs” is acknowledged in the NDMA’s own strategy. According to SDPI research, one of the main obstacles is “limited institutional capacity and expertise for disaster risk reduction at the local level.”

Effective implementation of climate programs is frequently hampered by provincial environmental ministries’ lack of resources or weakness. Pakistan “lacks institutional capacity to undertake an overall climate action at national and subnational levels,” despite having regulations in place to combat climate change. In reality, many local agencies lack the personnel, tools, and training necessary to enforce building codes or maintain flood defenses.

Chronic Funding Shortages

There is a lack of dedicated funding for climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction. As a gap, the NDMA strategy specifically mentions “the absence of dedicated funding streams” for disaster risk reduction. Pakistan has “limited financial resources and funding for DRR initiatives.” Even when plans are created, they cannot be carried out due to financial limitations.

For instance, a lack of maintenance funding frequently causes flood prevention infrastructure to deteriorate. Further highlighting the need for investment, the World Bank stated following the 2022 floods that infrastructure systems were “not adequately equipped” to tackle the calamity. Fiscal pressures were exacerbated at the same time by recent floods that compelled the government to reallocate funds for emergency aid.

Human Resource and Knowledge Gaps

Implementation is hampered by inadequate expertise. Following devolution reforms, analysts point out the necessity of “building capacity at the provincial level amid the transition of responsibilities.” Many local employees are not trained in risk management or climate science. For climate actions, “limited knowledge and technical capacity at the local level is also a major barrier.”

Weak data systems and evidence-based planning are challenging in Pakistan due to the lack of thorough, current hazard mapping and vulnerability data (NDMA also acknowledges). Even flood warnings were not always reliable; in 2022, residents only managed to survive by accident when a shepherd sent out an informal notice. Both mitigation and disaster risk reduction strategies suffer in the absence of robust technical capability and data.

Policy and Planning Obstacles

Regulatory and Planning Disconnect

Policies pertaining to disasters and climate change are not completely included in larger development plans. Due to DRR’s “weak integration with development planning,” climate concerns are frequently disregarded in infrastructure and urban projects. One effect is the loss of natural buffers and the widespread construction on floodplains. According to academics, development authorities have paved over portions of rivers that absorb water, “turning absorbent areas into concrete, inviting devastation.”

Conflicts may also arise from overlapping policy frameworks. According to Pakistan’s NAP, adaptability is hampered by “inconsistent or conflicting policies across sectors.” For instance, federal initiatives to increase irrigation or hydropower might run counter to floodplain conservation guidelines.

Stakeholder Engagement and Political Instability

There is little inclusive planning. According to Masud and Khan (2023), Pakistani climate policy has far too frequently been developed through a “closed consultation process” that excludes important players. Implementers develop mistrust and “false expectations” as a result of this top-down strategy. Political continuity is weakened by frequent shifts in government priorities: according to SDPI, DRR programs experience “lack of support… due to frequent changes in political priorities.” Long-term projects (such as restoring forests or making towns flood-proof) may stall before they are finished because of this instability.

Financial and International Issues

Climate Finance Gaps

Pakistan’s climate adaptation budget is still inadequate. According to observers, the majority of Pakistan’s predicted $152 billion in adaptation costs through 2030 are still unfunded. Although billions were promised for flood recovery, a lot of funding was postponed or moved, leaving Pakistan’s adaptation budget in tatters. Mitigation and DRR activities are directly hampered by this persistent finance gap; for instance, important projects like constructing reservoirs or improving early warning systems cannot move forward without funding.

Reliance on External Assistance

Pakistan’s approach to disaster assistance also demonstrates institutional limitations. Due to the delayed response of big foreign funders to the historic floods in 2022, local players had to fill the void. “The 2022 floods response was a locally-led humanitarian response coordinated by NDMA and PDMAs due to the absence of big global players,” with large local charities filling the void.

Community action was beneficial, but it also brought attention to the under-mobilization of the private sector and international support. In order to increase resilience through loans and insurance, NDMA’s approach suggests collaborating with private and microfinance organisations. However, these initiatives are still in their infancy and are hampered by lax regulatory frameworks.

Impact on Mitigation and Disaster Risk Reduction

In Pakistan’s flood-prone areas, institutional impediments have a noticeable impact on catastrophe risk reduction and mitigation. Infrastructure mitigation, for instance, is falling behind. Levees and drainage systems are examples of defenses that are frequently out-of-date or badly maintained. The 2022 floods revealed a systematic weakness, according to the World Bank: “lack of systems for infrastructure maintenance.” Similar causes have been stated for the recent 2025 floods. In summary, institutional neglect has caused flood-control infrastructure to lag behind the climate danger.

Ecosystem-based mitigation is also hampered. According to NDMA’s DRR policy, “ecosystem-based DRR” (such as restoring forests and wetlands) and infrastructure retrofitting are two ways to “invest in resilience.” Such nature-based strategies may, in principle, lower the risk of flooding.  These efforts have been undermined, meanwhile, by disjointed land-use regulations and a lack of interagency collaboration. For example, reforestation initiatives that could stabilise watersheds are hampered by the division of forest management between federal and provincial administrations. Because of institutional inertia, short-term development gains frequently come at the expense of floodplain conservation.

From a risk reduction perspective, these obstacles affect preparedness and early warning systems. In theory, flood EWS has been in Pakistan for a long time, but reports show that communities frequently did not receive enough warning. Hundreds of people only survived the 2022 glacial-lake floods by accident because “there was no official alarm.” Although execution is uneven, NDMA and others have emphasised the importance of bolstering public education and anticipatory action. Many communities are left vulnerable in the absence of robust local institutions to enforce evacuation preparations or distribute warnings.

Role of Non-governmental Actors

Though other actors play supportive roles, government institutions are primarily responsible for policy. Private companies, academic institutions, and NGOs have started to fill up the gaps. On floods, for instance, the Pakistan Red Crescent and IFRC have organised community education and emergency response. Nowadays, a few NGOs assist in gathering flood data or provide disaster preparedness training to the community.

Limited projects have been funded by the private sector (e.g., philanthropy for local water management). Their influence is limited, though, as these contributions are dispersed in the absence of official procedures for private-public collaboration. Similar to this, NDMA suggests forming alliances with insurance and microfinance firms to strengthen resilience; however, these relationships are still in their infancy. Therefore, in reality, non-governmental actors have only enhanced, not taken the place of, the necessity of robust governmental execution.

Conclusion

The floods in Pakistan in 2025 brought to light a crucial paradox: despite the government’s articulation of comprehensive climate and disaster risk reduction plans, their effectiveness has been hampered by institutional flaws. Pakistan’s capacity to decrease vulnerabilities and mitigate flood risk has been hindered by political fragmentation, budget shortfalls, coordination gaps, and capacity limitations.

These institutional shortcomings “further exposed underlying institutional and systemic challenges” that increase the probability of disasters. These same problems continued until 2025, threatening community readiness, infrastructure resilience, and early warning. In summary, Pakistan’s floods have become more lethal due to a combination of factors, such as institutional and governance systems to keep up with climate change.

Strengthening institutions and capacity at all levels will be necessary to address this. Proposals include establishing secure financial channels for catastrophe risk reduction, enabling and funding provincial and local disaster administrations, and ensuring climate policy is incorporated into urban and economic planning. Pakistan needs to increase stakeholder participation and make mandates clearer in order to close “the disconnect between policy design and implementation. Pakistan can only effectively implement its climate policy and reduce the risk of disasters on the ground by addressing these institutional obstacles. This will lessen the financial and human costs of future floods.

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