The Chinese counterterrorism approach is quite different from that of the Western approaches. While the US counterterrorism strategy employs military and economic intervention and soft tools, China has developed a strategy that encompasses its surveillance system, economic web, and non-interventionist foreign policy to tackle it. One aspect of this strategy is controlling dissent (rebels) in China through internal surveillance. China has established strategic economic ties with many regions and finally refrains from military action. This article discusses China’s counterterrorism model, the major terrorist threats that have left it almost untouched over the years, and its longstanding security cooperation with Pakistan.

China’s Surveillance System

As the most advanced country in surveillance and internal security, China has specific objective standards. This system is run through the massive infiltration of every citizen’s life by over 700 million cameras nationwide. Here, a good thing to know is that the government integrates surveillance with its operational counterterrorism force; that is, surveillance entails using data analytics, facial recognition, and biometric tracking to detect potential threats before they can fully manifest.

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The internal security and counterterrorism measures in China, which include overseeing religious groups, dissenters, and suspected ones, are under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) jurisdiction. They thus can cooperate alongside the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which deals with espionage and foreign threats. The next level of authority is the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), tasked with scanning anything that could arouse feelings of dissent against the government, mainly through the Internet. What is more presented as a campaign against dissent is, in fact, often a crackdown by the Communist Party against a whole list of separatist groups, primarily related in the case of Xinjiang to their resemblance to what are termed Muslim Uyghur separatists or any other groups perceived by the authorities to pose the significant risk to national integrity?

Additionally, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) also keeps an eye on dissent in the country which engages in activities like suppression of protests (stifling or repressing), suggesting that China prioritizes controlling internal threats over external ones. Whether linked to radicalization and separatism or sporadic local protests, these organizations keep everyone in line. Emerging from the comprehensive deliberation on China’s internal counterterrorism practices and an extensive surveillance system, it becomes evident that China primarily centres on domestic stability as a hallmark of its overall strategy. However, such an approach to counterterrorism does not stop at its borders; it uses different tactics beyond this point. The core of China’s foreign counterterrorism strategy is the non-interventionist foreign policy. In contrast to the US, which frequently resorts to military interventions, China focuses on engaging in economic ties and diplomacy while refraining from direct military action against the specific threats within the region. This foreign policy strategy would thus keep China the more informed Highlander down the track regarding the economically troubled regions, wherein it can then dictate interests, avoiding all force.

Non-Intervention Foreign Policy: Diplomatic Edge of China

One of the most distinguishing features of China’s counterterrorism approach is its non-interventionist foreign policy. While the United States has often resorted to military interventions to fight terrorist groups, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the nationwide conflict does not send its troops to combat regions. China prefers economic investment and strategic alliances to invading other nations for military purposes.

For instance, the US sent boots on the ground and spent $6.4 T fighting the Taliban’s continued efforts to stabilize and democratize AFG (2001-2021). On the other hand, China’s strategy is something else. China is cultivating and laying roots in Afghanistan utilizing soft power tactics, building up projects like the Mes Aynak copper mine and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) instead of bringing boots on the ground. China does not officially recognize the Taliban government, but it does not mean that diplomatically and economically, China will not engage in business and maintain regional influence. China convinced others that its involvement would promote stability in the region, especially to avoid the spillover effect of insurgency, including the Arab Spring, in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which is west of Afghanistan.

China has fewer than five bases compared to the US’s 750 bases worldwide. There are no Chinese military interventions in Iraq, yet it is enhancing its economic presence. Chinese philosophy is simple, “we have nothing to do with other states’ government systems (democratic, authoritarian, or whatever).”  It is Iraq’s second-largest oil buyer ($35.2B) today. Economic and trade routes keep the states under long-term influence without military involvement. As the US continues its military presence in the region, China quietly solidifies its economic position, ensuring it benefits from its resources while avoiding the political threat of direct military engagement.

Neutral Approach Towards Global Jihadism

Chinese investments are politically neutral. They do not jeopardize their gains in case of political upheaval in these countries. It keeps China in a good position with beneficial long-term relations with established governments and localized militias, thus allowing the development of its projects without interference or bias.

The Sahel in Africa has become a prominent jihadist battleground, and China has invested in infrastructure in these areas. Meanwhile, Western powers, specifically the US and France, have been concerned with military action. In this respect, Beijing’s investments, trade, and development relations with African states play a major role in the region’s economy.

While ensuring that the internal threats are checked, China cannot become an ideological target on the scale of the US or Israel. According to the political ideologies of these groups and their interpretations of religious affiliation, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and others view the US and Israel as key enemies based on that ideology. The Chinese Communist ideology of China makes it, in their view, relatively foreign to the other jihadists, who include religious warfare as the very key theme.

Afghanistan and the Sahel Region

These two case studies show the realities of China’s counterterrorism strategy in action.

Afghanistan: 

China has secured its economic interests in Afghanistan rather than allowing the Washington war to militarily engage it. While the United States is pouring out millions and dying with its troops in the Afghanistan battle, China quietly has put money into building infrastructure in Afghanistan with loans and much development support. Thus, China creates an external presence in Afghanistan at reasonable costs and risks without military disruptions. As an economic partnership, China also nullifies any consequential fallout from instability in Afghanistan into Xinjiang.

The Sahel Region: 

China has never sent troops to the Sahel, where terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda operate. It primarily provides economic support through infrastructure development and trade agreements. Thus, through this process, it has built the trust of many Sahelian governments and populations, which, in turn, has strengthened its position in the region.

Joint Counterterrorism Ventures Between China and Pakistan

Chinese President Li Qiang’s latest visit to Pakistan to participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting underscores years-long friendship, cooperation, common geopolitical and economic goals, and aligned international interests. Both countries reaffirmed the development of significant projects such as the Karakoram Highway, Gwadar Port, and the industrial and energy sector under CPEC. They vowed to extend their cooperation to Pakistan’s agricultural sector and to harness its human and natural resource potential. 

Most significantly, both states stressed addressing security concerns. Joint counterterrorism exercises aimed at deepening the Sino-Pak ties were initiated in November 2024. As a geostrategic ally of Pakistan, China appreciates the counterterrorism efforts from Pakistan’s side after 9/11 when the menace of terrorism and insurgency sprouted. However, the October 2024 attack on the Chinese Convoy in the Port Qasim Power Plant and China’s reaction highlights the prevalence of security concerns for Chinese stakeholders in Pakistan. Nevertheless, China and Pakistan, owing to their geopolitical interest and history, are interested in extending the CPEC progress pragmatically to address security concerns. China and Pakistan’s counterterrorism cooperation is as old as the fourth wave of terrorism. Yet, it faces evolving threats due to the emergence of insurgent groups, shifting geopolitics, and reassessing China’s approach towards it.

A Historical Overview of Joint Counterterrorism Initiatives

Sino-Pak counterterrorism cooperation dates back to the 1990s. Their cooperation measures range from extradition treaties, joint counterterrorism exercises, and informal intelligence sharing to a united stance at SCO and the UN and a similar stance against the weaponization of terrorism by states. In the 1990s, China faced an anti-China Jihad movement from Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). There was a surge in violent terrorist attacks in China. Between 1990 and 2001, 162 people were killed and 440 were injured in 200 terrorist attacks. China provided Pakistan military and economic support for counterterrorism actions against ETIM and Uyghurs.

Pakistan also helped to manage Uyghur militancy through regional diplomacy. Pakistan negotiated with the Afghan Taliban on behalf of the Chinese government to control Uyghur’s activities and movement in Afghanistan. This was a significant move to curb terrorism. During the Global War on Terror, China and Pakistan started joint counterterrorism exercises and signed other treaties for cooperation on counterterrorism. One prominent treaty Pakistan signed was “militant extradition accords” in 2003. Pakistan handed over convicted terrorists to China following this treaty. Pakistan and China started a series of counterterrorism drills in 2004 in China. This continued in subsequent years. During the Global War on Terror, the counterterrorism cooperation was simply against the declared terrorist organizations that were anti-China.

In 2015, China introduced a groundbreaking project, CPEC, under the Belt and Road Initiative to connect China, Pakistan, and the Middle East, boosting its trade and energy security whilst developing Pakistan’s infrastructure, energy capacity, and industrial sector. As per the latest data, CPEC has contributed to a $25 billion investment in Pakistan, 0.155 million jobs creation, 316.8 miles long highway construction, and an energy capacity of 886 megawatts. This project was launched after a delay of two years because of the surge in terrorist activities in both countries in preceding years. ETIM and IMU increased their violent attacks in Xinjiang. TTP increased the frequency and intensity of attacks in Pakistan. Terrorism was declared as the most direct and realistic threat by the Chinese government. CPEC was also delayed because of security concerns. 

China had twofold concerns regarding terrorism in Pakistan: firstly, it threatens the security of Chinese nationals and Chinese investment in Pakistan, and secondly, it fuels terrorism in Xinjiang, China. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was conducted in Pakistan, which positively impacted both countries. Pakistan claimed to eradicate ETIM roots from its soil. CPEC was launched after two years of delay. Nawaz Sharif’s regime established a Special Protection Division with 15000 troops while Khyber Pakhtunkhwa established a security unit of 4200 members for Chinese nationals working in the region. This second phase of counterterrorism cooperation was somehow progressive in solving the issue and moving towards investment.

The threat spectrum to Chinese nationals and investment in CPEC evolved in the coming years. Balochistan, the host for mega projects under CPEC, presents hostility through its separatist groups. The significant reasons are its historic depravity of fundamental rights and industrialization despite its potential, the disagreements over CPEC’s significant projects in Balochistan, and indifference towards Baloch leaders’ concerns and involvement in CPEC agreements. Balochistan, a province with Pakistan’s largest natural resource potential, has had concerns about the federal government’s approach towards the province and its resources. From the view of Balochistan nationalist groups, CPEC is seen as a non-transparent form of foreign involvement. 

Consequently, CPEC has been facing the biggest threat in the hands of separatists since the inception of its idea. Before CPEC, BLA conducted one violent attack on a Chinese convoy. After CPEC was initiated, there is a long list of violent attacks conducted by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF). These violent attacks include abduction, killing, suicide bombing, car bombing, attack on consulate, and attacks on convoys.

In 2017, the Balochistan Liberation Front took the lives of ten Chinese workers in the vicinity of Gwadar. In 2021, 10 Chinese nationals were killed, for which contractors demanded 37 million USD. Pakistan paid 11.4 million USD for compensation. BLA carried out violent attacks against Pakistan’s military in August 2024 that continued for up to a week and resulted in the killing of 40 military personnel and civilians and 20 attackers. “China stands prepared to strengthen counterterrorism and security cooperation with Pakistan to maintain peace and security in the region,” China responded. In the wake of these terrorist activities by  Baloch separatist groups, Pakistan and China conducted counterterrorism exercises in November 2024. 

The CPEC projects in Pakistan encompass Balochistan, KPK, and FATA regions. In all these areas, in addition to separatist groups, the presence of foreign terrorist groups is widely speculated. The security situation in Afghanistan is also consequential for Pakistan; KPK shares an immense border and cultural similarity with Afghanistan. Pakistan and China revised their foreign policies to include Afghanistan in their security network; China effectively guaranteed a commitment from Afghanistan in 2021 about disallowing anti-China attempts within its territory. The direct risk from the Uyghur community is also well-managed by China. Therefore, Balochistan’s separatist and extremist groups are the major concerns for Sino-Pak joint developmental ventures.

In Pakistan, China is playing a “protective role” along with its usual “developmental role” as evidenced by the joint counterterrorism vows and practices from both sides. However, as Pakistan is not entirely facing terrorism regarding CPEC projects, a shift in the policy is needed. It has been presumed that China appreciates deploying its security forces to protect its workers, secure Pakistan’s inner grid, and establish a military base at Gwadar as it faced a $14 million increment in project payments and loss of 60 personnel after 2016. However, Pakistan’s reluctance is obvious from the limited number and freedom of Chinese private security forces working in Pakistan. The presence of a joint security force, yet the persistent attacks on Chinese workers, attests that Pakistan is not rightly approaching the problem. For example, in the Red Mosque Siege of 2007 in Islamabad against the Islamic extremists for the hostage of Chinese workers, the Pakistani government’s immensely strict actions increased the hostilities of all extremist groups. Additionally, despite the often-repeated demands of Baloch leaders and separatists, their presence during the project agreements was not ensured.

Owing to the nature of security crises, some analysts argue that China’s direct discourse with Baloch leaders will positively impact the Pakistani government’s unfruitful efforts. Currently, at the hands of Baloch residents and separatists, Pakistan is facing two issues: the insurgent and nationalist movements, keeping control of which necessitates addressing security and structural challenges. To ensure the security of Chinese personnel, there is a need to approach the Baloch insurgency with kinetic measures along with non-kinetic measures. In addition to deploying joint security forces and enhancing counterterrorism activities and capabilities, the government must incorporate economic reforms and provide the Baloch people specific to the region’s historic deprivation and China’s projects.

The government shall also address the grievances of the Baloch people regarding resource inequality and involve them in CPEC agreements and nation-building by empowering them. Therefore, without heeding the concerns of the Baloch separatists, long-term peace and progress in Balochistan, the origin of CPEC’s biggest projects, is not possible, which ultimately necessitates a shift in the government’s policy towards the consideration of joint Sino-Pak kinetic operations.

Conclusion

In summary, China’s counterterrorism strategy is distinct from Western approaches, emphasizing economic influence and non-violence rather than military intervention. This approach has shaped China’s longstanding security cooperation with Pakistan. While both nations have made progress in addressing Afghanistan’s security challenges post-2021, insurgent threats continue to pose challenges. Addressing historical grievances alongside security cooperation will be crucial for the sustainability of their counterterrorism efforts.

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