Abstract
This paper examines major powers’ interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and what implications this will have for the region. Geo-economics and geo-politics are the indicators of competition between supreme powers in tracking their deliberate goals. They highlight the interests of major powers. Together, the US, China, and India make up about half of the world’s GDP and are vying for dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In this perspective, while being smaller than the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the IOR continues to be crucial because of its enormous oil and gas reserves, choke points, nautical traffic, and the interests of foreign powers. The IMF-predicted global growth was expected to fall from 3.4% in 2022 to 2.8% in 2023.
The US and Europe are heading for recession, whilst the Asian economic situation is better. China and India will be major engines of growth this year. Therefore, the Indian Ocean will remain the focus of attention for the world. New alliances are taking place in which the US and India are the key players, their sole aim being the containment of China. On the other end, China’s presence in the Indian Ocean has increased in the last decade due to BRI/CPEC and its military base in Djibouti. Chinese Navy regularly patrols and exercises with the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean.
Introduction
The Indian Ocean differs from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; landlocked from the north, most of it lies in the Southern Hemisphere. It is the point of contact between different great sea routes like the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia, with the US and Europe, with an estimated 120,000 ships passing annually. The Indian Ocean handles approximately 30% of world trade, around half of the world’s container traffic. It possesses some of the world’s largest fishing grounds, which account for 15% of the world’s fish catches, 55% of the known offshore oil reserves, and 40% of the world’s offshore natural gas reserves.
The prevailing geo-strategic environment in IOR reflects not only competition but also complex interdependence among various stakeholders due to enormous international trade flows and potential threats of disruption/blockade of chokepoints, i.e., Bab al Mandab, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca. These chokepoints are exposed to blockades, international conflicts, political instability, and piracy. Daily oil traffic from the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca is about 2 and 16 million barrels respectively. The world’s economy will suffer from any disruption in the Indian Ocean, particularly if chokepoints are blocked, especially those of Japan, China, South Korea, and India.
Security alliances such as QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), AUKUS, and I2U2 were established with the aim of restricting China. Pakistan has expressed concerns over the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its emphasis on India’s role as a net security provider in the IOR. Pakistan fears that this will undermine its strategic importance in the region, especially given the historical tensions between Pakistan and India.
The US and India are uneasy about China’s development and the region’s economic connectedness. Due to its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, Chinese investment in the BRI/CPEC, particularly the development of Gwadar port, is seen as a strategic threat to their interests in the Indian Ocean, and they are trying to sabotage CPEC and discourage other countries from joining it.
IOR has seen a significant increase in foreign military bases in recent years. The presence of these military bases reflects the region’s growing strategic importance. It is home to important sea lanes of communication and natural resources. The United States has several regional military bases, including Bahrain, Djibouti, and Diego Garcia. China has also established military bases in Djibouti. Other countries, such as the UK, France, Japan, India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, also have their respective military bases in the region.
The presence of foreign military bases in the IOR has raised concerns among some countries about the potential for increased militarization and competition. All stakeholders need to engage in constructive dialogue and work towards a more balanced and cooperative approach to regional security, which considers the interests and concerns of all regional countries. Pakistan is a significant player in the Indian Ocean due to its strategic location, as CPEC offers the shortest access to China, the CARs (Central Asian Republics), and Afghanistan, and is closer to the Strait of Hormuz.
Both internal and foreign pressures are present in Pakistan. Internally, there is political unrest and precarious economic circumstances. While ties between the US and Pakistan are at an all-time low. The US and India are working together to oppose the CPEC. Completing CPEC projects would alter the dynamics of entire areas, and numerous nations will invest in them.
Methodology
This paper employed qualitative research methodology and has examined, through standard content analysis, relevant primary and secondary sources of data and information from various sources such as research papers, opinion articles, websites, online journals, and books/e-books. The research also consulted experts, pertinent national and international documents, and academics in peer-reviewed publications to gather a variety of prior assessments and viewpoints. The paper’s analysis technique included an in-house session with experts to deduce findings and conclusions to produce recommendations for practical actions involving governance instruments proposed for Pakistan. Overall, this approach suggests that the research conducted in this paper is comprehensive, utilizing a range of sources and expert opinions to develop a nuanced understanding of the subject matter at hand.
US Interests In the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is indeed an important region due to its strategic location, busy trade routes, and presence of several powerful countries. It is also critical for global security, as it has several nuclear-capable countries and is home to many military bases.
The US has had a long-standing interest in the IOR. Despite any shifts in the policy of the Indo-Pacific Region, it is likely to prioritize the region’s stability and security. This may involve partnerships and alliances with regional powers such as India, Japan, and Australia, as well as increased naval presence and military cooperation. However, it is also important to note that the dynamics in the region are constantly evolving, and any future developments could have significant implications for the US and its interests. The US has 12 permanent bases or use-of-base facilities in the Indian Ocean, with Diego Garcia being the largest base outside the US, followed by the US Base at Djibouti and the 5th Fleet in Bahrain. The US made use of these bases to strike Afghanistan and Iraq, patrol the IOR, and make goodwill visits to the littoral states.
Even though maintaining bases abroad is quite expensive, the US spends a lot on sustaining these bases compared to its trade in the Indian Ocean. These bases give the region’s littoral nations comfort and deterrence as well. For instance, the US 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf gives Gulf states a sense of security and increases pressure on Iran. The containment of China and other maritime operations like piracy, patrolling in the Indian Ocean, exercises with littoral countries, etc., are key to US strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean. Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) continues US policies in the Indian Ocean, detailed below.
Combined Maritime Forces
The US has established Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), under which four task forces maneuver to ensure freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. The US forces regularly exercise with the littoral countries, visit ports, and patrol the Indian Ocean.
- The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) involve multiple naval forces working together to uphold the Rules-Based International Order (RBIO). They aim to counter illegal non-state entities in international waters and foster stability, security, and prosperity across approximately 3.2 million square miles of vital global shipping routes.
- The CMF’s primary areas of focus include countering smuggling, narcotics, and piracy, fostering regional cooperation, collaborating with neighboring nations and allies to bolster capabilities for enhancing overall stability and security and advocating for a secure maritime environment devoid of illegal non-state actors.
- CMF assets deployed at sea are ready to assist in responding to humanitarian and environmental incidents upon request. The area of responsibility of each CTF is shown in Figure 1.
The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) consist of four distinct combined task forces:
- CTF 150 (Conducting maritime security operations beyond the Persian Gulf)
- CTF 151 (Focused on counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and along the eastern coast of Somalia)
- CTF 152 (Engaged in maritime security operations within the Persian Gulf)
- CTF 153 (Dedicated to Red Sea maritime security)
- CTF 154 (Specialized in maritime security training)
Containment of China
The emergence of China as a significant global economic power and its display of military strength are seen as responses to the United States’ strategy in the Indian Ocean. Various task forces and foreign military bases in this region are potentially utilized to check China’s influence. The US and its allies are actively contesting China’s position as a major player in the Indian Ocean. China faces challenges due to its heavy dependence on oil and gas passing through the Strait of Malacca after departing from the Strait of Hormuz, leaving it vulnerable to disruptions.
China’s future reliance on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a shorter route to receive essential resources is a significant strategic move. Efforts are being made to impede or obstruct the development of CPEC. In 2021, the “Build Back Better World” (B3W) project was inaugurated by the US and G7 countries in competition with the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and aimed to invest $40 trillion in infrastructure needed by developing nations by 2035.
However, it is not expected to yield the same impact as the BRI. Despite this, China has expressed openness to this initiative, extending invitations to the US to participate in the BRI. Additionally, the US has made every effort to create and forge an accord with India to counter China in the Indian Ocean, but China is one of India’s neighbors and biggest trading partner, while India is reluctant to openly challenge China.
In the past ten years, US-Indian ties have strengthened on both economic and military fronts. Economically, the United States and India have been working towards strengthening trade relations. In 2019 the two countries signed a trade deal that increased market access for certain goods and services and included intellectual property protections.
In the field of defense, the US made special agreements with India, which were only done with its close allies, these included the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). LEMOA is an agreement usually signed by the US with its allies for greater synergy between the armed forces. The US and India signed a LEMOA agreement in 2016. LEMOA solidified and strengthened the military ties between the US and India. It includes procedures for logistical supplies, support, and services. The agreement includes training, medical services, fuel, spare parts, transportation, food, water, repair and maintenance, clothing, and communication services.
The COMCASA was signed in 2018, which allows the US to transfer data equipment to India. Real-time data sharing over secure channels with the Indian military is also possible. The BECA signed between the US and India in October 2020 significantly altered the region’s geostrategic stability balance. The agreement allows for geospatial intelligence sharing with enhanced access to each other maps and satellite imagery. As a result, India can now access detailed information, regarding military installation and troop placement, to target attacks with more precision and accuracy. It will enhance the Indian military system and the accuracy of weapons such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, etc.
Chinese Interests In the Indian Ocean
An emerging superpower, China, poses a threat to the US and its allies. The US has described China as its strategic competitor. The Indian Ocean is given top priority in the Chinese strategy since China imports 54 % (254,747,432 tons)—the amount of oil from the Middle East to suit its energy demands. AUKUS, QUAD, and other military alliances were formed to impose restrictions on China in the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, trade routes, such as the CPEC/CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor) will allow Chinese trade, particularly oil, to avoid the Strait of Malacca.
The BRI, estimated to be worth $1 trillion, is changing the dynamics of these nations; if fully operational, CPEC would fundamentally alter the landscape of the entire area. The western provinces of China will benefit from this and be able to catch up with the eastern provinces in terms of development. To ensure that its trade reaches its intended destinations in the future, China must rely on neighboring Indian Ocean nations such as Pakistan (CPEC) and Myanmar (CMEC) for a quicker and safer path. China depends on other countries because it is not a natural part of the IOR. The Indian Ocean will remain the primary objective of the Chinese grand strategy.
About 90% of oil imports to China pass through vulnerable choke points, as shown in Figure 2. The first one is the Strait of Hormuz, a far distance from China, and requires the blue water navy to safeguard its trade. The Indian Navy has a significant presence in the Indian Ocean, and its western and southern Naval Commands are located on India’s western coast. These commands can disrupt Chinese sea lines of communication (SLOCs) on their way to the Strait of Malacca, which could impact China’s energy security.
The US believes China has realized the “String of Pearls” (as shown in Figure 3) policy to pledge the continuance of its SLOCs, which are safeguarded by Chinese military and commercial installations that reach from China to Port Sudan. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Bab ul Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, and the Lombok Strait, as well as other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Somalia.
The first pearl is at Hainan Island in South China, and the second pearl is at the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota, which will be used for an LNG refinery, aviation, and naval ships’ fuel storage facility. The third pearl is at the Chittagong port in Bangladesh; the fourth is Woody Island, situated 300 miles east of the Paracel Archipelago, Maldives, Ports of Sittwe in Myanmar; and the fifth is Port of Gwadar in Pakistan.
China has planned economic and military development for the next 50 years, divided into three phases. The first phase, from 2000-2010, concentrated on economic activities, doubling GDP, and improving the capabilities of the navy from green water to blue water. The second stage further doubled the GDP and development of 6 aircraft carrier groups from 2010-2020. As per the US Report 2022, Chinese naval units are expected to grow to 420 ships by 2025 and 460 ships by 2030. In the final stage of thirty years, spanning from 2020-2050, China will be the largest economy and its navy powerful enough to project itself in all oceans, which is causing worries for the US.
The two main pillars of the Chinese strategy for an alternate route to its trade are CPEC and CMEC. At the same time, CPEC will provide the shortest route to the Chinese oil imports and export of goods from the western provinces of China. The CMEC is building road and rail transportation from Yunnan province in China through the Yangon Port of Myanmar, reducing considerable distance and days as well. Similarly, work is in progress to lay a pipeline from Kyaukpyu Port of Myanmar to Kunming in China, which will meet all the requirements of the Chinese imported oil for its southern provinces and avoid the Strait of Malacca.
In expanding its defense capabilities, the first overseas base of China is established in Djibouti to protect its SLOCs from the Strait of Bab al Mandab. This base includes a large helicopter base, a naval port, and accommodation for 10,000 troops. The base will be utilized by the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) ships for patrolling and exercising with other navies in the Indian Ocean. The West believes that the Chinese naval mission is not limited to “Military Operations Other than War” (MOOTW) or protecting SLOCs but includes intelligence collection and counterterrorism as well. This base enhances China’s emerging global influence and shows its presence away from its shores, particularly in the Indian Ocean. China is supplying submarines to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand and exports weaponry and systems to other Indian Ocean coastal nations. India is not pleased because these nations are its neighbors. The presence of China in the Indian Ocean is a balancing factor for global politics.
The Indian Ocean is seeing a steady but significant increase in China’s economic and military influence. The BRI/CPEC/CMEC (CMEC route is shown in Figure 3), military base, and ambition to be a global power reflect the Chinese strategy in the Indian Ocean. The US and its allies’ task of containing China will be difficult, but they can restrict its freedom of movement in the Indian Ocean.
Indian Interests In the Indian Ocean
India occupies a glaring place in the Indian Ocean with a coastline of 7516.6 km, of which 5422.6 km is the mainland and 2094 km is the coastline of island territories. The US supports India in becoming a significant maritime force in the IOR against China. The US wants Indian naval ships to deploy in the South China Sea, but India hesitates because of trade and being China’s neighbor. Though China captured 640 sq km of Indian territory along the “line of actual control” (LoAC) that démarches the China-Indo border, neither the US nor India took any military or diplomatic action. By signing the agreements mentioned above, the US supports India to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, which is not in the interests of Pakistan. Pakistan opposes it on all forums.
After Modi took over as the Indian Prime Minister in 2014, the relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated to their lowest ebb. The Hindutva policy of India has tarnished the image of a secular country. India is also a member or co-founder of different forums in IOR, like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in which Pakistan’s entry has been blocked, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) including Pakistan, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), could not flourish as compare to other alliances Indian unyielding attitude. The recent coalition of I2U2 is an indication of US plans. It illustrates India’s effective and reliable diplomacy and Israel’s plans to establish strong relations with the Gulf states.
The presence of Israel is viewed with suspicions by Iran and Pakistan. It may allow the Israeli Navy to operate in the Indian Ocean and create hindrance for CPEC. Another initiative is India’s SAGAR policy (Security and Growth for All in the Region) including Maldives, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius, and the South Asian region. The aim is to increase India’s political and economic influence and connectivity and minimize island vulnerabilities against security threats, including climate change and China’s further expansion in the IOR. India positions itself as the sole major force in the Indian Ocean, confronting China and downplaying Pakistan’s importance in these fora.
The Indian Ocean is paramount in India’s strategy as it handles 95% of its trade by volume and 68% by value. Nearly 80% of India’s crude oil, about 3.28 million barrels per day, is imported through this region. Additionally, India is considered the fourth-greatest importer of LNG, with an average rate of 45% arriving by sea. India ranks sixth globally in fish capture, harvesting 4.1 million tons and supporting a workforce of around 14 million in fishing and aquaculture industries.
India has taken a diversified strategy. On the one hand, it is boosting relations with the US and other major powers while fortifying relations with the IOR countries by forging various alliances and bolstering the capabilities and strength of the Indian Naval units. Indian Navy numerically is the strongest navy in IOR and operates in four commands: Southern Naval Command, Western Naval Command, Eastern Naval Command, and Andaman and Nicobar Command. Indian Navy is rapidly building up and planning to be a 170-ship navy by 2027. Currently, there are 137 ships in its fleet. This includes 3 carriers, 5 nuclear submarines, 20 conventional submarines, destroyers, and frigates (10 DDGs, 16 FFGs), and the latest maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters. The Indian Navy plans to acquire 57 carrier-based fighter aircraft and a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarines. Pakistan has always supported the idea of making the Indian Ocean nuclear-free, but the acquisition of 5 nuclear submarines will lead to its nuclearization.
India’s desire to become a mini-superpower and its reliance on the Indian Ocean forced her to build military bases. India has established 11 military bases/agreements to use berths/airfields in different littoral countries of the Indian Ocean, like Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius, etc. The purpose of these bases is to dominate the Indian Ocean and disrupt Chinese BRI.
India’s plans to rule the Indian Ocean are unpopular with its neighbors due to its unfriendly policies. Hindutva policies have distanced neighbors’ concerns even more. India is deepening its links with the US and the West, but it cannot pursue a strategy antagonistic to China because it is the latter’s main commercial partner. In 2021 China and India’s bilateral commerce was worth US$125 billion.
Key Players In Indian Ocean—Military Bases
When merchant ships used coal for their engines in the past century—the terminology “coaling station” was used—where these ships could enter any port to get coal and rest. The same concept is used in military bases, where ships and aircraft can enter the port/air base to take fuel and the crew can rest. Geographically, a foreign military installation beyond the nation’s borders is home only to that nation’s armed forces. A deal between the host nation and another creates such bases to achieve their strategic objectives. Although maintaining these bases costs a lot of money, it is important to do so because of their strategic value.
Regardless of the policy of the US towards the Indo-Pacific, the world would still consider the Indian Ocean important due to its chokepoints and oil and gas riches. Other key players and regional powers, in addition to the US and China, also have permanent bases or defense agreements to use ports and airfields to maintain a military presence. The list includes the UK, France, Italy, Russia, Israel, Japan, Greece, India, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. These bases create some economic activity in the host country, such as the rent of berths and land/air bases.
Interestingly, Djibouti is home to eight countries’ armed forces, including the US, France, Germany, Spain, Japan, Italy, China, and Saudi Arabia. This contributes $300 million to Djibouti’s economy. The purpose of bases in the Indian Ocean is to safeguard their SLOCs, power projection, maintain peace, intelligence gathering, and, if required, attack another country, as the US did from Diego Garcia for attacking Afghanistan and Iraq.
Sometimes, the natives of these countries show their resentment and hatred for foreign countries because they think their sovereignty has been compromised. Occasionally, these countries interfere with the politics of the host countries and create an unfavorable situation. Indian military presence in the Maldives has recently been the subject of protests from locals who want it to halt because they believe India is meddling in their internal matters.
A few islands in the Indian Ocean belong to the UK and France. The UK and France, who occupy the islands, own the resources located within two hundred nautical miles of those islands. They derive their income from these islands, which are also valuable strategically. The interests of the US, UK, France, India, and Japan in the Indian Ocean are furthered through military bases. They intend to obstruct the BRI, CPEC, and CMEC projects and the Chinese growth in the Indian Ocean.
Role of Quad/Aukus/I2U2/ Other Alliances
In the past decades, the US has formed a few alliances in the Indian and Pacific regions like QUAD, AUKUS, I2U2, IPEF, etc. QUAD consists of the USA, India, Japan, and Australia. The Quad intends to acquire a rules-based global direction, freedom of navigation, and a liberal exporting system. It will also provide debt financing to Indo-Pacific countries(Smith, 2021). However, the basic role of QUAD is to contain the strategic dominance of China across various regions like those of the South China Sea, Eurasia, and the Indian Ocean. The littoral countries worry it may encourage China to step up its coercive diplomacy through heavy-handed economic power and military use.
The US and other QUAD members have repeatedly characterized CPEC as the biggest geostrategic threat to their interests, increasing pressure on other states to distance themselves from the project at the expense of regional economic integration, trade, and livelihood development. Till now, the QUAD has not played an active defense- and security role in counterbalancing China. All QUAD countries have been taking part in Malabar Exercises since 2020. The exercise is held in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal, and South China Sea in different years and in Chinese SLOC. This may indicate that QUAD is forging a military alliance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The purpose of QUAD was widely viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power, and the Chinese government responded by calling it Asian NATO.
The volume of trade between China and the QUAD countries is astonishing. China is Australia’s top trading partner, followed by the United States, Japan, and India. On the economic front, these countries cannot cut their relations with China.
Australia pulled out of the French plan to buy 12 diesel-electric submarines for US$66 billion and joined the US and UK in AUKUS to buy eight nuclear submarines for more than US$100 billion. (Hashmi, Indo-Pacific Ocean, containment of China or exercise in futile, 2021) Australia is a peaceful state and has friendly terms with its neighboring states, yet it is compelled to acquire nuclear submarines to put China under pressure.
The Indo-Pacific countries showed different reactions. China has criticized it as “highly irresponsible,” and according to them, it can cause a race of nuclear weapons in the state. Pakistan always wants the Indian Ocean free of the nuclear platform. North Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are concerned about AUKUS. Japan welcomed it, and South Korea and the Philippines appreciated it. South Korea considers that it will be difficult to purchase nuclear submarines in the future. India was denied acquiring nuclear submarines by the US in the past but now hopes to get US nuclear submarines.
I2U2, an alliance was made between the major powers of the United States, India, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. The primary objective of I2U2 is to address global issues such as shortage of food, climate and environment issues, less oil production, and the conflict of fostering collaboration in various spheres. Like the QUAD countries, I2U2 nations might arrange naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. This collaboration would allow Israel to work its marine forces. Several states dominate the Indian Ocean, but Israel’s existence is identified as an estimation of the projects of BRI/CPEC plans and keeps a check on China strategically.
IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity) is a recently established coalition comprising thirteen nations: the US, Australia, India, Japan, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and New Zealand. Collectively, these countries represent 40% of the global GDP. The primary aim of IPEF is to promote economic growth, resilience, and competitiveness among its member states. It serves as a comeback to the BRI and intends to reduce China’s expanding influence in the region. However, as of now, IPEF has yet to demonstrate any substantial impact or effects.
The development of all these associations is due to the rise of China in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The current foreign minister of China, Wang Yi‘s speech at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 11 July in Jakarta stated that countries should avoid being used as “chess pieces” by global powers in a region— which he said was at risk of being reshaped by geopolitical factors. China and Pakistan are concerned about mushrooming new coalitions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, united against the BRI, under the umbrella of the US and India.
Implications for the Region, Especially Pakistan
A new age of geopolitical rivalry is taking place in the Indian Ocean. The regional nations are now in an awkward position due to the strategic interests and new partnerships of major powers in the Indian Ocean. The infrastructure of these nations has improved, and their trade has increased because of China’s significant investment in BRI, CPEC, and CMEC. They all believe that these alliances are formed to restrict China. AUKUS will start a race to acquire nuclear submarines in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India plans to build five, while Australia will purchase eight. South Korea could be the next country to obtain a nuclear submarine. The presence of many such submarines will increase the Indian Ocean’s vulnerability to accidents, such as underwater explosions, nuclear reactor malfunctions, collision with another vessel, etc., which would have devastating global consequences.
There are differences between the US and Chinese approaches when it comes to investing in a nation. China is glad to work with any nation and has no favorites or demands. Their main goal is to improve the framework and focus more on trading. The US is more interested in enacting its global plan, overthrowing unkind governments, selling old and outdated military hardware, and supplying help in trade for requests. When dealing with China, most nations feel at ease.
“It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”
Henry Kissinger
After World War II, the US has been involved in seventeen major wars in the world. The countries became more unstable after the war, e.g., Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and Lebanon. Therefore, the littoral states of the Indian Ocean are cautious in maintaining relations with the US.
As a result of various agreements between the US and India, relations in recent decades have strengthened. In addition, the US invited India to join the newly established QUAD, I2U2, and IPEF. IOR’s neighboring nations, particularly Pakistan, are uncomfortable with India’s increasing role. The US wants India to be the dominant nation in the Indian Ocean to counter China. The way India interacts with its neighbors and the Hindutva policies of discrimination inside the nation shows that it lacks a leadership vision.
Due to India’s obstinate stance, SAARC could not thrive like other alliances. It plays a saboteur’s role in CPEC, which is evident after the Kulbhushan Yadav was arrested by Pakistan in 2016. He engaged in subversive activities inside Pakistan. The attack on the Chinese in Pakistan is also linked to the involvement of RAW (Research and Analysis Wing of India). The Indian Navy’s agreement to utilize Oman’s Duqm port is part of a plan to sabotage CPEC. India engages in propaganda on social media and also dabbles in cyber warfare. A European organization discovered the disinformation network that India built in 2005 to spread false information to harm Pakistan and other hostile nations in 2020. 265 fake locally recognized media channels were there in 65 states serving various interests of India and multiple dubious NGOs and think tanks. In addition to organizing anti-Pakistan lobbying activities in Europe, this network was active in Geneva and Brussels and produced amplified content intended largely to weaken Pakistan.
The national security of Pakistan is dependent upon its maritime security. Pakistan has an underutilized two hundred nautical mile (NM) exclusive economic zone and a 150 NM continental shelf. Approximately 91% of trade and 100% of oil imports come from the sea. Pakistan is dependent on imports and exports via the sea. The Strait of Hormuz is nearby, making Gwadar Port the fastest and safest marine route to landlocked Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics, and the western province of China.
The goal of the US-India partnership and these alliances, like I2U2 and QUAD, is to reduce the influence of China in the IOR. The Chinese investment in BRI, CPEC, and CMEC will boost the local economy and open new trade avenues for China. Although the littoral and landlocked nations cannot challenge the US as the only superpower, they are all aware of the significance of Chinese investment for their economic future. Perhaps a new alliance of China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan can be formed to reassure the nations in the region and possibly counter US partnerships.
Pakistan’s heavy reliance on imported oil and gas, the need for a loan to pay off its debt, and the nation’s imports, which are more than twice as large as its exports, all contribute to its current fiscal crisis.
Pakistan is currently experiencing a financial crisis because of its excessive reliance on imported oil and gas, the necessity to take out a loan to pay off its debt, and the country’s imports, which are more than twice as high as its exports. The only option for Pakistan’s economic recovery is the CPEC.
For the entire region, the success of CPEC will be a game-changer; even the Western nations would invest in its projects.
Conclusion
The vast oil and gas reserves, susceptibility to choke points, and Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean will ensure that the region remains significant for the major powers. Pakistan’s security is seriously threatened by the spread of nuclear submarines, foreign military bases, and India’s quest for great power status in the Indian Ocean. The coordination between the US and India in QUAD, I2U2, and its allies to impede BRI/CPEC and stop China’s influence in IOR is unsettling the littoral countries. Even though it is difficult to restrain China, the US puts obstacles in its way to prevent it from dominating the Indian Ocean.
The yearly military exercise of QUAD countries in the Indian and Pacific Oceans needs to be evaluated. The CPEC/CMEC will open other commercial avenues to China. With India using cyberwarfare to promote propaganda against Pakistan and other countries, a new aspect of warfare has developed. Pakistan needs to monitor all Indian propaganda and be cautious in maintaining a delicate balance in its relations with the US, China, and other countries. Indian Ocean is significant for Pakistan because of sea trade and CPEC. The economic challenges of the twenty-first century are too large for any one country to manage on its own. New coalitions of like-minded countries can be created to maintain regional peace and economic growth in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s sole chance to rebuild itself and alter the dynamics of the entire region is through CPEC.
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This piece was originally published in the Journal of Nautical Eye and Strategic Studies
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