From Europe’s technological dependence to India’s cybersecurity goals and Brazil’s data protection regulations, states are increasingly viewing digital governance through the prism of state power.
The next big fight for sovereignty might not happen on a geographical border but rather through the digital networks linking our globe. Data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity have all become indispensable components of competitiveness in trade, political discourse, and defense. However, the technologies underlying those systems are now increasingly controlled by entities that operate across borders, causing states to be more worried about who owns their data, who controls their infrastructure, and who ultimately governs the digital domain.
The magnitude of this development cannot be ignored. As per the latest estimates from the International Telecommunication Union for 2025, there were about 5.8 billion internet users in 2024, representing 71% of the world’s total population. The digital economy is no longer an isolated sector working alongside conventional politics but an essential aspect of governing, competing, and wielding power by states.
This increased dependence has made digital sovereignty an important issue in international relations. Digital sovereignty means that the ability of a state to control its digital space, keep sensitive information safe, protect its critical infrastructure, and make its own decisions on technology needed by its citizens. It does not mean that the state wants to isolate its network from the rest of the world, but it wants to avoid becoming technologically dependent on others.
The EU, India, and Brazil provide three illuminating cases of this phenomenon. Their strategies vary, but each shows that digital governance has now become entwined with national security, economic sovereignty, and efforts to craft international law.
Europe: The Limits of Regulatory Power
The EU’s digital strategy is based on a potent mix of regulation and, more recently, technological capability. The EU’s strategy is to make sure that rule-making for international technology firms is an effective tool of influence, though it is not enough to be a leader in regulation without technological independence.
With the introduction of the GDPR, the EU created a regime for protecting personal data. With the passing of the Digital Services Act, there were new requirements for online platforms with regard to transparency, consumer protection, and system risks. Thus, the EU has shown that it is possible to impose binding obligations on digital firms despite being located outside of the jurisdiction of the EU.
Regulatory authority under the GDPR also carries concrete economic ramifications since, under the legal framework of the GDPR, any severe infringement can lead to fines worth a maximum of €20 million or 4% of an organization’s total annual global revenue, whichever is greater.
However, the experience of the EU reveals a much deeper irony. Europe can regulate foreign tech companies but needs to rely on non-European suppliers for critical digital technology. According to the Communication on Technological Sovereignty of June 2026 by the European Commission, more than 80 percent of the digital products, services, infrastructure, and IP in the EU came from non-EU providers.
This dependency can explain the shift of Brussels from mere regulation toward other approaches. In the European Technological Sovereignty Package of June 2026, initiatives for semiconductors, cloud computing, AI, and open-source technology have been included.
Moralism is obvious; regulation does not equal possession of power in the digital world. Regulation may affect corporate behaviour, but it does not equate to strategic independence, which also requires technical know-how, computing capabilities, and investment.
India: Cybersecurity and Strategic Autonomy
Digital sovereignty in India is a result of the interaction of several factors—data governance, cybersecurity, economic growth, and strategic autonomy. Specifically, it is necessary to develop a vast digital economy without exposing critical systems to any risks of vulnerability that may be exploited by adversaries or exacerbated by geopolitical dynamics.
The Digital Personal Data Protection Act of 2023 has provided India with a statutory framework for the processing of digital personal data. On the other hand, the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has a role in responding to cyber-attacks. Particularly, its cybersecurity directions of April 2022 mandate reporting of designated cyber incidents within six hours of discovery or notification.
These mandates illustrate how the scope of digital governance goes beyond the issue of privacy. Government systems, financial services, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructures can become victims of cyber incidents, which can impair their functions and erode the trust of citizens. Thus, the capability of detection, reporting, and responding to these risks represents a significant factor of national resilience.
Additionally, the economic component of digital sovereignty is evident. Developing digital capacities can help to decrease reliance on foreign providers and build local industries.
However, autonomy does not mean self-reliance. Innovation in the digital space requires international research, investment, equipment, and cooperation. Too stringent a policy may raise costs and limit innovation, while data security laws within the country should be put in place through processes that ensure accountability.
The key task for India, therefore, is to develop enough capacity domestically to make independent decisions without losing the gains of integration.
Brazil: Digital Sovereignty and the Rights of Citizens
Another way in which Brazil brings a new angle into the discussion is through its focus on digital sovereignty, personal privacy, and online platform governance. The Brazilian model exemplifies the fact that the matter of digital sovereignty goes beyond competition between the state and foreign tech companies. Rather, it is about the protection of citizens as their personal data becomes an asset.
The Brazilian General Data Protection Law (LGPD), Law No. 13,709 of 2018, governs the processing of personal data and protects individual rights. Its Marco Civil da Internet, Law No. 12,965 of 2014, outlines the principles, rights, and responsibilities in the use of the internet, emphasizing the need for freedom of expression, privacy, and the internationality of the internet.
These laws can be seen as a basis for the governance of digital activities in Brazil, keeping in mind the fact that cyberspace is not confined to national borders. Moreover, their importance transcends the purely technical aspect of implementation, as digital platforms affect the circulation of information, participation in political life, and monetization of personal information.
In countries that want more control of their digital spaces, this becomes a problematic issue of how to regulate powerful platforms without making digital regulation a means for the arbitrary control of the state.
Brazil is a clear example that demonstrates why digital sovereignty requires protection not only for the government but also for its citizens. Institutions, transparency of enforcement, and protection of individual rights become crucial components to gain public trust.
However, despite all the legal provisions, they alone will be insufficient to stop reliance on foreign technology companies and cybersecurity issues.
Three Models, One Geopolitical Struggle
The distinctions among these cases indicate that digital sovereignty cannot be regarded as a monolithic approach. The EU relies on regulatory powers and strives to bolster its own technological standing. For India, it involves cybersecurity measures, strategic autonomy, and digital development. Brazil pays special attention to data protection, individual rights, and regulation of internet platforms.
Still, all of them can be seen as part of larger shifts in international politics: control over digital infrastructure and information is becoming increasingly important as a strategic resource.
Cloud computing technologies, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and digital platforms are not politically neutral, as their use can be determined by business considerations, foreign legislation, export controls, or geopolitical conflicts. A state that is highly dependent on third parties may find itself in a situation where its ability to govern critical data or provide certain services is limited by the decisions made elsewhere.
This is where digital sovereignty meets great power rivalry. States see their technological dependence from the perspective of economic security, supply chain resilience, and military issues. One can refer, for instance, to the EU Commission’s technology sovereignty strategy until 2026, where capabilities are seen as an aspect of strategic autonomy.
Yet, the quest for digital sovereignty comes with its own set of dangers. Measures such as blocking the flow of information between countries, banning foreign companies, or requiring incompatible regulations could lead to fragmentation of the worldwide web and higher costs for businesses. More worryingly, states could resort to their national security to engage in intrusive monitoring and censorship.
Thus, digital sovereignty might be seen as an asset to build up state capacity and resilience, or it might become an excuse for digital protectionism and state domination. The key is whether states will succeed in building resilience without sacrificing openness and cooperation.
The Developing World and the Unequal Distribution of Digital Power
The controversy also poses a broader issue related to inequality within the international system. Developing sophisticated computing capabilities, securing access to semiconductors, and creating a strong AI industry are unevenly distributed. Technologically backward states may become vulnerable to dual dependency; they must rely on foreign companies for necessary digital services but have lower influence over the conditions of those services.
The Internet use statistics of the ITU provide a quantitative illustration of the problem: in 2024, 2.3 billion people were still not online. Digital sovereignty would not make sense for countries that cannot ensure reliable access to digital infrastructure.
As regards developing nations, their task is not to reproduce the technological infrastructure of leading states at all costs. Instead, they should focus on building domestic expertise, strengthening cybersecurity capabilities, negotiating equal technology partnerships, and protecting classified data without losing access to international markets and innovations.
Cooperation between states within a region may be crucial when a country is unable to develop certain technologies on its own because of insufficient resources.
This is also a chance to reconsider digital sovereignty beyond the idea of a contest among the great powers. This is a matter of the ability of states to make decisions based on knowledge about the future of technology, and not to accept dependencies which they cannot manage.
Conclusion: Sovereignty in an Interconnected World
This struggle for digital sovereignty signals a major change in how the very essence of sovereignty works. In a world where artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and a globalized infrastructure become important, sovereignty is not about having territorial control but is dependent on whoever will have control over important technologies, whoever will control data, and whoever will be able to resist external pressure.
There is no one way to do this, as is shown by the examples of the European Union, India, and Brazil. Regulatory measures will help protect citizens and curtail the powers of corporations; cybersecurity measures will make countries more resilient; and developing a strong domestic technology sector will help diminish strategic risks. But none of these measures alone is enough.
The main risk here lies in the fact that a government may conflate sovereignty with isolationism. It may close digital markets, restrict the flow of information, and engage in more surveillance.
A more sustainable method will require the development of technological capabilities, diversification of dependence, the establishment of clear rules, and international cooperation. It will also require protection of the rights of individuals so that the concept of digital sovereignty does not turn out to be a synonym for limitless government powers.
Ultimately, the countries that will have the most influence in the digital era will not be those who have full control of technologies or completely isolate themselves from any foreign influences. These will be those countries that will have the ability to manage their dependencies, protect their people, and create the rules of cyberspace while maintaining strategic independence.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.
Tehreem Ahmed is an MPhil scholar in International Relations with research interests in China’s foreign policy, International Political Economy (IPE), and regional security dynamics. Her work focuses on China’s growing influence in global affairs and its impact on regional and international politics.
