Drug Smuggling into Pakistan and the Politics of Security

Drug Smuggling into Pakistan

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, straddling Pakistan’s most volatile province, survives on a delicate nexus of smuggling economy and the politics of security. From the unilaterally operated Torkham border to the hub of opium, the Tirah Valley, the provincial government and elite capture administration play vital roles in enabling the safe route for illicit trade. The formal government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa often plays second fiddle to informal networks of trade, power, and security. For the elites of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, hardcore yet unilateral border surveillance poses a significant threat to the survival of politics and trade benefits. What Islamabad frames as a threat to national security is used for political bargaining by the KP authorities and the drug mafia.

Afghanistan, often considered the epicenter of opium and morphine, has facilitated the flow of drugs in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province due to inadequate security measures on the Afghan side. Typically, international borders are bilaterally managed by the forces of both states; however, in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, border management responsibility falls solely on Pakistan. Given the 2,611 km long shared border with Afghanistan, Pakistan’s complex geographic position places it in a vulnerable situation where it is a direct target of illicit trade, smuggling, narcotics, and transnational movement of terrorism originating from Afghan soil.

Afghanistan benefits from a porous and unilaterally guarded border with Pakistan, which facilitates the smuggling of narcotics into Pakistan and onward to the rest of the world through the extensive illegal networks. As a leading hub of opium cultivation and marketing, Afghanistan remains a primary source of opium and morphine that flows through Pakistan to the destinations beyond the region. The implications of unchecked drug trafficking are not limited to Afghanistan itself, but it has affected the region and beyond, with Pakistan being the first and most severely affected country by this illicit trade.

However, after the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) came to power, a ban on poppy cultivation was announced. Despite this, a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime shows that there is a 19% spike in opium cultivation in Afghanistan that continues to generate a significant amount of revenue for AIG in Afghanistan and other terrorist organizations.

Why Security Measures Are Opposed

The persistent flow of narcotics poses serious threats to the health and overall well-being of the Pakistani population, especially the younger generation. Afghanistan persistently produces a substantial amount of hashish (charas), opium, heroin/morphine, and methamphetamine (commonly known as ice). Analysts and researchers widely believe that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province is the most severely affected province, with 10.7% of its population reported as strong users of ice, compared to 4.5% and 5.45% of users in the rest of the provinces in Pakistan.

For the sake of national security, Pakistan at times unilaterally attempts to secure its border with Afghanistan either by closing the Torkham border or by strengthening its security measures. However, such decisions are usually rejected by the authorities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The primary objective behind the very opposition and rejection of such security measures lies in the fact that certain political figures and influential personalities are key beneficiaries of the illicit trade.

Thus, they reject policies that threaten their financial, social, and political interests. Law enforcement agencies, along with the provincial government, have shown some intent in tackling complex drug networks, as segments of the political leadership and a few administrators are themselves deeply entrenched in and profiting from such illegal networks.

In this context, lawlessness has become a sustainable tool for their political and social survival. Hence, any sort of crackdown from the armed forces and the federal government, such as closing the border or disrupting trade flows, would directly undermine the smuggling economy on which their political and financial survival partly depends, thereby exposing or clogging the very loopholes in the functioning of the system that enable their gains.

There exists a strong nexus between terrorist organizations such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Islam (LI) and certain, not all, elements in the provincial government. These terrorist groups generate revenue from the drug users, with tacit support or protection of influential businessmen and political elites in KP. They face no resistance from the government side, as they share a huge percentage of the revenue generated with the existing authorities, which provides safe routes for exploiting loopholes.

Terrorist groups, in collaboration with smugglers, have established their own checkpoints in areas that are known as hubs of opium, such as the Tirah Valley, Wazir Dhand, and Shah Kas market in Jamrud, where they engage in and facilitate the movement of narcotics, weapons, and transnational terrorism into Pakistan. Such illegal and threatening practices undermine the state’s sovereignty, as no sovereign state would allow its territory to be exploited under the veil of trade. This complex and deep-rooted terrorist-smuggler nexus has plagued not only the KP province but also the entirety of Pakistan.

This is precisely why military operations initiated by Pakistan’s armed forces are always opposed by the KP administration. Those benefitting from illicit trade and drug trafficking understand that any military crackdown or strong security measures against drug traffickers would jeopardize their illegal business and cut off the privileges they enjoy on a routine basis. Consequently, they oppose such decisive security policies by invoking “security cards” and a lack of confidence, emphasizing that military operations would destabilize the province. While in fact their denial of security measures stems from their vested interest in drug trafficking and the transnational movement of weapons, and the smuggling-terrorism nexus.

A National Security Threat

Pakistan continues to carry out military crackdowns along the Pak-Afghan border, strengthening border surveillance measures that actually disrupt the designs of its adversaries. For Pakistan, the challenge moves beyond simple drug trafficking and illicit trade. Under the guise of laborers and truck drivers, those associated, directly or indirectly, such as Fitna al-Khawarij (FAK) and Fitna al-Hindustan (FAH), infiltrate Pakistan to carry out terror attacks inside Pakistan.

For instance, the case of petrol smuggling from the Iranian border. At the beginning of 2024, nearly 15 million liters of petrol were being smuggled into Pakistan. Due to proactive military leadership and the government, it has been reduced to 6 million liters now. Smugglers buy Iranian oil at the price of 15-20 rupees per liter and resell it at the price of 230-240 rupees in Pakistan. Even after the deduction of 30-40 rupees for transportation and employees, they still generate 200 rupees per liter, amounting to nearly 1.8 billion rupees per day.

However, a critical question arises here: where does this enormous amount of revenue generated from drug trafficking go? The answer lies in the terrorists, their facilitators, narcotics dealers, some media runners, and other vested interests, including black sheep hidden in the judiciary. Whenever the Pakistani military intensifies its crackdown along the Pak-Afghan border, correspondingly, terror attacks intensify inside Pakistan, orchestrated by Fitna al-Khawarij (FAK) and Fitna al-Hindustan (FAH).

Recommendations

To address these national security threats, it is essential for both Pakistan and Afghanistan to foster cooperative and brotherly relations with each other. Afghanistan must ensure that its territory is not being utilized by Fitna al-Khawarij and Fitna al-Hindustan against Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan seeks formalization of cross-border engagement and the implementation of joint-border mechanisms such as bilateral guarding of the border. Furthermore, the integration of digital surveillance can play a pivotal role in dismantling terror and transnational narcotics networks operating in this way.

Pakistan must adopt a comprehensive digital monitoring approach in safeguarding its border with Afghanistan, particularly by using Electronic Cargo Tracking (ECTs) for all Afghan transit and Afghan-origin re-exports. For all such measures to be successful, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa must align its provincial interests with the broader national interests by standing side by side with Pakistan and its armed forces. Provincial authorities must endorse and fully support military operations against enemies of Pakistan, as their cooperation is essential for transforming KP, and ultimately Pakistan, into a terror- and drug-free state.

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