Examining Iran’s foreign policy reveals that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the operating body during this period, has designed and implemented a multifaceted strategy. This strategy can be elucidated within a hierarchical framework. The foreign affairs of Iran are characterized by a complex interplay of diplomacy and strategic engagement, reflecting both its regional aspirations and global ambitions.
Based on the three standing facets of this pyramid, three categories of dynamism and action have been undertaken. At the base or bottom layer of this pyramid lies a seated strategy that supports the aforementioned actions and reflects a strategy of maximum flexibility from both sides. This means that the more flexibility Iran observes from the opposing party, the more flexibility it will, in turn, demonstrate in consultations and diplomatic interactions with the United States. This signifies a shift from a “less for less” approach to a “more for more” paradigm. It begins with a singular, fundamental issue, for instance, the nuclear program, in exchange for the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions and the removal of obstacles to all Iranian foreign and international economic activities. However, should this initial phase prove successful, it could extend to other concerns of both parties and become subject to negotiation.
Nevertheless, the minimum benefit of this approach is that the core issue, namely the “less for less” strategy, is not sacrificed for other matters. It can conclude at this point or continue and evolve into a comprehensive agreement. The approach is not to commence with a comprehensive agreement and risk losing all issues midway. This, in essence, is the foundation of Iran’s actions or strategy.
The first facet of Iran’s actions is the approach to negotiation with the United States, which Iran has devised as an exchange of written messages. This initiative recently took a structured form during the Muscat talks, marking the commencement of direct written correspondence, given that Iran and the United States have consistently exchanged indirect messages through media outlets and pronouncements on matters of mutual interest. Within this facet, negotiation with the United States encounters three primary considerations: form, content, and basis. Regarding form, consultations will begin with an exchange of messages. However, should Iran secure a favorable concession from the United States, it would likely have no objection to transitioning to a “more for more” framework, transforming these exchanges into face-to-face consultations and direct negotiations.
Concerning content, the majority pertains to the nuclear issue in exchange for the complete lifting of sanctions, commencing with a “less for less” approach and progressing toward other problems and concerns. In this context, the role of Middle Eastern issues in the relationship between Iran and the United States is undeniable. Recognizing that a stable Middle East can sustain Iran-United States relations at a zero-tension or stable level is crucial. Finally, concerning the basis, ambiguities persist regarding the foundation of the negotiations. The origin, standing, and legal basis of the United States for negotiating with Iran are unclear.
Many American citizens have a strong distrust in regard to Iran.
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For instance, as a party to the JCPOA, Europe can negotiate with Iran, entering into give-and-take arrangements whereby Iran might accept commitments beyond the NPT and JCPOA frameworks in exchange for not triggering the snapback mechanism. Here, Europe possesses an international mandate. Similarly, the IAEA, given Iran’s membership in the NPT and its oversight role within the JCPOA, can be Iran’s negotiating partner. However, the United States is neither a member of the JCPOA nor has it been assigned any international role. Even during his first term, after withdrawing from the JCPOA, Trump twice failed to achieve consensus against Iran in the Security Council. Therefore, one of the most critical questions when Iran-United States negotiations enter the details is the legal standing of the United States in these discussions. The answer to this question is significant as it will determine the level, extent, scope, and guarantee of commitments from both sides and the issues to be negotiated. This was one facet of Iran’s actions related to engagement with the United States.
The second facet of Iran’s actions, which is incidentally considered the primary one, pertains to consultation and stakeholder negotiation. In this area, we have not witnessed Iran’s foreign policy cessation in light of the Iran-United States negotiations. This implies that we have not sidelined other issues due to negotiations with the United States; within this hierarchical strategy, Iran has concurrently undertaken numerous activities alongside the talks with the United States.
Iran held trilateral summits with Russia and China in Beijing, which took place in two phases at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers and yielded positive outcomes. Additionally, meetings have been held with European representatives; specifically, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister met with the Deputy High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the European Union in Vienna. Furthermore, cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency is ongoing concurrently, and this process has progressed well. Meetings in Vienna and Mr. Grossi’s previous and recent visits, including the one on Wednesday, indicate Iran’s intention to engage with all stakeholders to leverage their capabilities and constructive roles in resolving its issues with the United States.
The third facet of this strategic pyramid of Iran’s actions specifically relates to cooperation with China and Russia. If Mr. Araghchi, the Foreign Minister, had proceeded to Beijing after his visit to Moscow on the eve of the second round of Muscat talks, it would have sent a positive message to the international community. This would have conveyed that Iran maintains close cooperation with its JCPOA partners to justify its positions, manage this process, and secure guarantees for the United States’ commitments in any potential future understanding, given the mistrust of this country and Trump’s history of reneging on bilateral and multilateral agreements. Due to the Chinese President’s travel, the Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to Beijing has not yet been scheduled. However, a visit to Russia, Iran’s large neighbor, was organized and undertaken. During this visit, where the Foreign Minister conveyed a message from the leader (Khamenei) to Mr. Putin, discussions could have naturally included how Russia would oversee the negotiation process and potential understanding with the United States as a guarantor of US commitments in the future, or any cooperation to counter future scenarios.
Russia is Iran’s large, historical, and influential neighbor on the international stage. Moreover, apart from their particular disposition, they have created problems in Ukraine. Consequently, Russia has been harmed by the war with Ukraine. Iran (by creating an imbalance in its foreign relations) has allowed any country to exploit its weaknesses, which have formed a protective and deterrent shield for Russia through its imbalanced policies to resolve its issues.
Preventing such an occurrence necessitates a return to a balanced foreign policy. We have moved away from the world of the Cold War and security equations and entered a world of interests. Therefore, the two countries have a mutual need for each other. However, Iran is relatively vulnerable in this cooperation. Russia has better leverage to create balance with the United States, Europe, and the Arab states.
The weight of Iran’s imbalanced foreign policy in its inclination towards the East and antagonism towards the United States is no less significant than Iran’s military cooperation with Russia. However, we realistically assess the relations between the two countries. In that case, the ceiling of today’s Iran-Russia relations, due to the characteristics of Iranian society and politics and governance in Iran, cannot exceed bilateral ties. The perception and promotion of a strategic relationship from this connection (separate from the need to discuss the new cooperation agreement that has not yet been ratified and implemented) will even harm traditional and bilateral ties, as both countries have made themselves vulnerable at the national, regional, and international levels and should preferably diversify their foreign interactions through hedging to benefit from diverse international interests rather than relying solely on each other.
In other words, Iran’s powerful presence has prevented the complete hegemony of the United States and its dominance over one of the world’s strategic regions. Even without Iran’s military cooperation with Russia and its impact on the Ukraine war, which may be exaggerated, it necessitates attention to the Western sensitivities regarding Iran-Russia relations. This demonstrates the significant assistance Iran has inherently provided to Russia and its expectation that Russia will reciprocate in regional and international cooperation with Iran.
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Bahram P. Kalviri is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India. His research interests focus on the Middle East, particularly the interplay of international relations and public diplomacy within the region.